The subject and the other : construction of gender and identity in Genesis. by Matskevich, Karalina
The Subject and the Other: 
Construction o f Gender and Identity in Genesis
Karalina Matskevich
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Biblical Studies 
The University of Sheffield
February 2013
LIBRARY
H
SIJLItt
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ
www.bl.uk
PAGINATED BLANK PAGES 
ARE SCANNED AS FOUND 
IN ORIGINAL THESIS
NO INFORMATION IS
MISSING

Abstract
This study examines the construction of gendered and national identities in a 
selection of narratives in the book of Genesis. It distinguishes two processes of 
signification that run alongside each other, namely, the construction of the androcentric 
Subject that starts in the narrative of Genesis 2-3, and the emergence, in the stories of 
the patriarchs, of the ethnocentric Subject of Israel. In both cases, unified subjectivity is 
perceived in relation to and over against the Other, represented respectively as female 
and foreign identity. The study adopts a multidisciplinary approach, using the tools of 
semiotic analysis, narratology and psychoanalysis to uncover the presence and function 
of alterity, suppressed by the dominant discourse. The study highlights the contradiction 
inherent in the project of dominance, through which the Subject seeks to suppress the 
very difference it relies on for its signification. In the garden narrative (Genesis 2-3), 
this contradiction is reflected in Yahweh’s double-edged discourse and in the 
ambiguous role woman and the serpent play in leading hà ’àdâm out of the garden. In 
the larger narrative cycles of Genesis 12-36, the dichotomy of the Self and the Other 
unfolds on more than one level, revealing itself in the Subject’s conflicted attitude to 
Egypt as the seductive and threatening Other (the Abraham cycle) and to Haran as 
‘mother’s land’, a complex metaphor of the feminine (the Jacob cycle). The study 
identifies two conflicting voices or ideologies interacting in the Genesis narrative, the 
institutional and the individual, and demonstrates how the unified institutional discourse 
of the patriarchal Subject is continuously challenged and changed by the individual 
perspective in the narrative, represented by women, foreigners, and younger siblings.
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Introduction
The present study of subjectivity and its gender-related metaphors in Genesis is 
a predominantly synchronic or, borrowing the term of Mieke Bal, ‘text-internal’ 
exercise.1 The gradual construction of the ‘world of the text’ with its intricately 
interrelated elements and its inner system of values leads to the emergence of a complex 
Subject, whose functioning lends itself to structural and psychological analysis. 
Looking at the text as a whole, I aim to examine the effects patriarchal structures have 
on the identity and the psyche of the Subject. By doing so, I do not oppose the socially 
oriented approach of biblical feminism that shows the patriarchal narrative as an 
instrument of sexual politics. However, the social and political functions of the biblical 
text lie outside the scope of this study, informed by the procedures of psycho-linguistic 
and semiotic analysis. Without disputing the ideological conditioning of the text, I shall 
examine the impact the patriarchal claim has on the functioning (and the dysfunction) of 
the narrative mind within the world of the text.
The question that will guide the present study is how the text accommodates and 
accounts for the social and political assumptions built into its texture. To a certain 
extent, the exercise will be deconstructive, allowing the reader to see the patriarchal 
argument deconstruct itself from within, through the semiotic structures of the very 
texts that are seen as ideological documents of patriarchy. I do not suggest that these 
compensatory structures reflect female-oriented or egalitarian concerns of the narrator. 
The biblical narrative is by and large a narrative of patriarchy. David Jobling attributes 
the occasional favourable light shone on femininity in the biblical narrative to ‘the 
patriarchal mindset tying itself in knots trying to account for woman and femaleness in 
a way which both makes sense and supports patriarchal assumptions’.2 Along similar 
lines, Bal speaks about traces of ‘a problematization of man’s priority and domination’
1 Mieke Bal, ‘Sexuality, Sin, And Sorrow: The Emergence of the Female Character’, in Elizabeth Anne 
Castelli and Rosamond C. Rodman (eds.) Women, Gender, Religion: A Reader (New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 2001), p. 154.
2 David Jobling, The Sense o f  Biblical Narrative: Structural Analyses in the Hebrew Bible II (JSOT SS, 
39; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986), p. 43.
that comes from the fundamental insecurity of the patriarchal claim.3 Reflecting a 
distorted view of reality, of the Self and the Other, the unified (male) subjectivity is 
vulnerable and in constant need of reaffirmation by the normative voice of the narrative. 
This vulnerability, this trauma of dominance along with the resilience of the repressed 
presents a considerable interest to this study of subjectivity.
In this study, I have drawn on a variety of approaches that include narratology, 
structuralist analysis, anthropology, literary criticism, and psychoanalysis, and am 
particularly indebted to the work of Mieke Bal, Cheryl Exum, Ellen van Wolde, Mark 
Brett, and Francis Landy.4 For the purposes of space, I shall limit my examination to a 
number of narratives foundational to the construction of the biblical model of gender: 
the garden narrative of Gn 2:4-3:24 (referred to in what follows as Genesis 2-3) and 
selected texts belonging to the narrative cycles of Abraham and Jacob in Gn 11:27-37:1.
Chapter 1 examines how the narrator of Genesis 2-3 constructs gendered 
subjectivity in relation to the human beings’ discovery of the knowledge of good and 
bad. The emergence of the Subject and the Other is analysed both at the level of the 
gendered identities of man and woman, and in the relationship between humanity and 
the earth as its metaphorical counterpart. Particular attention in this chapter is given to 
Yahweh’s ambiguous role in the process that leads the human couple out of the garden.
Chapters 2 looks at the emergence of the ethnocentric Subject in the narrative 
cycle of Abraham. It considers the central concept of the promised land as a metaphor 
of identity as well as a gendered reality in need of appropriation. Particular attention is 
given here to the recurrent pattern of separation, through which the Subject’s identity is 
shaped by excluding what is perceived as different. The stories of Lot and Hagar are 
read in the context of Israel’s conflicted attitude to Egypt as the seductive and 
threatening Other.
3Mieke Bal, Lethal Love: Feminist Literary Readings o f  Biblical Love Stories (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), p. 110; see also J. Cheryl Exum, Fragmented Women: Feminist (Subversions o f  
Biblical Narratives (JSOT SS, 163; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), pp. 9-10.
Bal, Lethal Love\ J. Cheryl Exum, Fragmented Women; ‘Hagar en procès: The Abject in Search of 
Subjectivity’, in Peter S. Hawkins and Lesleygh Cushing Stahlberg (eds.), From the Margins I: Women o f  
the Hebrew Bible and Their Afterlives (Bible in the Modem World; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 
2009); Plotted, Shot, and Painted: Cultural Representations o f  Biblical Women (2d rev. edn; Sheffield: 
Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2012); Ellen van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis o f  Genesis 2-3: A Semiotic Theory 
and Method o f  Analysis Applied to the Story o f  the Garden o f  Eden (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1989); Words 
Become Worlds: Semantic Studies o f  Genesis 1-11 (Biblical Interpretation Series, 6; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1991); Mark G. Brett, Genesis: Procreation and the Politics o f  Identity (London: Routledge, 2000); 
Francis Landy, Paradoxes o f  Paradise: Identity and Difference in the Song o f Songs (Sheffield: Almond 
Press, 1983).
Chapter 3 examines the complex structure of the Jacob cycle. As a starting point, 
it employs the tools of Claude Levi-Strauss’s structural analysis of myth to uncover a 
series of oppositions that underlie the narrative and contribute to its overall 
compositional and thematic symmetry. It then looks at the concept of mother’s land as a 
foundational metaphor that conveys the transforming role of the Other in the formation 
of the patriarch’s identity as Israel. Chapter 3 offers a close reading of the stories of the 
three matriarchs, Rebekah, Rachel, and Leah, and concludes with an examination of 
binary relational structures in the cycle.

Chapter 1
The Subject, Gender, and Knowledge in Genesis 2-3
Defining the Problem
A story of origins dealing with the creation of humankind and the institution of 
gender, the garden narrative in Genesis 2-3 perhaps more than any other biblical text 
has influenced social and religious perceptions of femininity in Western culture. 
Throughout the history of biblical reception, the creation of woman out of man and her 
subsequent disobedience to the will of Yahweh gave rise to many misconceptions, 
providing a particular frame for the interpretation of woman’s position and identity. One
of the most striking examples of such misconceptions is Paul’s statement on the
\
subordination of women in 1 Tim 2:11-14, which to a large extent has shaped the 
traditional exegesis of the narrative.5 Regarded in both Jewish and Christian 
interpretation as derivative in substance and subordinate in status with respect to man, 
the woman of the garden narrative has also been branded as a morally flawed being, 
responsible for the fall of man, the loss of paradise, and for bringing painful toil and 
death into the range of human experience.6
Feminist scholarship has demonstrated different approaches to the construction 
of gender in Genesis 2-3. The first wave of feminist critics with Simone de Beauvoir 
and Kate Millett, while rejecting the Bible’s ideological assumptions, agreed in essence 
with the traditional interpretations of the garden narrative, which for them was designed 
‘in order to blame all this world’s discomfort on the female’.7 Later literary readings
5 See Bal, Lethal Love, pp. 109-12.
6 Phyllis Trible lists eleven most common arguments for misogyny that are based on the narrative of 
Genesis 2-3 in God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), pp. 72-73.
7 Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (London: Granada Publishing, 1969), p. 75. See also Simone de Beauvoir, 
Le deuxième sexe (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1949). Esther Fuchs’ analysis takes the insights of Millet to 
a new level, identifying particular narrative strategies that serve the patriarchal agenda of biblical texts 
(see Esther Fuchs, Sexual Politics in the Biblical Narrative: Reading the Hebrew Bible as a Woman 
(JSOT SS, 310; Sheffield: Academic Press, 2000).
5
refused to take the text as a monolithic document of patriarchy. Phyllis Trible in her 
close literary analysis of Genesis 2-3 has argued that most misogynous ideas associated 
with the garden narrative are more a product of its later interpretation than of the 
biblical text itself.8 Trible claims Genesis 2 presents an egalitarian model of gender, 
which becomes corrupted by dominance and hierarchy only after the ‘fall’, in 
consequence of human disobedience.9 Following Trible, a number of scholars pointed to 
the inner tensions, gaps and inconsistencies of Genesis 2-3, stressing the complexity of 
the story and its unequivocal perspective on gender and hierarchy.10
Resisting the text as irredeemably patriarchal or affirming the positive elements 
in its portrayal of female subjectivity, early feminist interpretations of Genesis 2-3 often 
have not paid sufficient attention to the problematisation of divine authority in its 
relation to human freedom. However, the central transformation of the narrative, the 
transfer of knowledge to the humans, is far from being unequivocal, and lends itself to a 
range of interpretations. How one understands woman’s role depends largely on 
whether one assesses the human ascent to knowledge as primarily an act of 
disobedience and a fall from grace or as a stage in the process of human maturation set 
up by God where gender is a fundamental feature of the evolving Subject.
Traditionally, the second creation account has been read as a story about the 
human ‘fall’ and its consequences, telling how the first human beings, by disobeying 
God, bring disharmony and chaos into the initially perfect universe.11 In the new world 
order, the relationships between the earth, the human and the animal worlds as well as 
between the sexes are affected by dominance, and human existence becomes marred 
with pain, toil, and eventual death. At the centre of these negative and dramatic changes 
stands a human action, performed against God’s explicit order.
What many feminist studies share with this traditional view is seeing Yahweh as 
a monolithic subject -  the creator, lawgiver, and judge of the human beings, who
8 Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, pp. 72-143.
9 Phyllis Bird has argued along similar lines that the sexual equality in Genesis 2 is the ‘prelude to its 
negation in Genesis 3’ (see Phyllis Bird, ‘Genesis 1-3 as a Source for a Contemporary Theology of 
Sexuality’, ExAuditu 3 [1987], p. 39).
10 Bal, Lethal Love, pp. 104-30; van Wolde, Words Become Worlds, pp. 13-31; Brett, Genesis, pp. 29-35; 
Anne Lapidus Lemer, Eternally Eve: Images o f Eve in the Hebrew Bible, Midrash, and Modern Jewish 
Poetry (Waltham MA: Brandeis University Press, 2007); Reuven Kimelman, ‘The Seduction of Eve and 
the Exegetical Politics of Gender’, in Bibint 4 (1996), pp. 1-39.
11 Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11 (trans. John J. Scullion; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1984), p. 193; 
see also Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15 (Dallas TX: Word Books, 1994), p. 90. Hermann Gunkel 
understands the narrative as an aetiology that first describes the ‘golden age’ of humanity and then gives 
an answer to the basic question ‘why are we not there?’ (Hermann Gunkel, Genesis [trans. Mark E. 
Biddle; Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1997], p. 33).
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epitomises the patriarchal values of power and dominance. In relation to such a God, 
woman plays a counter, rebellious role, transgressing his command and bringing about 
man’s fall from grace. But is Yahweh himself free from ambiguity? After all, the very 
fact of disobedience undermines and destabilises his absolute authority, exposes the 
weakness of his rigid hierarchical position. In looking at the construction of gender in 
Genesis 2-3 it is crucial to decode and demystify the character of God, subjecting him, 
as Danna Nolan Fewell and David Gunn emphasise, to the same kind of critical scrutiny 
as all the other characters.12
Turning one’s attention to Yahweh reveals the inconsistency of his behaviour 
and poses a range of questions. Why should Yahweh, the creator who in 1:31 was 
entirely satisfied with the exceeding goodness of all that he had made, set out issuing 
prohibitions and punishing his creatures for disobedience? If Yahweh wants to protect 
ha’adam from death, why does he plant the tree of knowledge, associated with death, in 
full view of the human being? Since all the trees in the garden are functional in 
satisfying the needs of ha’adam (‘every tree pleasant to the sight and good to eat’, 2:9), 
what is the function of the only tree the fruit of which is not to be eaten? The tree of 
knowledge represents the symbolic boundaries of the garden, points to its finality, and 
yet, remarkably, Yahweh places it, spatially, in the centre of the garden, and,
t
symbolically, at the centre of his discourse. Does Yahweh have any purpose for it other 
than to lead the humans out of the garden? And does the garden itself have any purpose 
other than to produce this tree and, with it, create the possibility for the human beings to 
choose and to act?
Various scholars have observed the ambiguity of God’s actions in Genesis 2-3. 
Looking from different perspectives, James Barr and Terje Stordalen both suggest that 
God has ulterior motives in prohibiting knowledge. For Barr, both eternal life and 
knowledge are exclusively divine attributes, and the texts of 2:17 and 3:22 show 
Yahweh’s reluctance to share those attributes with his creatures.13 Stordalen, on the 
other hand, places the divine-human confrontation within the context of a spatial 
opposition inside and outside, the garden and the land. For him, the overall programme 
of Genesis 2-3, to provide a human being to till the land, contradicts Yahweh’s primary 
concern as a private landowner to have ha’adam ‘to keep and till the garden’. In this
12 Danna Nolan Fewell and David M. Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise: The Subject o f  the Bible’s 
First Story (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1993), p. 19.
13 James Barr, The Garden o f  Eden and the Hope o f  Immortality (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 
14.
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view, God forbids the knowledge of good and bad because it can show the humans the 
way out of the garden.14 In both cases, the function of Yahweh’s order is seen as 
preventative.
In his recent detailed study of Genesis 2-3, Tryggve Mettinger draws attention to 
the crucial role that Yahweh plays in the human transgression. Mettinger defines the 
subject of the Eden narrative as ‘the divine test of obedience to the commandment’.15 In 
his view, by forbidding the tree of knowledge God provokes the human beings, or tests 
them in a similar way as he does in 22:1-19 and Job 1-2. In so doing, he aims ultimately 
to assert his authority. Similarly, Walter Brueggemann understands Yahweh’s 
prohibition as an exercise of authority.16 Seeing the prohibition as provocative raises in 
its turn the question of the ambiguity of Yahweh as a moral subject. Norman Whybray 
pays particular attention to the lack of consistency and moral integrity in Yahweh’s 
actions in the garden narrative, putting it alongside a number of biblical texts, including 
18:22-33, Job 1-2, Ex 32:7-14 and Nm 11,14:11-25.17
" All the above approaches share their emphasis on Yahweh’s motivation. The 
way one interprets the main transformations of the narrative - the institution of gender, 
the acquisition of knowledge, and the expulsion from paradise - depends on how one 
understands Yahweh’s intentions; in other words, whether by prohibiting knowledge he
i
seeks to protect the humans or to provoke their disobedience. But, perhaps, these 
possibilities do not have to be mutually exclusive. Could Yahweh’s subjectivity be 
composed of contradictory strands, making his intentions more complex than what 
either model appears to suggest? If this suggestion were valid, the story’s underlying 
tension would shift from the conflict between the human and the divine to the tension 
between Yahweh’s own conflicting perspectives. Uncovering this tension by means of 
narrative and structural analysis might lead to a different understanding of the garden 
narrative and of the way it constructs subjectivity and gender.
14 Teije Stordalen, ‘Man, Soil, Garden: Basic Plot in Genesis 2-3 Reconsidered’, JSOT 53 (1992), pp. 3- 
25. See also Edward L. Greenstein, ‘God’s Golem: The Creation of Humanity in Genesis 2 ’, in Henning 
Graf Reventlow and Yair Hoffman (eds.), Creation in Jewish and Christian Tradition (London: 
Continuum, 2002), pp. 219-39.
Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, The Eden Narrative: A Literary and Religio-historical Study o f  Genesis 2-3 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2007), p. 64.
16 ‘What counts is the fact of the prohibition, the authority of the one who speaks and the unqualified 
expectation of obedience’ (Walter Brueggemann, Genesis [Interpretation; Atlanta GA: John Knox Press, 
1982], p. 46).
7 R. Norman Whybray, ‘The Immorality of God: Reflections on Some Passages in Genesis, Exodus and 
Numbers’, JSOT 72 (1996), pp. 89-120.
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The Overture: To Eat or Not to Eat
The narrative starts with a description of the earth, lifeless and uncultivated, 
with no rain to water it and no human to till it (2:5). This situation of lack defines a need 
that guides Yahweh’s first creative action: in 2:7 he forms a human, ’adam, from the 
dust of the earth, ’“damah. With a breath of life from Yahweh, ha’adam becomes hay 
nepes, a living being. At this stage, ha ’adam is a generic term referring, in the words of 
Mieke Bal, to an earth-creature with ‘no name, no sex, and no activity’.18
The use of the Hebrew word ha’adam requires clarification. It has been widely 
recognised that hd’adam is non-gendered term that is used collectively for ‘humanity’ 
and individually for ‘human being’.19 Brett maintains that the generic term ’adam is 
made specific by the use of the definite article (‘the human’) and as such can refer to a 
particular man.20 As a narrative subject, ha’adam remains ungendered until the creation 
of woman in 2:22. Susan Lanser has criticised this view from the perspective of speech- 
act theory. For her, the grammatically masculine form of ha ’adam defines the way the 
reader perceives the character as male by inference.21 Lanser’s argument is made from a
reader-centred perspective that incorporates inferred meanings in the process of
I
signification. Though this approach is justified, it lies outside the text-centred structural 
method adopted in this study. In what follows I shall therefore adopt the view of Trible
18 See Bal, Lethal Love, p. 112.
19 See Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, pp. 80, 97-98; Carol Meyers, Discovering Eve: Ancient 
Israelite Women in Context. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 81-82; Robert Alter (trans. 
and com.), Genesis (New York: Norton, 1996), p. 5. James Barr’s argument that haadam  is essentially a 
male term that can only include women collectively when they appear together with men has been 
convincingly opposed by David J. A. Clines (see James Barr, ‘One Man, or All Humanity? A Question in 
the Anthropology of Genesis 1’, in Athalya Brenner and Jan Willem van Henten (eds.), Recycling 
Biblical Figures: Papers Read at a NOSTER Colloquium in Amsterdam 12-13 May 1997 (Studies in 
Theology and Religion, 1; Leiderdorp: Deo Publishing, 1999), pp. 3-21; David J. A. Clines, ‘□"7N, the 
Hebrew for “Human, Humanity”: A Response to James Barr’, VT 53 (2003), pp. 297-310; see also 
Johannes C. de Moor, ‘The First Human Being a Male? A Response to Professor Barr’, in Brenner and 
Henten (eds.), Recycling Biblical Figures, pp. 22-27).
20 Brett, Genesis, p. 149 n. 19.
21 Susan S. Lanser, ‘(Feminist) Criticism in the Garden: Inferring Genesis 2-3’, in Hugh C. White (ed.), 
Speech Act Theory and Biblical Criticism (Semeia, 41; Decatur, GA: Scholars Press, 1988), p. 72. A 
similar argument has been advanced by Barr, Jobling, and Ronald A. Simkins, who see the phrase 
h a ’adam we ‘isto in 2:25; 3:8,21 as a proof that ha'adam is semantically equivalent to ‘man’ and therefore 
is used as a gendered term from the start (see Barr, ‘One Man, or All Humanity?’, pp. 11-12; Jobling, The 
Sense o f  Biblical Narrative, p. 41; Ronald A. Simkins, ‘Gender Construction in the Yahwist Creation 
Myth’, in Athalya Brenner (ed.), Genesis: A Feminist Companion to the Bible [Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1998], p. 40 n. 30). For a counterargument, see Clines, ‘D7X, the Hebrew for “Human, 
Humanity”, pp. 302-4.
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and Bal, refraining from the use of masculine pronouns to refer to ha ’adam before the 
creation of gender.
Next, Yahweh plants a garden in Eden, and there he places the new human 
creature (2:8). So far it would appear that the garden is planted for the sake of ha’adam, 
and is subsequently filled with trees to satisfy human needs (‘all trees pleasant to the 
sight and good to eat’, 2:9). In return, ha’adam receives the task ‘to till ( ‘abad) and 
keep the garden’ (2:15). The verb ‘abad, which usually means ‘to serve’, places the 
human on a lower structural plane in relation to the garden. The use of ‘abad reminds 
the reader about the initial need (‘there was no human to till the earth’, v. 5), and 
suggests its partial fulfilment. In fact, the garden represents an ideal situation, where all 
the initially lacking elements have been supplied. The garden is watered by the river 
that flows out of Eden (2:10), and now it has a human to till it. Consequently, in 
contrast to the barren earth of v. 5 (‘no shrub..., no plant...’), the garden is now filled 
with vegetation (cf. ‘every tree’, v. 9). The state of the earth outside the garden is not 
specified; moreover, it is not clear whether there is an ‘outside’ at all since the 
boundaries of the garden will not be established until the end of the narrative (3:23-24). 
However, in serving and keeping the garden, ha ’adam clearly falls short of reaching a
direct relationship withtthe earth. The programme ‘ ’adam to serve damah’ remains
\
unfulfilled, leaving a background tension for all that is going to happen in the narrative.
The description of the plentiful and harmonious existence in the garden is 
disrupted with Yahweh’s discourse. In 2:16-17 Yahweh addresses ha’adam for the first 
time, allowing the human to eat from any tree of the garden, except the tree of 
knowledge. His speech is composed of four verbal clauses based on just two verbs: ’kl, 
‘to eat’, and mwt, ‘to die’. Together, they form a sequence that ultimately links the idea 
of eating with the possibility (or certainty) of death:
’akol to ’kel, ‘you shall certainly eat’
lo ’ to ’kal, ‘you shall not eat’
*kafka, ‘you eat’
mot tamut, ‘you shall certainly die’
In this sequence, the expressions ’akol to 'kel and mot tamut stand out due to 
their grammatical uniformity (the infinitive construct plus the imperfect), as well as 
their parallel syntactic position at the end of a clause. Being compositionally parallel,
2:16
2:17
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they appear to form an antithesis, which contrasts eating to dying. This antithesis could 
be presented as an incomplete semiotic square:
Fig. 1
you shall certainly eat (A)
sanction i
any tree j
I
I
t
you eat (Ài)
violation
tree of knowledge
(Ai) you shall not eat
prohibition
y  tree of knowledge
(À) you shall certainly die
punishment 
no tree
............opposition
-----------contradiction
--------- ^  implication
In the logic of Yahweh’s speech, a sanction (A) is followed by a prohibition or 
non-sanction (Ai), which is in its turn followed by its hypothetical violation (Ai) and 
the punishment (A). Though the command appears straightforward, its semiotic 
structure is contradictory, consisting of a series of semantically opposing statements. To 
begin with, Yahweh’s second proposition ‘you shall not eat’ (Aj) opposes and to a point 
negates the indiscriminate and unconditional sanction ‘you shall certainly eat’ (A) that 
refers to all the trees in the garden. Then, in its turn, the prohibition Ai is negated by its 
violation ‘you eat’ (Ai). The logic of this double reversal brings the narrative back to its 
starting point. As a result, the transgression Aj not only echoes the sanction A but also 
appears to be structurally implied by it (the dashed vertical line). A similar relation of 
implication exists between the respective objects of the action, i.e. the ‘tree of 
knowledge’ and ‘all the trees of the garden’. In this way, eating of the forbidden tree is 
structurally implied in Yahweh’s initial dietary sanction. While the positive sanction 
(eating of any tree) introduces a wider range of possibilities in the relations between the 
human being and the garden, the prohibition to eat of the tree of knowledge emphasises 
one specific course of action within that range, narrowing focus to a particular tree. The 
forbidden action becomes the only possible action.
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The semiotic analysis uncovers the ambiguity at the basis of Yahweh’s 
commandment. The contradiction between the direct meaning of his speech and the 
meaning implied by its semiotic structures creates a tension that will from now on 
dominate the narrative (in 3:1 the serpent will exploit this tension, asking woman what 
it was that God really said). While, at one level, Yahweh imposes a taboo on the tree of 
knowledge apparently with the view to protect human life, at another level, he intends 
the earth-creature to experience knowledge and death, and provides it with the tree as a 
means to achieve that goal. While the motives behind this double-edged discourse are 
not yet clear, its immediate impact is the loss of simplicity in the relationship between 
the creator and the earth-creature.
It is at this point that Yahweh decides that ha’adam is not self-sufficient and 
needs a partner.
Yahweh and the Institution of Gender (2:18-22) 
ha’adam in Need of a Helper
In 2:18 Yahweh says that ‘it is not good that ha’adam should be alone’, and 
decides to ‘make for him a helper matching him’. This statement shows no apparent 
links with the preceding text of 2:16-17. I would suggest, however, that the context of 
the prohibition directly influences Yahweh’s assessment of ha’adam in v. 18. In order 
to understand the logic behind this apparent digression, it is necessary to look closely at 
the formulation of v. 18.
Here Yahweh describes the lonely state of the earth-creature as ‘not good’. This 
is the first time a negative judgment appears in the narrative, in stark contrast to the 
absolute goodness of creation in the first creation account. In Genesis 1, Yahweh sees 
the universe and its constituents as tob, ‘good’, that is, complete and fit for its purpose 
(1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31). In contrast, the state of the earth-creature in 2:18 is Id - 
tob.22 What is it that makes human aloneness ‘not good’ in Yahweh’s eyes? Here one
22 It should be noted, however, that 'adam in Genesis 1 is never directly described as tob. In Gn 1:25 God 
approves of the land animals made on the sixth day, but does not do the same for humans, and his general 
appreciation of ‘everything that he had made’ in Gn 1:31 does not quite compensate for the omission. It is 
difficult to determine whether humanity, created in the image and likeness of God and appointed to 
subdue the earth and rule over its creatures, stands here above all judgment, or whether this detail 
anticipates the human being as lo ’-tob in Genesis 2. Whatever the answer may be at this stage, the
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should avoid reading into the text God’s underlying concern for human social needs. 
Yahweh’s words do not convey the point of view of the human being, for he is speaking 
to himself, without consulting or addressing ha’adam. Since Yahweh does not say that 
being alone is not good for the human, it would appear that ha’adam’s state of being 
alone in itself contradicts Yahweh’s overall design. So what exactly is it that makes the 
earth-creature Id ’-fob?
It must be noted that the Hebrew term Fbad does not necessarily stand for 
loneliness. As Anne Lemer observes, most of the 158 occurrences of the term in the 
Hebrew Bible stress singularity rather than loneliness.23 Edward Greenstein, followed 
by Lemer, looks at the use of the term in a number of other contexts.24 In Ex 18:17-18 
Jethro says that it is ‘not good’ for Moses to be the sole judge over the Israelites, since 
the task is too heavy and he cannot do it by himself (Is bad). Jethro then recommends 
that Moses appoints officials to help him, ‘leaders of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties 
and of tens’ (Ex 18:21). Similarly, in Num 11:14 and Deut 1:9, 12 Moses says that he 
cannot carry the burden of his people’s problems by himself i f  bad), and asks the 
Israelites to choose tribe leaders. In all these cases the term fbad  is used in relation to a 
task or function one cannot perform by oneself, without help. It is arguable that Yahweh 
in 2:18 is also assessing ha’adam with regard to a particular task, and concludes that the 
latter cannot manage it alone. In this case, the following solution -  creating a helper for 
the human creature -  would carry the pragmatic connotation of sharing its task, and not 
of alleviating its loneliness.
The phrase ‘ezer kfnegdd is often translated as ‘helper, suitable for him’ (2:18).25 
The term kenegdd, a prepositional form of neged, ‘in front of, in sight o f, 
communicates the idea of facing and, therefore, opposing the subject.26 As such, it 
anticipates the creation of gender in 2:21-22 that shall ‘split’ ha’adam into two. As Bal 
remarks, the use of kenegdd offers a deep insight into the nature of sexuality, which, 
being a form of binary relationship, is shaped by the ‘tension between the same and the 
different’ (italics M.B.). In order to create this tension the earth-creature needs to be 
faced with a part of itself, which explains why the animals later in the narrative will not
narrator’s reluctance to present hâ'âdâm as tôb in Genesis 1:26-28 is semiotically consistent with 
Yahweh’s assessment in Gn 2:18.
23 Lemer, Eternally Eve, p. 67.
24 Greenstein, ‘God’s Golem’, p. 237; Lemer, Eternally Eve, p. 67.
25 So in NIV, NIB, NAU (cf. the RSV’s ‘helper fit for him’). Trible criticises this common translation for 
its sexist implications and suggests instead ‘a companion corresponding to it’ (Trible, God and the 
Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, pp. 89-90). Bal takes the same view in Lethal Love, p. 115.
26 BDB, p. 617; DCH V, pp. 603-604.
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be accepted as suitable helpers (2:19-20).27 In 2:18, the term kenegdô introduces binarity 
as a characteristic opposite to Iebad-  the singular state of the earth-creature that has just 
been considered ‘not good’. By implication, one might perceive the new, binary state 
intended for hà’âdàm as ‘good’, or as that which, in the eyes of Yahweh, fits the 
purpose of the human existence in the garden.
The use of the word ‘ëzer, ‘help, helper’, in 2:18 is more problematic. In the 
Hebrew Bible this term often has the connotation of help received in mortal danger, of 
action that delivers from death.28 Taking this meaning further, van Wolde sees ‘ëzer as a 
prerequisite for life.29 In most cases, the term signifies divine assistance, or serves as a 
direct metaphor for God as saviour.30 However, in 2:18 none of these connotations of 
‘ëzer is obvious, neither is its literal meaning of ‘help’. Indeed, what kind of help does 
hâ’âdâm need at this stage in the narrative? Yahweh puts the human into the garden ‘to 
till it and to keep it’ (2:15), but since Yahweh has already filled the garden with trees 
and arranged their irrigation, this task seems to be taking care of itself.31 The following 
narrative does not offer much clarification. Woman, who will assume the role of helper, 
will not be given the task of looking after the garden, and neither will she share 
hâ’âdâm's lot of toiling on the earth in 3:17-19. It would therefore appear that the term 
‘ëzer is not related to woman’s role within the world order that emerges at the end of 
Genesis 3.32 Clines, on the other hand, convincingly argues that the nature of woman’s 
help will only become clear in 3:16, where she will be assigned the role of bearing 
children.33 At this stage, however, this task is not announced. Is this really what 
Yahweh has in mind? The difficulty with the interpretation of ‘ëzer has led some
^  See Bal, Lethal Love, p. 115.
See the analysis by Jean-Louis Ska, ‘“Je vais lui faire un allié qui soit son homologue” (Gen 2,18): A 
propos du terme ‘ezer -  “aide”’, Biblica 65 (1984), pp. 233-38.
van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis, p. 177.
Cf. Ex 18:4; Dt 33:7, 26, 29; Ps 33:20; 115:9-11; 121:2; 124:8; 146:5. Wenham, Genesis 1-15, p. 68, 
also mentions the three prophetic passages where the term is used of military aid (Is 30:5; Ez 12:14; Hos 
13:9).
Here I disagree with Greenstein who contends that hâ adâm himself is created as a helper to maintain 
and till the garden fo r  Yahweh (see Greenstein, ‘God’s Golem’, pp. 232-35). On this subject, see also 
Stordalen, ‘Man, Soil, Garden’, pp. 3-25.
Unless, of course, one understands the term in its most general sense as mutual assistance. Thus, 
following F. Delitzsh, Westermann says: ‘The man is created by God in such a way that he needs the help 
of a partner; hence mutual help is an essential part of human existence’ (Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 
227). However, this broad interpretation locates a referential point outside the story, in the world of the 
reader’s general experience, and is not supported by the narrative itself.
Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help? and Other Readerly Questions to the Old Testament (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), pp. 27-40.
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interpreters to suppress it altogether, using in their translations the word ‘companion’ 
instead of ‘helper’.34
In my opinion, the semantic connotation of help is crucial, because it holds an 
important clue to the understanding of Yahweh’s motives as well as the overall logic of 
the narrative. While woman is not portrayed as ha’adam’s helper in the distribution of 
roles in 3:16-19, she undoubtedly assists him at another level. For the only time when 
woman takes the initiative and acts, eating of the forbidden tree in 3:6, is also the time 
when she helps her husband to do the same: ‘she ate, and she gave also to her husband 
with her, and he ate’. This moment stands at the centre of the plot, with the sequence 
‘ate-gave-ate’ as its main transformation. From the perspective of the overall plot, 
woman’s structural role is to make sure that both she and ha ’adam eat of the tree of 
knowledge. Could this be the help that Yahweh speaks about in 2:18? 35 If this is so, 
Yahweh’s internal monologue should reveal his real intention, namely, that his 
prohibition should be broken. In this case, the interpretation should turn its focus to the 
contradictory character of Yahweh’s communication.
Notably, the two successive speeches of Yahweh in 2:16-17 and 2:18 are very 
different in character. In the first speech, addressed to ha’adam, Yahweh builds his 
discourse on,an antithesis, issuing a sanction ‘to eat’ together with a prohibition ‘not to 
eat’. As I have already indicated, the interplay between the sanction and the prohibition 
results in ambiguity, producing an unspoken, subliminal inversion of the explicit 
command. The mode of communication between Yahweh and ha’adam suggests 
multiple meanings, and is characterised, in the words of van Wolde, by ‘the semantic 
openness or the possibility for change’.36 But being semantically open, it is also 
semantically selective, drawing attention to one particular meaning, and is, therefore, 
highly provocative.
In 2:18, the tone of Yahweh’s communication changes. Crucially, here he 
speaks not to ha’adam, but to himself about ha’adam, hiding his reasoning from the 
human (cf. the change in pronominal suffixes referring to ha’adam from the second 
person in w . 16-17 to the third person in v. 18). Although Yahweh does not refer to the
34 Trible and Bal both opt for the translation ‘companion’, albeit for opposite reasons. Trible rejects the 
word ‘help’, since for her it presupposes superiority of ha ’adam over the new creature, and therefore goes 
against the idea of equality implied by Ifnegdo (Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, pp. 88-90). 
Bal, on her part, suggests that the translation ‘help’ trivialises the meaning of Hebrew ‘ezer, which is 
associated with divine assistance (Bal, Lethal Love, p. 115).
35 To preserve this interpretative possibility, it seems important to translate ‘ezer as ‘help’ or ‘helper’ 
rather than ‘companion’ or ‘partner’.
36 van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis, p 137.
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prohibition that he has just issued, his speech is inevitably placed in its context. It looks 
as if, having just established the parameters of human existence with the knowledge of 
good and evil as its inverted, repressed goal, Yahweh draws back and takes a look at the 
earth-creature, as if to assess its aptitude for knowledge and for decoding the divine 
double-talk. The result is disappointing: hâ’âdâm in his singular state is lô ’-tôb, i.e. 
‘insufficient’ or ‘inadequate’, and therefore, in need of assistance. Therefore, it would 
appear that from the start hâ’âdâm is distanced from Yahweh’s inner perspective, and 
not allowed to understand the full meaning of his orders. By assessing the ungendered 
being as lô’-tôb, Yahweh puts it in a context of suspicion. On the other hand, the figure 
of ‘helper’ from the onset is endowed with a constructive role in Yahweh’s overall 
design. The new creature should be more than a companion, a perfect counterpart for 
hâ adâm, its purpose is to give knowledge to the human being. The inner contradiction 
of this role is that, despite its crucial importance, ‘ëzer exists for the sake of hâ ’âdâm 
and not for its own, is functional rather than ontological. Ignorant of Yahweh’s real 
intentions, hâ’âdâm is still at the centre of Yahweh’s concerns.
The Making of the Animals and Woman
\
The process of finding a helper takes two stages! To begin with, Yahweh creates 
out of the earth ‘every animal of the field and every bird of the sky’ (2:19) and brings 
them to the human being to be named. The animals, however, do not match Yahweh’s 
image of ‘ezer kenegdd, for they are not complementary to the human (2:20). For the 
first time Yahweh appears to have failed to create what he intended.37 This unusual 
instance of trial and error in Yahweh’s otherwise purposeful activity poses a problem 
that could be addressed at two levels.
On the one hand, as Wenham points out, the creation of the animals as part of 
Yahweh’s search for a helper heightens the narrative suspense.38 As a result, when 
woman finally appears, she is perceived as the culmination in the process of creation, its 
final stage that completes the world of Genesis 2. On the other hand, in creating the 
animals, Yahweh has a specific agenda. Despite their apparent inaptitude to be proper
37 Umberto Cassuto points out the contrast between this failure and the rest o f Yahweh’s successful acts 
of creation (Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book o f Genesis 1: From Adam to Noah (trans. Israel 
Abrahams; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1961), p. 128.
38 Wenham, Genesis 1-15, p. 68.
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companions for ha ’adam, they will be indirectly linked to the function of ‘ezer in the 
following episode. In 3:1-7 the serpent, the wisest of all the animals, persuades woman 
to eat from the forbidden tree. By helping woman -  the ‘helper’ of ha’adam -  the 
serpent plays a crucial role in the human attainment of knowledge. The compositional 
choice of placing the creation of the animals alongside that of woman and relating them 
both to the notion of help endows them with a shared function that will lead in the end 
to a shared punishment (3:15). Towards the end of the garden narrative, this association 
will be linguistically reinforced through the wordplay between woman’s name ‘Eve’, 
hawwah, and the word for ‘animal,’ hayyah, both of which stem from the same verb ‘to 
live’.39 ;
When Yahweh finally comes to creating woman, he uses as his material not the 
earth, but the earth-creature. Having put it to sleep, he removes one of its ribs and 
shapes it into a woman. The narrator seems to emphasise the unconscious state of the 
human, using two different terms to describe it: tardemah, ‘deep sleep’, and yasen, ‘to 
sleep’ (2:21). Trible has argued that Yahweh does it to ‘anaesthetise’ ha’adam before 
the subsequent surgical procedure.40 However, it seems more plausible that the deep 
sleep is meant to prevent cognition, or conscious witnessing on the part of the human.41 
A similar usage is found in 1 Sam 26:12. The narrative here describes how no one 
notices -  sees or knows -  when David removes a spear and a jug of water from beside 
the sleeping Saul, ‘because they were all asleep {yasen), for a deep sleep (tardemah) 
from Yahweh had fallen on them’. Here Yahweh intends to make Saul’s companions 
unaware of what has happened. If this is also the case in 2:21, and ha’adam is put to 
sleep to be kept from witnessing the forthcoming inner separation, what is Yahweh 
seeking to achieve by that? Is Yahweh intentionally concealing from ha ’adam the origin 
of woman and her essential, organic unity with the original earth-creature? From the 
jubilant speech in 2:23 one could assume the opposite, since here man seems perfectly 
aware of where woman has come from. In that case, what is it that is missed during the 
unconscious state of ha add ml
Following Bal, one could understand the deep sleep of the human being as a 
marker of discontinuity in the permanence of the Subject, as the death of the old,
39 Wenham in Genesis 1-15, p. 68 observes the parallel, but uses it to emphasise the fact o f the 
inadequacy of the animals, who despite their name cannot become partners for the human being.
40 Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 95.
41 Westermann here quotes J. G. Herder, A. Dillmann, and J. G. Thomson, who relate the sleep of 
ha'adam to the philosophical idea that ‘the man ought not to be a witness of the work of creation’ 
(Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 230).
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singular, non-gendered creature and the birth of the new, differentiated ha ’addm.A1 This 
interpretation is structurally valid, yet it needs to be qualified. Crucially, it does not take 
into account the way ha ’adam is constructed after the event. For the narrator seems to 
insist on the continuity of the character, calling the new, differentiated creature the same 
name, ha ’adam. This would be consistent with the character’s self-perception: having 
missed the process of internal separation, the human creature should continue to 
perceive itself as the same being, essentially unchanged. On the other hand, the 
narrative does not mention hd’adam's transition back to consciousness. With no waking 
up moment, there is a slight uncertainty as to whether the entire scene of 2:21-24 might 
not be seen as one continuous dream of ha’dddm that is never consciously 
acknowledged. At a semiotic level, the deep sleep of ha ’adam marks the beginning of a 
story of a deeply ambivalent Subject, which is simultaneously permanent and 
discontinued, transformed and left unchanged by the creation of gender.
Yahweh makes woman from ’ahat missal’otaw, traditionally translated as ‘one 
of his ribs’ (2:21). This translation proved to be particularly attractive from the 
perspective of human anatomy, because a rib, being one of many, might be considered 
an expendable body part. Beginning with Paul and the rabbis of late antiquity, Jewish 
and Christian interpreters used this narrative feature to justify the patriarchal view on
\ . , A'*
gender, presenting woman as ‘derivative in substance and second in sequence’. In 
recent decades this view, however, has been challenged.42 34 While it has become 
normative to translate §ela‘ as ‘rib’ in modem Hebrew, in the Hebrew Bible this 
meaning is not well attested. In fact, the scene of the creation of woman appears to 
provide the only example of such a usage, while, in all of the thirty-eight occurrences of 
?ela‘ outside 2:21-22, it denotes ‘side’ or ‘side room’ and is used in the descriptions of 
sacred architecture. To read ?ela‘ as ‘side’ would also be consistent with the LXX 
translation of 2:21 (pleuron, or ‘side’) as well as with some early rabbinic 
interpretations.45 Heinz-Josef Fabry argues that, given its semantic singularity in the 
biblical text, the reading of ?ela as ‘rib’ in 2:21-22 is unlikely to be correct.46
The term ‘side’ seems particularly appropriate to describe the institution of 
gender because of its connotation of duality. This connotation is certainly present 
whenever ?ela‘ is mentioned as part of sacred buildings. The tabernacle (Ex 25:12, 14;
42 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 115.
43 Lemer, Eternally Eve, p. 40.
44 Heinz-Josef Fabry, ‘tsela‘\  TDOTXll, pp. 400-5.
AS Genesis Rabbah 8:1.
46 Fabry, Usela", TDOTXII, pp. 400-5.
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26:20, 26, 27, 35; 37:3, 5), the temple of Solomon (1 Kgs 6:5, 8, 15, 16, 34), and the 
temple in Ezekiel’s vision (Ez 41:5-9, 11, 26) are all constructed symmetrically, with 
the emphasis on their opposite sides, fn e  f  ld'im. The associated verb s a l a ‘to limp’, 
also has a semantic link to symmetry, albeit in its opposite form, as an upset balance 
between the two sides. Given this dual connotation of sela‘, the expression ’ahat 
missal‘dt_dw in 2:21 could be taken to mean ‘one of his (two) sides
And so, instead of woman’s subordinate status, the concept of sela ‘ might point 
to the basic binarity, and therefore, to the equality of sexual differentiation.47 Reuven 
Kimelman advocates a non-sexist reading of the scene, stressing that ‘male and female 
are coeval in the primordial earthling’ as its two sides.48 Made from one side, or one 
half, of ha’adam, woman stands in structural opposition to the remaining, other side, 
becomes kenegdd, ‘as opposite to him’ and thus fulfils Yahweh’s purpose (2:18). 
However, the symmetry between the two is only a conjecture that should not be 
overstated. Here the use of the term ’ehad, ‘one’, is notable. Outside 2:21, 
whenever ’ehad is used in conjunction with sela\ it is always followed by sent, 
‘second’ or ‘other’, which indicates a clear opposition ‘one side : the other side’ (cf. Ex 
26:26-27; 37:3). However, in this case the other side is not named. This could be seen as 
the beginning of a structural discrepancy in the narrator’s treatment of gender: out of the 
two presumably equal parts, only one undergoes separation and is acknowledged as a 
part, while the other retains the appearance of a whole. Yahweh’s action of separating 
one side of the human being is therefore iconic, the first in the long sequence of 
transactions that will construct woman as a bearer of difference, and man as the bearer 
of unity.
Next, Yahweh offers a different treatment to each of the sides of ha’adam. In 
order to substitute for the missing side, Yahweh adds bdsar, ‘flesh’, to what is left of the 
human being.49 Yahweh’s gesture has important semiotic repercussions for the 
construction of the Subject. First, as the substance that replaces the ‘woman’ side of 
ha ’adam, flesh is structurally dissociated from female reality. It alludes to the idea not 
of maleness, but of being-without-female, of a residual entity defined by the absence of 
one side. At another level, basdr in 2:21 serves to imitate wholeness. By replacing the
47 This supports the idea of ‘anthropology of equality’ that Bird applies to the image of male -  female 
creation in Gn 1:27 (Phyllis Bird, “‘Male and Female He Created Them”: Gen 1:27b in the Context of the 
Priestly Account of Creation’, HTR 74 [ 1981 ], p. 151).
48 Kimelman, ‘The Seduction of Eve’, pp. 14-15.
49 The term basar appears here for the first time, one of the four occurrences found in the narrative o f the 
creation of woman (Gn 2:21, 23, 23, 24). Before Gn 6:3, the term is used exclusively in the context of 
sexual differentiation.
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missing side of ha’adam with flesh, Yahweh ‘patches’ him up, preserving an 
appearance of the former, ungendered being. But who is the viewer, for whom this 
appearance of continuity is intended? Neither Yahweh, who knows the old ha’adam, 
nor woman, who does not know what existed before her, need the original being to be 
‘mended’. The only character for whom this apparent wholeness is meaningful is 
ha’adam, who is, on his awakening, to make sense of his new self. For him, 
permanence of appearance implies permanence of being. It lays ground for a claim of 
precedence: being on the inside only a half of his former self, the new being perceives 
his appearance as that of the same, old ha ’adam.
In contrast to this apparently unchanged, unified identity, the removed side of 
ha’adam is further changed, ‘fashioned’ or ‘built’ into woman. The action o f ‘building’ 
in v. 22 structurally opposes that of ‘replacing’ in v. 21, inasmuch as it creates a new, 
different identity instead of imitating the old one. Thus the physical construction of 
woman’s body and the semiotic construction of her subjectivity both imply her 
difference from ha adam. While the concept of man has not yet emerged, the concept of 
woman is already established, both for Yahweh and for the reader.
\i
‘And He Brought Her to ha’adam ’
Having created woman, Yahweh brings her back to ha’adam (2:22). This brief 
statement carries powerful repercussions for the power dynamics of the account, not 
only by what it says but also by what it holds back. The phrase wayebi ’eha ‘el-ha ’adam, 
forms a clear parallel with 2:19b, where God, having formed the animals from the earth, 
brings them to ha’adam (wayyabe’ ’el-ha’adarri) ‘to see what he would call them’. 
Notably, in the case of the animals, Yahweh has a clearly stated purpose (to see what 
they are named), while there is no such purpose mentioned for woman. This leads 
Trible to conclude that woman ‘does not fit the pattern of dominion’ that characterises 
the relationships of the earth-creature to the animals, as well as to the earth and the 
plants.50 Yet the distinction here is not so clear-cut. In itself, the fact of woman being 
brought to ha ’adam entails the latter’s semiotic superiority. Like the animals before her, 
woman is subjected to the human being as a reality in need of interpretation. What is
50 Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 97.
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different now is that ha’adam names woman of his own accord and not following 
Yahweh’s wish.
What is it then that Yahweh is seeking to achieve by bringing woman back to 
ha’adaml In 2:19 Yahweh showed the animals to the human being in order to see, 
lir’dt, what the latter would call them, which implies that until then they had not been 
properly differentiated, or named. Having given the human being the freedom to name 
his (Yahweh’s) creatures, Yahweh himself becomes an observer who follows the events 
in order to find out their outcome. The naming of the animals clearly has an objective 
impact on the newly created world; in a way, it continues the process of its 
differentiation and structuring (‘and whatever the man called a living creature, that was 
its name’). Woman, however, has been fully differentiated from the onset, and came on 
stage bearing her generic name (‘and Yahweh God built the side... into a woman 
[’issah]\ 2:22). The naming speech of hd’ddam (‘she shall be called ’issah, 2:23) will 
not impart any new qualities to woman or communicate anything new about her to 
Yahweh or the reader. From a semiotic point of view, woman will remain untouched 
and unaltered by meeting her counterpart. On the one hand, she is totally objectified by 
Yahweh and ha’addm; on the other hand, as an object she resists change, is immutable, 
while her mere presence effects a deep transformation on ha’ddam. Presumably, this is 
what Yahweh meant all along. By bringing woman back to man, he does not need to see 
what she would be called, neither does he expect anything to be done to her. Instead, 
Yahweh allows hd’ddam to see ’issah and to work out his own identity as a function of 
hers. If there is, therefore, any new identity emerging from the naming speech of 2:23- 
24, it should be that of man and not of woman.
To summarise, in 2:22 as elsewhere in the garden narrative, Yahweh’s attitude is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, by bringing woman to haadam, he hands over to man the 
power to recognise and to interpret female reality. This initial attribution of speech to 
man is emblematic of the Hebrew narrative, where the reader is constantly invited to 
share the male perspective on the female Other. On the other hand, Yahweh offers no 
comment or endorsement to the naming speech (cf. 2:19b). In fact, he does not even 
linger around to see whether or not woman is recognised as the needed helper, he goes 
off stage until after the transgression (3:8). Yahweh’s silence makes the naming speech 
of 2:23-24 an expression of hd’ddam's own, subjective view. As for Yahweh, his task is 
completed: having created woman and brought her to ha’addm, Yahweh has set up all 
the conditions necessary for what he intends to happen.
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ha’adam and the Interpretation o f  Gender (2:23-24)
The Emergence of Man
At the heart of ha’adam's interpretation of gender lies the naming phrase: ‘she 
shall be called woman ( ’issah) for out of man ( ’is) she was taken’ (2:23). According to 
ha’adam, woman derives her particular name and identity from man. The generic 
similarity between the two is expressed linguistically through the assonance of ’is 
and ’issah. However, the use of the gendered term ’is in this aetiology is problematic. 
Until this moment, there has been no mention of ’is in the narrative, and yet ha ’adam 
refers to ‘man’ as an existing, familiar reality that mediates for him the new reality of 
woman. In the same aetiological formula he points to the identity of ’is: by saying ‘out 
of ’is she was taken’, haadam clearly refers to 2:22, where Yahweh fashioned into 
woman ‘the side that he has taken from hd’adam'. The two parallel actions of ‘taking 
from’ fuse together ’is and ha adam and put both of them at the origin of woman. In 
making woman derive from ’is, the Subject formulates his own structural ambiguity: he 
keeps the name of the ungendered earth-creature, yet formally identifies himself as 
male. As Lemer observes, ‘the real naming that occurs here is the adam's naming 
himself ish, man’.51 Bal offers a psychoanalytical explanation of the confused identity 
of ha’adam, who for her ‘idealises his earlier version from his actual state’. Having no 
memories of his ungendered existence, man here imagines that he has always been a 
sexual being. Bal ironically calls this character ‘ha’adam the Second’, implying that the 
original name ‘is definitely lost to its previous meaning’.52 Bal’s reading, however, 
seems to undermine the ambiguity that is central to the semiotic construction of 
hd’adam.
It is possible, as Bal points out, to understand the words ‘taken from’ in the 
sense of separation.53 Bal stresses that this interpretation of the origin of the sexes is 
consistent with the model of creation in Genesis 1, where God creates by separating 
different substances from each other (the light from the darkness, the waters below from
51 Lemer, Eternally Eve, p. 133.
52 Bal, Lethal Love, pp. 116-17.
53 ‘Out of ha adam Yahweh made ’issd and ’is by separating the one from the other’ (Bal, Lethal Love, p. 
117).
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the waters above, dry land from sea).54 That woman is taken from or out of man could 
therefore refer to the inner differentiation of ha ’adam, the separation between his two 
sides that leads to the emergence of gender. However, one should not overstate the 
similarities between the processes of creation in Genesis 1 and 2. In Genesis 1, the 
separation between the cosmic elements does not impose any hierarchy of value or 
status. Here the order of the elements could be reversed: the separation of the light from 
the darkness implies the separation of the darkness from the light. On the contrary, the 
separation of woman from man in 2:23 could not be reversed, since it has an 
asymmetric connotation of provenance, ha’adam draws the sexual and linguistic 
identity of ’issah from ’is, sees her as his derivative, and not the other way around. The 
concept of male subjectivity, introduced by the earth-creature that has already lost its 
female component, comes on stage endowed with a higher semiotic position. And yet, 
paradoxically, it depends on the already existing female identity. If there is anything 
that defines the male subject at this stage, it is his claim of precedence over the being 
that was created first.
From One's JFlesh to *One Flesh ’
\
In establishing the sexual identities of woman and man, the speech of ha ’adam 
in 2:23-24 stresses the unity of the two gendered beings. It starts with a declaration of 
the common nature of man and woman (‘this is, this time, bone of my bones and flesh 
of my flesh’) and concludes with an achievement of their final union (‘they become one 
flesh’). Biblical scholars have often read this text within the social and theological 
context of kinship, covenant, and marriage.55 Westermann sees in it a declaration of 
‘personal community of man and woman’, Trible, a rare statement of gender equality.56 
A similar view on the text is presented in an extensive article by N. P. Bratsiotis in
54 van Wolde in particular stresses the idea of separation as central to the process of creation in Genesis 1. 
In her linguistic and textual analysis of the usage o f the verb bara' in the first creation account, she 
concludes that the verb denotes the action of separation and not of creation, as commonly believed (van 
Wolde, ‘Why the Verb tna Does Not Mean “to Create” in Genesis l.l-2 .4a’, JSO T34 [2009], pp. 3-23).
55 Thus, Gerhard von Rad describes the woman in Genesis 2 as a bride (Genesis: A Commentary [trans. 
John H. Marks; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961], p. 84); Wenham sees Gn 2:24 as a reference to 
marriage as a kinship relation (Wenham, Genesis 1-15, p. 71). See also Cassuto, Genesis I, pp. 136-37; 
Nahum M. Sama, The JPS Commentary: Genesis. The Traditional Hebrew Text with the New JPS 
Translation (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1989), p. 23.
56 Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 232; Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 99.
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TDOT, in which he relates 2:23-24 to God’s institution of marriage as an equal 
partnership between man and woman.57 58
More recently, this understanding has met with objections from a number of
co
feminist scholars. Meyers, in particular, has opposed the idea of reading social 
institutions into the literary and archetypal setting of the garden story. Interpreting 2:23- 
24 from the perspective of love and marriage seems to lead away from the text’s central 
process of establishing narrative identities. Moreover, one could hardly effectively 
apply the idea of partnership and equality to a text that does not include woman’s view. 
The speech conveys ha 'adam's perspective on woman and his interpretation of unity. 
His vision of gender is therefore essentially biased. I suggest that this bias is consistent 
with the structurally ambiguous identity of haadam and might be seen as its 
expression. In other words, to understand better what is being said, one should look at 
who is speaking.
So who exactly is naming woman in 2:23-24? The word ha ’addrn here should be 
denoting a different kind of creature, since in 2:21-22 the original hd’adam has lost one 
side. In its place, the incomplete, lacking body of the human being receives a different 
substance, ‘flesh’, which preserves the appearance of former totality. The semiotic 
implications of this procedure come to the fore when ha adam attempts to make sense 
of female reality. Remarkably, the prevailing notion in his speech is that of flesh. The 
term basar, used three times in the space of two verses, seems to encapsulate the 
Subject’s attitude towards the gendered Other, marking the starting point of sexual 
differentiation (‘flesh of my flesh’) as well as its outcome (‘one flesh’). Seen as 
ha ’adam's preferred metaphor, basar can have several connotations.
In its most literal sense, the term basar signifies flesh as animal and/or human 
musculature, body as a whole, and, by extension, all living things, and emphasises the 
physical, bodily aspect of living creatures.59 In 2:22-23, this first layer of meaning 
points to the physical nature of woman’s unity with man, both in her physical derivation 
from him, and in the consummation of their union implied by the phrase, ‘they become 
one flesh’.60
57 N. P. Bratsiotis, 'ish, ishah', TDOTl, pp. 222-35.
58 See Meyers, Discovering Eve, p. 110; Bird, ‘“Male and Female He Created Them’” , p. 155; Lemer, 
Eternally Eve, pp. 60-61.
59 D C H II, p. 277; BDB, p. 142.
60 Brett reads the idea of being ‘one flesh’ as the celebration of an intimacy (Brett, Genesis, p. 31). See 
alsoN. P. Bratsiotis, 'ish, ishah', TDOT I, pp. 227-28.
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At another level, used as part of the kinship formula ‘x is y’s flesh’, the term 
describes a relationship between brothers and, by extension, between any blood- 
relatives (cf. 29:14; 37:27; Lv 18:6; 25:49; Jg 9:2; 2 Sam 5:1; 19:12, 13; 1 Ch 11:1).61 62
ha’adam's speech, according to Bal, holds this precise connotation, stressing the 
common origin of man and woman as the son and daughter of ha’adam, and their 
ensuing equality as siblings.
Overlying these general interpretations of the term ‘flesh’ is the particular 
perspective of hd’ddam in 2:22-23. Coming from the male subject whose body is 
partially made of flesh (2:21), the emphasis on basar communicates more than mere 
physicality. On the one hand, the ‘flesh’, which emerged not as a thing in itself but as a 
replacement and a compensation for what later becomes woman, is a continuous 
reminder of the missing side and, as such, connotes lack, desire and longing. This 
longing for the lost wholeness moves man to ‘cling’ to his wife, so that the two become 
‘one flesh’. On the other hand, flesh also points to the act of concealment, of hiding 
physical signs of lack, by which Yahweh imitates the totality and therefore, the 
permanence of ha’adam. The notion of flesh in the speech is therefore loaded with 
double symbolism. It alludes to a range of contradictory motives that form the basis of 
male subjectivity in the narrative: it speaks simultaneously of longing and its denial, of 
an experience of separation and a claim of totality. By calling woman ‘flesh of his 
flesh’, hd’ddam commits a structural error, since basar as a signifier is exclusive to the 
semiotic construction of a male body. The unity of flesh is therefore a unity on man’s 
terms, basar ‘ehad being a supposedly ‘common’ denominator, but that in which 
woman has no signifier of her own. Semiotically, the Subject’s vision of wholeness is 
achieved by subsuming, that is, annihilating, woman as the Other. Consequently, the 
formula ‘two become one’ communicates an idea of the unity based on suppression of 
the heterogenous. Man in this picture carries all the unity, and woman, all the 
difference.
Elsewhere in Genesis, the expression ‘x is y’s flesh’ displays similar ambiguity. 
In 29:14 Jacob’s uncle Laban welcomes his nephew in Haran, saying ‘you are my bone 
and my flesh’. Here Laban refers to the ties of kinship that unite the two men, but his 
subsequent exploitative attitude towards Jacob gives his words a double edge, turning 
them into a statement of bondage: ‘you are my flesh’ = ‘you are mine’. This position of
61 D C H II, p. 277 gives ‘relative’ as one of the meanings of basar. Cf. BDB, p. 142.
62 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 116. See also Trible, God and the Retoric o f Sexuality, p. 99; Walter Brueggemann, 
‘Of the Same Flesh and Bone (Gen. 2, 23a)’, CBQ 32 (1970), pp. 532-42.
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Laban becomes particularly clear in the parting scene, when Laban attributes to himself 
Jacob’s family and possessions, saying, ‘the daughters are my daughters, and the 
children are my children, and the flocks are my flocks, and all that you see is mine’ 
(31:43). The words ‘you are my flesh’ in this context acquire a connotation of 
dominance, of encroachment on the identity of the Other.
An example of a similar usage is found in the story of Joseph. In 37:27 Judah 
persuades his brothers not to kill Joseph but to sell him instead to the Ishmaelites, 
arguing that he is their brother, their own flesh. Here too, the phrase ‘he is our flesh’ 
expresses a deeply ambiguous stance of Judah: by alluding to the ties of kinship, he 
apparently seeks to save his brother’s life, yet at the same time, he symbolically 
eliminates Joseph, removes him from the stage by selling him into slavery to a foreign 
land. Judah’s entire argument about the humane disposal of Joseph has a connotation of 
personal gain (‘what profit is it if we kill our brother’, 37:26). Joseph is not annihilated; 
rather, his identity is taken up, subsumed by his brothers in the form of its symbolic 
equivalent - twenty pieces of silver. For Judah, as well as for Laban, the unity of flesh is 
underscored by a claim of totality, achieved by taking over the Other.
To conclude, the concept of flesh appears to be central both to the semiotic
construction of a male body (2:21-22) and to the formation of the point of view of the
\
male subject (2:23-24). As Lois Bueler remarks, along similar lines, ‘she is created out 
of his body so that he may simultaneously enjoy both identity with and primacy over 
her, for she makes possible the distinct, male, progenitive, dominant human figure 
Adam becomes’.63 64In this sense, the creation and naming of woman lays the ground for 
what will become a prevalent vision of gender in the biblical narrative.
How does this perspective of the male subject fit in with the overall plot, and in 
particular, with Yahweh’s design? By bringing woman to ha’adam, Yahweh invites 
man to recognise and assess her as his Other and thus to answer the question whether or 
not she constitutes ‘ezer kenegdd, a ‘helper matching him’. As van Wolde rightly 
observes, man pays no attention to the ezer aspect of woman -  which is not surprising, 
for Yahweh has not told him about it -  yet he seems to recognise her other aspect, that 
of matching or corresponding, kenegdd.M He takes the idea of correspondence too far, 
however, seeing the new creature not so much as his partner, but rather as part of 
himself. As a result, his stance is to subsume and dominate woman’s subjectivity. 
Ironically, he himself seems to disappear in the process, his own subjectivity exhausted
63 Lois E. Bueler, The Tested Woman Plot (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), p. 17.
64 van Wolde, Words Become Worlds, p. 19.
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by his striving towards appropriation, since from the moment woman is created, he has 
no preoccupations other that ‘clinging to his wife’. One could see this pattern of 
appropriation as part of Yahweh’s ruse. In order that his double play could work, man 
should regard woman as ‘flesh of his flesh’. Only in that case will woman’s action at the 
critical moment be repeated by man without thinking (‘and she ate, and she also gave to 
her husband with her, and he ate’, 3:6). The woman’s role here is deeply dichotomous: 
it is central to the main transformation of the narrative, yet peripheral to the Subject and 
so has to be undermined. The perfect partner (or the perfect part?) of ha’adam, woman 
is also a perfect instrument for Yahweh. The naming speech of ha’adam in 2:23-24 
therefore implies Yahweh’s success: he has now found the helper needed for the drama 
of the human acquisition of knowledge to unfold.
The Human Beings and Knowledge (2:25-3:6)
The Subversion of Yahweh’s Voice
Following the naming of woman, the narrative describes the new couple as 
‘naked (" rummim) and not ashamed’ (2:25). This detail stresses their state of unity. 
Being naked, the human beings are exposed to each other’s sight, yet they are not 
conscious of their exposure, that is, they cannot see their differences imposed by gender 
and therefore do not feel shame. By implication, their personal or gender boundaries do 
not yet exist. For ha ’adam, this is consistent with his understanding of woman as his 
own flesh; for woman, who has yet no voice of her own, this merely reflects his vision.
At this point, the serpent comes on stage, described as the wisest of the animals 
(3:1). The word ‘arum, ‘shrewd, wise’ plays directly on ‘arom, ‘naked’, suggesting a 
link between the couple’s yet unrecognised distinctions, exposed by nakedness, and the 
role the serpent is going to play in their transformation. Notably, the serpent is the 
wisest ‘of all the animals of the field (mikkol hayyat hassadeh) which Yahweh God had 
made’. The text here makes a clear allusion to ‘all the animals of the field’, kol hayyat 
hassadeh, created in 2:19. Being the wisest of all of them, the serpent serves as their 
collective representation, an animal par excellence. And since Yahweh conceives of the 
animals as potential ‘helpers’ for ha ’adam, the serpent too is structurally linked to the 
idea of ‘help’ and to the figure of the actual ‘helper’ -  woman. Therefore it seems fitting
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that the serpent should address woman searching for the meaning of God’s prohibition, 
leaving ha ’adam out of the picture.
In 3:1 the serpent asks woman to interpret what God really said, but its question 
is loaded, for it already contains an apparently false answer.65 Suddenly, it becomes 
possible to understand otherwise, and the ambiguity of God’s communication is brought 
to the fore. In her reply, woman reformulates the official version of Yahweh’s order, 
which is then, once again, contradicted by the serpent.66
Fig-2
2:16-17 3:1-5
a. you may certainly eat a1, you shall not eat
of all trees of any tree
b. you shall not eat ^ --------> b'. we may eat
of the fruit of the trees
c. you eat x c'. you may not ea t...
\ lest you die
d. you shall certainly die — d'. you shall certainly not
die
e'. for God knows
that on the day you eat from it 
your eyes will be opened, 
and you will be like gods, 
knowing good and bad
serpent’s interpretation (direct reversal) 
— woman’s interpretation (correspondence) 
compositional reversal of action
65 Speiser points out that the serpent’s opening remark is better read as a false statement than as a 
question (E.A. Speiser, Genesis [Anchor Bible, 1; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964], p. 23).
66 Although woman’s account is essentially faithful to Yahweh’s words in 2:16-17, it deviates from them 
in details (see the discussion below).
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By putting the two verbal sequences next to each other one can observe an 
interesting compositional arrangement. The serpent’s words frame woman’s 
interpretation with a direct reversal of Yahweh’s explicit meaning (a-a' and d-d1). 
Although woman’s account in itself corresponds to Yahweh’s speech (a-b1 and b-c1), 
the serpent’s initial address (a1) shifts her sequence by one position, so that woman’s 
words compositionally come to contradict the words of Yahweh (b-b1 and c-c'). In this 
way, the composition of the narrative presupposes a shift in woman’s position from 
conforming to Yahweh’s authoritative voice to opposing it, and highlights the serpent’s 
role in effecting this change. The last statement of the serpent, e stands by itself, 
concluding the dialogue. It presents an alternative interpretation of Yahweh’s motives 
that challenges not only the meaning but also the very validity of his law.
Due to its subversive interpretation of Yahweh’s command and the 
consequences it has for the humans, the serpent has traditionally been blamed for 
humanity’s fall, being seen as a tempter of humanity, an evil force that corrupts the 
relation between the humans and their creator. It is in this capacity of the ‘deceiver’ who 
acts against God’s will that both the New Testament and the rabbinical writings 
associate the serpent with Satan. Westermann has opposed this inference on theological 
grounds, stating that in the Yahwist’s view, the serpent could not oppose God’s will, 
being itself one of God’s creatures.671 suggest that the same applies on textual grounds. 
Until now, the narrative has presented Yahweh’s role as purposeful in every detail. 
Even when his motives are not revealed, they can be inferred, constmcted from his 
internal monologue and his actions and appear to follow a certain logic. By stressing 
Yahweh as the creator of the serpent in the verse where the serpent questions Yahweh’s 
words, the text suggests that this questioning is somehow related to Yahweh’s purpose. 
Moreover, since the same verse says that Yahweh has created the serpent as wise, it 
seems that an exercise of this wisdom -  the serpent’s subversion of Yahweh’s words -  
might be exactly what Yahweh expects from it.
A psychological and symbolic analysis by Francis Landy attaches to the 
character of the serpent a connotation of rebellion, of the power of chaos that 
overthrows the established order. For him, the role of the serpent is ‘to introduce the 
plurality of meaning, the intrinsic ambiguity, and hence deceptiveness of the world’.68 
Such a reading, however, should be qualified. While the subversive character of the 
serpent is hardly disputable, it is not the serpent who introduces ambiguity or
67 Westermann, Genesis 1-11, pp. 322-27; similarly Cassuto, Genesis I, p. 142.
68 Landy, Paradoxes o f  Paradise, p. 232.
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deceptiveness into the story. Rather, by virtue of being wise it sees beyond the 
established order and perceives its underlying ambiguity and plurality of meaning. The 
serpent not only distinguishes between the opposite meanings, but reverses Yahweh’s 
pattern of repression, uncovering the meaning that has been hidden. What it tells woman 
is therefore not a lie but a secret: ‘You shall certainly not die! For God knows that on 
the day you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing 
good and bad’ (3:4-5).
The following narrative will prove most of these predictions to be accurate. 
First, the humans do not die on the day they eat of the tree. Although the concept of 
death is formulated in 3:19 as part of Yahweh’s punishment, ha’adam will live to see 
his numerous descendants and will die at the ripe old age of nine hundred and thirty 
(5:5). In her turn, woman’s death will never be mentioned. Second, the eyes of woman 
and man indeed are opened as they see each other’s nakedness (3:7). Third, in 3:22 
Yahweh admits that, having eaten of the forbidden tree, ha’adam became like him (lit. 
‘like one of us, knowing good and bad’). But if the serpent is right about the 
consequences of disobedience, then it must have been Yahweh who misguided the 
human by his death warning in 2:17. The logic of the narrative upholds the subversive
interpretation of the serpent and renders problematic Yahweh’s authoritative command.
\
The serpent ceases to be a disruptive and scheming enemy; instead, it seems to be rising 
out of the deeper layers of the narrative, invested with a superior knowledge of its 
moving forces. Knowing what God knows and revealing it to the humans, the serpent 
brings to the surface the other, repressed side of Yahweh, which arguably constitutes his 
real agenda. Similarly, for Landy, the serpent ‘symbolises a side of God (the tempter; 
good-and-evil) he refuses to recognize’.69 In this, the serpent functions as Yahweh’s 
Shadow.
It would, however, be a mistake to consider Yahweh’s repression as something 
unconscious. The deity is in control of the serpent -  his own creature -  having made it 
the wisest of all the other helpers and therefore fit for his purpose. The serpent’s 
rebellion against God -  a fruitful motif in the history of reception -  could be seen as a 
premeditated part of Yahweh’s ploy and an expression of his inner dichotomy. 
Dissociating from his Shadow, he simultaneously puts it to his service. In her insightful 
analysis, Bal has given a semiotic ground to the serpent’s subversive unity with 
Yahweh. In relation to the central action of the myth, the deity, the serpent, and the tree
69 Landy, Paradoxes o f  Paradise, p. 238.
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share the actantial position of the destinateur. ‘the tree as a source of temptation, the 
serpent as the actual tempter, and God as the prohibitor of the action’.70 Despite their 
opposite points of view and the contrast in their narrative status, the deity and the 
serpent are structurally related by their collaboration. With respect to the transformation 
-  the passing on of knowledge to the humans -  one cannot function without the other.
Woman and the Tree
As a character, woman stands at the centre of most of the contradictions of the 
narrative. She is united with ha’adam as well as distanced from him, is part of the 
Subject as well as the Other. She is created to be the ‘ezer, ‘helper’, of ha’ddam, but her 
‘help’ leads to his expulsion from Eden. The narrative makes her responsible for 
bringing death into human existence, yet at the end of it she receives the name hawwah, 
‘life’. In the context of Yahweh’s law, her actions are impulsive and irresponsible, while 
from the perspective of knowledge they appear purposeful and consistent. This 
ambiguity of woman’s position comes from her semiotic association with knowledge.
Although she plays a central role in Yahweh’s hidden plan to give knowledge to the
I
humans, like the plan itself, she is never openly acknowledged. From this perspective, 
the disavowal of woman and its patriarchal implications stem from Yahweh’s apparent 
repression of knowledge.
But what about woman’s own point of view? Created in the ‘shadow’ of the 
forbidden tree, does she know about the role she has to play? Though the text does not 
record any communication between her and Yahweh, in 3:2-3 she gives the serpent her 
account of Yahweh’s commandment. Clearly, woman knows about the forbidden tree 
and its link to death. However, her version of 2:16-17 is slightly different. She 
exaggerates the strictness of the taboo, saying that God has forbidden not only to eat but 
also to touch the fruit of the tree. More crucially, she identifies the forbidden tree not as 
the tree of the knowledge of good and bad but as ‘the tree in the middle of the garden’. 
In this, she contradicts 2:9, which placed in the middle of the garden the tree of life, and 
the tree of knowledge alongside it. Which of the two trees is woman talking about? Is it 
possible that she would subsequently eat of the tree of life, the real ‘tree in the middle’?
70 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 124.
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The narrative remains remarkably vague on this point. In fact, despite its focus 
on the acquisition of knowledge, Genesis 3 never explicitly names the tree of the 
knowledge of good and bad. Its identity is always inferred from the context, presented 
differently by different characters: ‘any tree of the garden’ (serpent, v. 1), ‘the tree in 
the middle of the garden’ (woman, v. 3), ‘the tree from which I commanded you not to 
eat’ (Yahweh, w . 11, 17), or simply ‘the tree’ (narrator, v. 6). The different angle each 
character has on the forbidden tree points to its underlying instability as a semiotic 
object. Each description simultaneously emphasises the tree as a sign and leads away 
from it as a concrete reality. The serpent ironically speaks of ‘any tree in the garden’, 
which questions the positive relation of any particular tree to God’s prohibition. 
Yahweh, on the contrary, emphasises one particular tree, yet avoids calling it by name, 
defining it by the taboo he imposed on it (3:11, 17). Woman, in her speech, constructs 
the forbidden tree as something she might have heard of but has never experienced. She 
thinks it brings death, but this knowledge is clearly not first hand. She locates it in the 
middle of the garden, but she must have never come close to it, otherwise she would 
have seen the other tree growing there (cf. 2:9). How does she recognise the forbidden 
tree, or else how does it happen to be right in front of her when the dialogue is over? 
What is it that gives concrete reality to this shifting object which is simultaneously a 
non-tree and all the trees, which brings death as well as imparts God’s knowledge of 
good and bad, and which might even be confused with the tree of life?
It seems that in the midst of all these varied and contradictory descriptions, the 
tree in question only becomes the tree of the knowledge of good and bad when woman 
experiences it as such. The instability of verbal communication causes her to move to 
direct experience, and her experience invests the unstable object with concrete and 
positive meaning: in 3:6a she looks at the tree and sees that it is ‘good for food, delight 
to the eyes, and desirable to make one understand’.
Woman looks at the tree because looking, as opposed to eating or touching, is 
not forbidden. At another level, looking is emphasised because it serves to activate the 
mechanism of desire that drives the central transformation. From the onset of the garden 
narrative, looking has been linked with desire. In 2:9 Yahweh plants the trees that are 
‘attractive to look at (nehmadfmar’eh) and good for food’. The appearance of the trees 
is meant to arouse desire (the root hmd means ‘to desire, delight in’), to entice one to eat 
of their fruit. However, ha ’adam, for whose benefit the trees are planted, is only related 
to the alimentary aspect of the trees (cf. 2:16-17). The visual aspect of reality seems to
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be lost on him, and so in 3:6b, he eats of the forbidden tree without looking, and, 
apparently, without thinking. The forbidden tree arouses in him no desire, and he eats of 
it, as he will confess in 3:12, only because it has been offered to him by woman, whom 
God gave him and whom he regards as ‘flesh of his flesh’ and an extension of himself.
From this angle, woman provides a missing link, a connection between the 
Subject, incapable of vision and desire, and therefore, of reflection and choice, and the 
value object. She looks at the tree and sees it as desirable. One might note that the order 
in which woman perceives different characteristics of the tree reverses that of 2:9. 
There, the narrator constructed looking as a precondition of eating. By contrast, for 
woman in 3:6, the food aspect of the tree is its first and most apparent feature that leads 
to the delights of seeing and knowing. The tree is not only ‘good for food’ (tob 
Fma^kal), it is also ‘a desire to the eyes (ta^vah laenayini)', and ‘desirable to make 
one wise (nehmad Fhaskil)' (2:6). It is interesting that the language of desire is not 
applied to the alimentary properties of the tree: woman sees it as tob f  ma *kal and not 
nehmad fma ’akal. She feels no desire to eat, but will eat in order to see and to know.71 
Looking/seeing and knowing/understanding are therefore emphasised as the ultimate 
motives for woman’s action. It is notable that the same structural pattern ‘eating —*■
seeing —► knowing’ could be found in the serpent’s vision of events (3:5) as well as in
i
the description of the actual transformation in 3:6b-7:
Fig. 3
3 :5
eating
when you eat o f it
seeing knowing
your eyes shall be opened you will be like gods,
knowing  good and bad
3:6a good for fo o d delight to the eyes desirable to make one 
wise
3:6b-7 she a te . . .and he ate the eyes o f  both o f them they knew  that they were
were opened naked
71 Kimelman stresses this anticipated gain from eating, which makes the tree first appeal to the palate and 
then to the eye (‘The Seduction of Eve’, p.8).
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Now that she has seen the tree for herself, whose point of view does woman 
come to share? Apparently, her vision of the tree disproves Yahweh’s warning, for 
nothing in what she has seen points to death. Instead, she sees that the tree gives 
understanding. The verb sakal, ‘to be wise, understand’ echoes both the serpent’s own 
wisdom ( ‘arom) and its allusion to God’s knowledge of good and bad iyada'), all of 
which seems to indicate that the serpent was right. Yet the use of the hiphil form of 
sakal ‘to make one wise’ also points to woman’s uncertainty and her own search for 
meaning. In 3:6 she faces the discord between the authoritative voice of Yahweh and 
the subversive voice of the serpent and tries to make sense of the fragmented, 
contradictory world in front of her. Doing so, she invests ‘the tree’, a semiotically 
unstable object, with a new function and thus completes its construction. Arguably, her 
desire for understanding turns the tree she is looking at into the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil.
The act of seeing in 3:6 stands out as the only instance of direct sensory 
experience in the garden narrative. Here the narrator uses zero-focalisation, inviting the 
reader to look at the tree with woman. Unlike what she has heard -  words with their 
double meaning -  what she sees resists doubt and equivocality. Bal speaks of the strong 
connotation of truth that characterises the Hebrew verb ‘to see’: ‘to see is to have
i
insight into what really is, behind false appearances or incomplete information’. In 
woman’s eyes, and, therefore, in truth, the value of the tree is unquestionable, for it 
offers sustenance, beauty, and understanding (the verb sakal could also connote success 
and prosperity). This positive evaluation both anticipates and justifies woman’s next 
move.
Compared to the gradual build up of suspense around the taboo object, the 
culmination of the narrative is brief: ‘she took of the fruit of the tree and ate, and gave 
also to her husband with her, and he ate’ (3:6b). Walsh has demonstrated how the metre 
and the sonic composition of v. 6 emphasise the final word wayyd ’kal, ‘and he ate’ and 
makes it the centre of the entire narrative structure.72 3 Thus, despite woman’s leading 
role, it is the male subject’s breaking of the prohibition that is presented as the climax of 
all the semiotic transactions of Genesis 2-3. In the verbal sequence ‘she ate... she 
gave... and he ate’, woman’s action of giving the fruit to man stands between the two 
symmetrical instances of eating and shows woman’s primary role as a mediator. And 
this mediation is the last thing she does. Never again will the narrator focalise on her
72 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 122.
73 Jerome Walsh, ‘Genesis 2:4b-3:24: A Synchronic Approach’, JBL 96 (1977), p. 166.
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experience or even allow her to act independently. Created to be a helper suitable to 
ha ’adam, she has now fulfilled her task.
It is notable that man reappears on stage as emphatically linked to woman (‘her 
husband with her’). For Cassuto, this use of pronominal constructions stresses woman’s 
leading role in the action.74 Lemer draws attention to the similar wording in 3:16, where 
woman is punished by desire for ‘her husband’, and interprets this linguistic link as an 
indication of a bond between woman and man.75 There is yet another way to look at the 
expression ‘with her’, since it might signify that man has been with woman all along, as 
her extension, and therefore must have heard her conversation with the serpent. The 
implications that man’s likely awareness of the preceding dialogue might have for his 
motives are, however, hidden from view. The same narrative strategy that makes 
woman a conscious subject, responsible for breaking Yahweh’s law, denies man the 
possibility of making a conscious choice and with it, to take responsibility for his 
actions, shifting the blame onto woman.
‘They Knew That They Were Naked’ (3:7)
\I
\
Once woman and man had eaten of the tree, ‘the eyes of both of them were 
opened and they knew that they were naked’ (3:7). In the context of the serpent’s 
ambitious promise (‘you shall become like God, knowing good and bad’), this newly 
acquired knowledge appears thoroughly inadequate. Scholars have often pointed out the 
contrast between the significant expectation attached to the forbidden tree and the 
questionable benefit that it brings to the humans. Cassuto describes the knowledge of 
nakedness as a bitter disappointment, a ‘wretched and grieving realisation’.76 Similarly, 
Lemer holds that the knowledge of nakedness ‘can hardly be what woman had imagined 
as divine knowledge when she took that risk’.77 Trible interprets the knowledge of 
nakedness as the opposite to what the serpent promised to woman. In her opinion, what 
the humans acquire through their disobedience is, ironically, not the divine knowledge, 
but the knowledge of ‘their helplessness, insecurity, and defencelessness’.78 The
74 Cassuto, Genesis I, pp. 147-48.
75 Lemer, Eternally Eve, pp. 95,112,198 n. 52.
76 Cassuto, Genesis I, p. 148.
77 Lemer, Eternally Eve, p. 105-6.
78 T rible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 114; see also Edwin M. Good, Irony in the Old Testament 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965), p. 84.
35
humans, led by a desire to become godlike, become instead deficient and vulnerable, 
feeling ashamed of each other (3:7; cf. 2:25) and afraid of Yahweh (3:10). The irony of 
this transformation reflects the general scepticism towards knowledge that characterises 
the leading plot. However, in this instance as elsewhere in the garden narrative, a 
different reading is possible.
One should remark, to begin with, that the consequences of transgression in 
Genesis 2-3 are not clearly defined. We have already observed how the narrative 
destabilises any attempt to identify the forbidden tree. The definition of its properties is 
similarly unstable. In fact, almost every character (except ha ’adam) has a different idea 
of what the tree does to the one who eats from it. According to Yahweh’s authoritative 
voice, eating of the tree of knowledge brings death to ha’adam (2:17), the idea with 
which woman initially agrees (3:3). The serpent contradicts both woman and Yahweh 
(‘you will certainly not die’), and offers an alternative view (‘you shall become like 
God’, 3:5). This is followed by the narrator’s description of the actual event (3:7) and 
Yahweh’s assessment of what has happened (3:22). The last three statements in w . 5,7, 
and 22, display significant parallels:
Fig. 4
i
serpent (v. 5) la  your eyes will be opened 1 b and you will be 
like God
1 c knowing good 
and bad
narrator (v. 7) la  the eyes o f both of them 
were opened
- 2c and they knew 
that they were naked
Yahweh (v. 22) — 3b the man has become 
like one o f  us
3c knowing good 
and bad
The serpent’s prediction in la  is confirmed by the narrator’s report in 2a, which 
states, ‘the eyes of both of them were opened’ (v. 7). The rest of the serpent’s speech is 
strikingly similar to that of Yahweh in v. 22. Speaking respectively before and after the 
transgression, the serpent and Yahweh agree that it makes the humans become like God, 
‘knowing good and bad’ (161c -  363c). Under the double weight of this assessment, the 
discovery of nakedness in 2c becomes less ironic. The implications of the parallels 
between w . 5, 7, and 22 are twofold. They suggest, first, that through the discovery of
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nakedness the human beings have come to know good and bad, and second, that by 
virtue of knowing good and bad they have indeed become like God. There is no clear 
confirmation of this in the text, and so 2b  remains an ellipse that the reader can fill in on 
the basis of the existing parallels.
Two Kinds o f Knowledge
With regard to the first suggestion, how could one explain the analogy drawn 
between the knowledge of nakedness and the knowledge of good and bad? The 
connection is not obvious, since the idea of physical exposure could not be easily 
translated into the terms of moral discernment indicated by the phrase ‘good and bad’. I 
would argue that the two notions are united by their semiotic structure; namely, that as 
an object of knowing, the nakedness of man and woman is shaped by the same 
fundamental principle of binarity as the idea of good and bad.
On the one hand, the knowledge of good and bad could be understood as a 
capacity to make distinctions, to differentiate between the opposite phenomena that
form empirical reality. According to van Wolde, the knowledge of good and bad
i
‘denotes a discriminating power, a knowledge based on experience which comprises 
everything, both persons and objects, and this is represented by the two halves of the 
merism: good and bad’.79 Here the formula ‘good and bad’ embraces not only the 
categories of moral choice, but primarily the whole world perceived as a unity of 
opposites, or, in the words of Dominic Crossan, as a ‘disjunctive totality’.80 Understood 
cosmologically, God’s knowledge of good and bad resonates with the process of 
creation in Genesis 1. There God established the world order by progressively 
manifesting distinctions and setting boundaries between the opposites; for example, 
between heaven and earth, light and darkness, dry land and sea. In the context of 
Genesis 1, God’s knowledge of good and bad reflects the discriminating power of God 
as creator.
On the other hand, the knowledge of being naked that man and woman obtain in 
3:7 implies an experience of physical distinctions imposed by gender. The couple make 
for themselves hagdrdt, coverings, which suggests that it is their sexual difference that
79 van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis, p. 195.
80 John Dominic Crossan, ‘Response to White: Felix Culpa and Foenix Culprit’, Semeia 18 (1980), p. 
110.
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they have discovered and are trying to hide. In his structural interpretation, Edmund 
Leach identifies the forbidden knowledge with the knowledge of sexual
Q 1
differentiation. Like the knowledge of good and bad, the knowledge of gender has a 
strong binary connotation. It is strengthened by the dual form fnehem, ‘both of them’, 
used in conjunction with ‘erummim/ ‘“rummtm, ‘naked’, both at the beginning and at the 
end of the scene (2:25; 3:7). Here the notion of nakedness appears to be structurally 
related to the dual state of the Subject as man and woman. Notably, the closer the 
couple come to realising their nakedness, the stronger is the dual connotation in the way 
they are presented. In 2:25, the two of them are not yet aware of their gender. Here the 
term fnehem  is used alongside the asymmetrical unity ‘ha ’adam and his wife’, pointing 
to duality as a potential that is not yet fully realised. The asymmetry disappears at the 
moment of eating, when the two become 'issah and Isah, woman and her man (3:6). 
Finally, when their eyes are open in 3:7, the couple are described simply as fnehem. It 
seems that the knowledge of gender takes away all the social and psychological 
preconceptions, making the ‘two of them’ a pair of equal yet distinct binary 
counterparts.
Here sight plays a central role as a mediator between knowing and not knowing.
The entire transformation has to do with the opening of the eyes of the humans (‘their
V ■
eyes were opened and they knew’). In contrast to Eve’s seeing in v. 6, in v. 7 sight 
becomes a faculty of a binary subject, which makes it reciprocal. In 3:7 the couple do 
not become any more naked than they were in 2:25, but once their eyes have been 
opened, each of them can see the nakedness of the other and therefore, in turn, becomes 
seen. Man and woman are now exposed to each other’s gaze, and both of them, to that 
of Yahweh. The emergence of the Other as the subject of seeing leads to the 
fundamental exposure and vulnerability of the Self, manifested in the feelings of shame 
and fear (3:7b, 10). The negative mood associated with exposure contrasts the feelings 
of joy and satisfaction that ha ’adam experienced when he first saw woman. His speech 
in 2:23-24 was a celebration of totality, where man is the only subject of looking, and 
therefore is figuratively ‘unexposed’. From this point of view, the sense of insecurity 
that comes with the transgression reflects the existential anxiety of the Subject who 
loses totality and, with it, the monopoly on vision. 81
81 See Edmund Leach, Genesis as Myth and Other Essays (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 14. Many 
interpreters have seen the discovery o f nakedness as an allusion to sex and procreation. For an overview 
of the main trends in the interpretation of ‘the knowledge of good and bad’, see Westermann, Genesis 1- 
/ / ,  pp. 242-45. Westermann considers it untenable to restrict the knowledge acquired by the humans to 
sexual knowledge.
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The narrative therefore operates with two kinds of knowledge that demonstrate 
binarity on different levels. While the discriminatory knowledge of good and bad 
concerns the relation of the Subject to the knowable world, the knowledge of gender is 
directed back towards the Subject and represents his/her self-awareness as a unity of 
oppositions. Both the serpent and Yahweh interpret this self-knowledge as the 
knowledge of good and bad (w. 5, 22), which links the notions of being differentiated 
and being able to differentiate.
Fig. 5
‘they knew that they were naked’, v. 7
I
binarity of the Subject 
(male and female, Self and Other)
\
differentiated Subject
‘knowing good and bad’, w . 5,22
binarity of the world 
(good and bad)
I
differentiating Subject
*\J
By knowing their distinct sexual identities, man and woman become able to 
experience distinctions in creation, thereby acquiring an understanding of the world 
order -  the knowledge of good and bad. As a metaphor, nakedness communicates 
binarity as the fundamental principle of the knowing Subject. To know the world as 
differentiated, the Subject needs to realise his/her own differentiation, experiencing an 
inner tension between wholeness and fragmentation, between sameness and difference, 
between the Self and the Other. The epistemological process starts when man and 
woman direct their gaze at each other and see the pattern of creation reveal itself in their 
gender.
On this point, I disagree with Jobling, who interprets the newly acquired 
knowledge as the ‘knowledge of the conditions of existence “outside”’, of which sexual 
differentiation is only one aspect. Jobling’s otherwise attractive structuralist model 
asserts the priority of the knowable world over the knowing Subject. For him, the world 
‘outside’ the garden, characterised by differentiation, coexists with the world ‘inside’, 
characterised by unity. By learning to differentiate between good and bad, the Subject 82
82 Jobling, The Sense o f  Biblical Narrative, pp. 31-32.
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becomes associated with the world ‘outside’ and assumes its binary characteristics. 
However, the garden narrative presents little evidence to support such a reading. Unlike 
Genesis 1, where the world, structured by oppositions, preceded the creation of binary 
humanity and therefore was posited as primary, Genesis 2-3 focuses primarily on the 
construction of the knowing and experiencing Subject. Here the outside world -  
haidamak, which ha’adam is to serve -  of itself is not binary. In fact, one cannot 
presume the existence of ‘outside’ at all until the moment when Yahweh sets the 
boundaries of the garden; that is, until the expulsion of ha’adam (3:23-24). Here the 
world ‘outside’ emerges as a domain of the differentiated Subject and therefore itself is 
perceived as differentiated. Jobling’s argument could therefore be reversed: instead of 
being an aspect of the outside world that the Subject acquires together with knowledge, 
sexual differentiation is a fundamental feature of binary subjectivity that allows it to 
discriminate between good and bad, and, by doing so, to shape the world of human 
experience.
Knowledge and the Image o f God
V
Despite their opposite views on the tree as the source of death, the serpent and 
Yahweh agree that eating of the forbidden tree makes the humans like *lohim, knowing 
good and bad (3:5, 22). The narrator puts a double emphasis on the idea that the power 
of discrimination is a divine quality and that by sharing it the woman and man become 
godlike. The notion of becoming like God forms a distinguishable semantic parallel 
with 1:26-27, where ha’adam is created in the image of *lohim. Intertextually, this 
parallelism with Genesis 2-3 allows us to interpret God’s image in Genesis 1 in terms of 
discriminatory power. The entire garden narrative may thus be seen as an elaborate 
account of how God created the humans in his own image and likeness. Bal asserts a 
similar link with the creation of humankind in Genesis 1, saying that Genesis 2-3 is ‘a 
specified narration of what events are included in the idea that “God created them male 
and female’” . Seeing the second creation account as an elaboration of the first, the 
entire model of the ‘fall’ becomes untenable. Instead of being a curse, a sign of 
disobedience, knowledge emerges as an aspect of Yahweh’s own nature that he shares 
with the human couple, thereby creating them ‘in his image and likeness’. 83
83 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 119.
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The idea of rapprochement between divine and human subjectivity in the two 
creation accounts has a particular semiotic ground. Notably, both Genesis 1 and Genesis 
2-3 link the concept of image/likeness of God to the ideas of gender and differentiation. 
In the garden narrative, man and woman become godlike through their knowledge of 
gender, through seeing themselves as naked, ‘male and female’. Similarly, 1:27 places 
the image of God alongside the notion of gender: ‘God created humankind in his image, 
in the image of God he created it; male and female he created them’. Critics have often 
pointed to semantic and structural correspondences between these three clauses. Karl 
Barth was the first to interpret the imago Dei in terms of relationality that is introduced 
by the phrase ‘male and female’. Developing Barth’s idea, Trible sees this phrase as a 
metaphor, pointing to God’s image in humanity, a vehicle for communicating a 
different level of meaning. In her opinion, ‘to describe male and female... is to perceive 
the image of God’.85 Trible, van Wolde, and more recently Paul Niskanen substantiate 
this argument pointing to the parallel composition of 1:27. They argue that the phrases 
‘in his image’, ‘in the image of God’, and ‘male and female’ function as three parts of a 
narrative structure, where each successive part runs parallel to the previous one, 
clarifying and developing its meaning. The composition of the verse, therefore, presents 
‘male and female’ as an explanation of ‘the image of God’.86
i
The meaning of the imago Dei in 1:27 with respect to the sexual differentiation 
of ’adam has been the subject of a vast and complex discussion. Critics have strongly 
opposed the idea that God’s image in 1:27 could be related to the creation of humankind 
as ‘male and female’ on historical-literary grounds. For example, Adela Yarbro Collins 
refutes the possibility of the Priestly writer ascribing to God ‘any quality corresponding 
to sexuality or sexual differentiation’.87 Phyllis Bird formulated what has become 
known as the ‘historical-critical consensus’, seeing the imago Dei in the context of 
dominion (l:26-27b), separate from the ideas of sexual distinction and reproduction 
(l:27c-28).88 This consensus, however, cannot account for the striking parallelism that
84 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (trans. Harold Knight etal.; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1960), pp. 183- 
84.
85 Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f Sexuality, p. 20.
86 See Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f Sexuality, 17; van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis, pp. 198-99; Paul 
Niskanen, ‘The Poetics of Adam: The Creation of m s in the Image of D’rnN', JBL 128 (2009), p. 428.
87 Adcla Yarbro Collins, ‘Historical-Critical and Feminist Readings of Genesis 1:26-28’, in Roger Brooks 
and John J. Collins (eds.), Hebrew Bible or Old Testament? Studying the Bible in Judaism and 
Christianity (Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity, 5; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1990), pp. 197-99; see also James Barr, ‘The Image of God in the Book of Genesis: A Study in 
Terminology’, BJRL 51 (1968), pp. 11-26; ‘Man and Nature: The Ecological Controversy and the Old 
Testament’, BJRL 55 (1972), pp. 9-32.
88 Bird,“‘Male and Female He Created Them’” , pp. 129-59.
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holds 1:27b and 1:27c together. Human dominion over the earth and its creatures seems 
to be a function that is associated with the image of God and derives from it, while 
sexual binarity appears to point to the inner differentiation of God himself.
The grammar of 1:26-27 seems to substantiate this view. Here both the creator 
and his creature are characterised by flexibility of number. The unmarked plural and the 
singular are both used here, first, in relation to *lohim, and then, in relation to ’adam. 
Niskanen remarks on that: ‘D’rftx speaks as many and acts as one in creating D7X, who is 
simultaneously one and many’. By comparison, Genesis 2-3 also displays flexible 
number. To begin with, ha’adam exists here as a singular subject (cf. fbaddo, 2:18), 
and so does Yahweh. Duality (fnehem  ‘both of them’) first appears in 2:25, after the 
creation of woman. Later, in 3:1-7, knowledge is each time attributed to human 
subjectivity in the unmarked plural form. Strikingly, the unmarked plural is also applied 
to God as the subject of knowledge: ‘you shall be like *lohim, knowing (yocf’e, pi.) 
good and bad’ (3:5); ‘the man has become like one of us (mimmennu, pi.), knowing 
good and bad’ (3:22). The grammatically plural term * lohim, which usually has 
singular meaning, takes a plural verb (v. 5) and a plural pronoun (v. 22) in both 
instances related to knowledge. Like 1:26-27, the garden narrative constructs both God 
and ha’adam as ‘one anci many’; however, here the plurality and inner differentiation of 
the Subject is correlated With his/her power to discriminate.
Constructing God in Human Likeness
The concept of the divine-human likeness that appears in the two creation 
accounts has repercussions not only for the human but also, potentially, for the divine 
subjectivity. If God assumes a grammatically plural form only when he shares his 
knowledge with the humans, making them godlike (Genesis 3), does this indicate that 
divine subjectivity, too, is transformed in the process? Could the arrival of a binary 
Subject capable of differentiation make Yahweh see himself and act as many? After all, 
Yahweh was not plural before the transgression, neither was he described as ‘knowing 
good and bad’. Although he plants the tree of knowledge in 2:9, it functions there not as 
his attribute, but as a possibility intended for the humans. God’s knowledge seems to be 
actualised only when it comes to be shared with the humans. 89
89 Niskanen, ‘The Poetics of Adam’, p. 426.
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The narrative presents God as the subject of knowledge on two different 
occasions, both times in relation to human knowing. First, in 3:5 the serpent 
describes *lohim as knowing good and evil. The verse is composed symmetrically as a 
chiasmus that places two kinds of God’s knowledge at the beginning and the end of the 
transformation:
yodea ‘ (sing.) yocf ‘e (pi.) fob ward ‘
*Whim ki ke’lohim
10kafkem ... weni^cfhu ‘enekem wiffyitem
At the centre of the chiasmus is the moment when the human couple eat of the 
tree and have their eyes opened. This transformation bridges the opposition between the 
omniscience of a singular transcendent creator {yodea' *Idhim) and the discriminatory 
knowledge of the plural God (* Idhim yo<f ‘e fob ward “). Semiotically, the structure 
implies that the human transformation brings changes both to the subject of divine 
knowledge ( ^ lohim) and to its object. On the day the eyes of the humans are open, God 
is transformed from the ‘God who knows’ into the ‘gods who know good and bad’.
Second, Yahweh confirms the truth of the serpent’s statement in 3:22: ‘ha’adam
\
has become like one of us (pi.) knowing good and bad’. Speaking to himself as 
yhwh *lohim, God admits both his differentiation (plurality) and his knowledge of good 
and bad. This confession presents a very different image of Yahweh: in contrast to the 
authoritative lawgiver of Genesis 2, the new, plural yhwh *Idhim is vulnerable and feels 
the need to protect himself from human freedom. The story brings a loss of totality to 
God as well as to humans. Bal describes this as a semiotic process of creating God in 
human likeness. In her view, woman realises the transformation of the transcendent God 
of Genesis 1 into an antropomorphic character who strolls in the shade of the garden, 
shows anger and fear, and engages in dialogues and confrontations with the humans.90 
From this angle, the transfer of meaning between the divine and human realms becomes 
mutual. As Fewell and Gunn point out, by gaining God’s knowledge, the humans lead 
God out of paradise.91
90 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 125.
91 Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, p. 37
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Nakedness and Wisdom
Like all the significant concepts and structures in the garden narrative, the 
human knowledge of nakedness is dichotomous on many levels. It presupposes the 
sexual binarity (male-female) and duality of the Subject (Self-Other), and signifies an 
awareness of the fundamental binarity of the world, shaped by oppositions (good-bad). 
Finally, it brings together the characteristics of the two non-human characters in the 
story, God and the serpent.
While the narrative identifies the human knowledge of nakedness with God’s 
knowledge (3:5, 22), it also links it linguistically to the wisdom of the serpent. This 
occurs through the wordplay ‘arom/‘arum. The two instances of ‘arom, ‘naked’, form 
an inclusio for the entire scene of transgression: at the beginning ‘the man and his wife 
were both naked ( " rummim)’ (2:25); at the end ‘[both of them] knew that they were 
naked { ‘erummim)' (3:7). Within this inclusio, the protagonists become conscious of 
their nakedness helped by the serpent who is ‘arum, ‘wise’. As Landy points out, the 
serpent mediates between the concepts of nakedness and shrewdness: the humans, who 
at the beginning are naked, become shrewd because of the serpent’s interference. The 
reverse is also true: the animals, represented by the serpent, start as being shrewd and 
end up being symbolically naked, stripped of their skins to clothe the humans (3:21).92
The serpent’s wisdom is an iconic quality that makes it imminently suitable to 
transfer and distribute God’s knowledge. Its wisdom is never directly identified with the 
knowledge of good and bad -  that is, after all, God’s prerogative -  but seems to be an 
insight into the nature and the purpose of things, an understanding of the way life 
works. It serves to reveal what is hidden, manifesting the secret thoughts of Yahweh 
(‘for God knows that...’). The three kinds of knowledge are interposed: by knowing that 
they are naked woman and man become not only like God, who knows good and bad 
(wayyeif ‘u, v. 7; cf. yocf 'e, v. 5), but also like the serpent, who knows what God knows 
{ ’erummim, v. 7; cf. ‘arum, v. 1). The dichotomy of sharing the likeness of both 
Yahweh and the serpent fits in with the idea of Yahweh’s. double subjectivity: if the 
serpent is a manifestation of the repressed side of God, then becoming like God also 
means becoming like the serpent.
92 Landy, Paradoxes o f  Paradise, pp. 228-45. For an analysis of the multiple meanings created by the 
wordplay ‘arom / ‘arum see Lemer, Eternally Eve, pp. 90-91; van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis, pp. 165- 
66.
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There is yet another aspect to the knowledge of nakedness, which is its iconic 
correspondence to the overall symbolism of the story. In Genesis 2-3 human beings 
uncover the hidden reality of knowledge. Their own nakedness or being uncovered runs 
semantically parallel to this process, which exposes the meaning behind Yahweh’s 
authoritative voice. Symbolically, their exposure is also that of Yahweh. The serpent, 
being ‘arum, leads the human couple to uncover, make ‘arom, the world of possibilities 
secretly intended for them by Yahweh.
Yet the newly discovered knowledge has a sense of illicitness about it. The 
prohibition still holds, and thus the exposure -  symbolic as well as physical -  is a 
violation that upsets the existing order and therefore needs to be rectified or 
compensated for. And so the couple perform a gesture that is semantically opposite to 
exposure: they cover themselves with hagorot, coverings, made from the leaves of a fig 
tree. In the context of 2:25, this means that they are ashamed, bos. Having discovered 
their distinctions, woman and man instantly feel the need to hide them from each other. 
Yet the fig leaves do not take away their nakedness, for in the following verse they still 
need to hide from Yahweh ‘among the trees of the garden’ (3:8), and in 3:10 man 
admits that he is naked, ‘erom. The problem of nakedness seems to be resolved only at
the closure of the narrative in 3:21, when Yahweh clothes the humans in garments of
\
skin. However, even here the way of concealing nakedness -  the skins -  remains deeply 
ambiguous. The Hebrew term ‘or, ‘skin’, is semantically related to ‘erdm, ‘naked’,93 
and its use brings in the connotations of the wordplay ‘arom/‘arum. The skins must 
have been taken from the animals and so, metaphorically, from the wisest of them -  the 
serpent ( ‘dr - ‘arum). At the end of the story, Yahweh ‘clothes’ the humans in their 
knowledge, which carries the signs both of their nakedness and of the serpent’s wisdom. 
The garments of skin simultaneously cover the external signs of their gender and reveal 
their fundamental binarity. Having become like God and like the serpent, man and 
woman will leave the garden being simultaneously covered and naked, united and 
differentiated, one and two.
93 Both words come from the root ‘wr, which denotes being laid bare or stripped of outer layers (see 
BDB, pp. 735-36; DCH VI, pp. 316-17).
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The Subject on Trial (3:8-13)
On the surface, Yahweh’s interrogation of the couple in 3:9-13 has all the 
appearance of a court hearing, in which Yahweh takes on the role of prosecutor.94 His 
questions seem to aim at a ‘reconstruction’ of the crime, from looking at its evidence 
(the fact that the couple have hidden themselves as well as ha’adam's awareness of 
being naked, w . 9, 1 la), to establishing the actual transgression (man and woman’s 
eating of the forbidden tree, w . 1 lb, 13a) and naming the accomplices (woman and the 
serpent, w . 12, 13b). And yet despite this clear legalistic framework, Yahweh’s 
questions seem rhetorical, as if Yahweh already knew what the answers were and was 
merely asking the couple to acknowledge their transformation and make sense of it. The 
reader has come across a similar instance earlier. In 2:22 Yahweh brought woman to. .. 
ha ’adarn not to see what the latter would call her, but to prompt man to formulate his
*v»
view of the Other. Similarly, interrogating the couple in 3:9-13, Yahweh gives the 
humans an opportunity to re-establish their relationship with him and with each other. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to examine the different tactics Yahweh shows in 
addressing man and woman.
i ’ ■
Significantly, from the beginning Yahweh is looking only for man and not for 
woman (v. 9). The question ’ayyekkah, ‘Where are you?’, is addressed to ha’adam (with 
the masculine singular ending), creating an ambiguity with respect to woman’s 
presence. Is God looking for man because he is concerned only about him and not 
woman, or, alternatively, because woman has not been hiding from him? Both 
possibilities hold. Although the previous verse suggests that man and his wife have 
hidden together, their action is described with the masculine singular verb 
wayyithabbe\ ‘and he hid’ (v. 8). Grammatically, the verb agrees with the proximate 
subject (wayyithabbe’ hd'ddam we’isto), a feature commonly attested in the Hebrew 
Bible.95 However, this irregularity has also an iconic function, marginalising woman, 
who has until now played the main role in the episode.96 She has been excluded from 
the conversation that follows between Yahweh and hd’adam {w . 9-12), but reappears in 
v. 13 to reply to Yahweh’s question as if she has always been there (similar to man’s 
complementary position in 3:6). This invisible presence is one of the signs of woman’s
See Mettinger, The Eden Narrative, p. 25.
”  See, for example, Gn 9:23; 11:29; 24:61; 31:14; 33:7; Nm 12:1; 2 Sam 12:2; Am 8:13.
See Lemer, Eternally Eve, p. 106.
46
compromised subjectivity in the aftermath of the transgression. When her function has 
been fulfilled, she recedes into the shadows, becoming simultaneously present and 
absent, included and excluded, man’s counterpart as well as a mere p a r t  of man.
Woman’s invisibility also signals a return to the framework of the leading plot, 
centred on the relationship between Yahweh and h d ’dddm . In Genesis 2 that 
relationship was characterised by God’s absolute authority and h a ’a d a m 's  automatic 
obedience. Man there was a non-autonomous, passive recipient of whatever God had 
done, said to, or given him. In this context, the fact that Yahweh in 3:9 does not know 
where h a ’a d a m  is indicates a sudden change in their relationship. For the first time 
Yahweh addresses h d ’dddm  as an autonomous subject, capable of response. According 
to Joel Burnett, the rhetorical function of the phrase ‘where are you?’ is to emphasise 
the absence of the object or person in question.97 What matters for the speaker is not 
‘where’ the required object is, but the fact that it is not ‘here’ (in 1 Sam 26:16 David 
asks that question knowing exactly where to find the required objects since he himself 
has removed them). Pointing to h a ’a d a m 's absence in relation to Yahweh, the spatial 
term ’ayyeh  becomes a relational metaphor that connotes separation.
Prompted by Yahweh, h a ’a d a m  gives the reason for his breaking away (‘I heard 
your voice in the garden and was afraid because I was naked, so I hid myself, v. 10). 
The words w a  ’ira  ’ k i- ‘erom  ’a n o k i  run as a close syntactic parallel to the report of the 
couple’s transformation in v. 7: w a yye d 'u  k i  ‘erum m im  hem , ‘they knew that they were 
naked’. The parallel draws attention to a shift from the binary subject (hem  [ fn e h e m ] ,  v. 
7) to the individual male point of view ( ’anoki, v. 10) that entails a change in the 
connotation of nakedness. In v. 7 'erum m im  signified sexual distinctions of man and 
woman and their exposure to each other. In v. 10, ‘erom  loses its gender connotation 
and indicates an exposure of the singular, implicitly male subject to the authority of 
Yahweh. These parallels signify the emergence of boundaries at two different levels: 
between male and female, and between human and divine subjectivity. In both cases, 
the Subject is compelled to hide his/her nakedness from the Other: with the fig leaves 
(v. 7) or among the trees of the garden (v. 8). However, in the presence of Yahweh 
nakedness becomes a source of guilt and a sign of vulnerability.98 Facing each other, 
woman and man simply kn ew  their nakedness; facing Yahweh, h a  ’a d a m  is a fra id  of it.
97 See Joel S. Burnett, ‘The Question of Divine Absence in Israelite and West Semitic Religion’, CBQ 67 
(2005), p. 215.
98 Trible maintains that the cause of man’s fear is knowledge of nakedness and not the presence of God 
{God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 118). However, since man becomes afraid of being naked only in 
the presence of Yahweh, the link between the two is not entirely absent.
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Yahweh’s next question is directed at the source of man’s knowledge: ‘ Who told 
you that you were naked?’ (3:11a). Notably, the phrase ki ‘erom ’attah follows the 
syntactic structure used in the previous statements of nakedness {ki ‘erummim hem, 3:7; 
ki-‘erdm ’anoki, 3:10). It seems significant that the personal pronouns hem, ’anoki, 
and ’attah first appear in the narrative in conjunction with ‘erom/‘erummim. This might 
support the idea, expressed previously, that in Genesis 2-3 the awareness of nakedness 
is fundamental to the construction of personal boundaries. By asking, i Who told 
you...?’, Yahweh implies that man should not have been able to see his nakedness for 
himself. In order to know oneself as naked, or distinct, man needs the point of reference 
-  the reality he is distinct from -  to be placed outside him. In this sense, Yahweh posits 
the looking Other as the source of man’s knowledge. At one level, mi seems to point to 
woman, who has given the fruit to her husband, and who is the only character in the 
story who knows that man is naked (3:7)." At another level, the Other from whom 
ha’adam has tried to hide his nakedness, whose presence has induced man’s fear, and 
who is looking at man now, is Yahweh himself. If the knowledge of nakedness comes 
from the Other, then by asking, ‘Who told you?’ Yahweh is ultimately pointing at his 
own role in communicating knowledge to man. Perhaps, this is why he does not wait for 
a reply and moves on to the next question.
In 3:1 lb Yahweh finally voices his main concern: ‘Have you eaten of the tree of 
which I commanded you not to eat?’ He alludes to his prohibition of 2:16-17, speaking 
as a prosecutor who names the crime and seeks to locate responsibility. Yet this 
ominous reference to his law does not quite ring true. First, it casts doubt on the 
accuracy of Yahweh’s death warning in 2:17. In fact, Yahweh himself must not have 
meant it literally, otherwise he would have known, from seeing man alive, that the 
prohibition had not been broken. Instead, Yahweh admits not only that man can disobey 
him but also that than can do so and stay alive. Second, the fact that Yahweh relates 
man’s new autonomy to his eating of the forbidden tree means that Yahweh has known 
all along about the consequences of disobedience, but withheld them from ha’adam. 
With 3:11b, the integrity of Yahweh the lawgiver breaks down, exposing the double 
meaning at the heart of his law. ,
Once again, Yahweh’s question is rhetorical. Through it, Yahweh makes 
ha’adam admit his disobedience and hence, his autonomy. This is reflected in the 
syntactic structure of the question, where the emphasis on the tree, mentioned at the 9
99
One should bear in mind that woman fulfils the role of the Other only as part o f the dual subject, which 
includes man, and not independently.
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beginning of the sentence, gives way to the tension between ‘not to eat’ and ‘eat’, and 
ultimately, between ‘I’ and ‘you’. Here I agree with Trible, for whom the significance 
of the tree in v. 11 pertains to disobedience rather than to the specific content of man’s 
knowledge.100
The re-shaping of Yahweh’s relationship with man culminates in the next verse, 
where hd’dddm confirms that he has broken God’s command. Yet in doing so he does 
not accept sole responsibility and blames woman and Yahweh as the ultimate cause of 
his disobedience: ‘Woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me from the tree, 
and I ate’ (3:12). Man’s fear of being naked or ‘exposed’ makes him try and ‘cover’ his 
own action, presenting it as an unavoidable result of the others’ interference. This 
reveals significant changes in hd’ddam’s subjectivity. He is no longer the exuberant and 
expansive Self that in 2:23-24 saw woman as his own extension. Now, after the 
transgression, hd’dddm sees her as a heterogeneous reality imposed on him by Yahweh, 
and himself, as a victim of her (and Yahweh’s) actions.
It is ironic that man’s weak attempt to shift the blame onto others is also an 
accurate account of what has happened. Indeed, it was woman who led man to eat of the 
tree, and it was Yahweh who had installed her as man’s helper. In man’s view, woman 
and Yahweh perform the same action towards him (natattah ‘immadi; nafnah-li, ‘gave
i
me’), and his only move is to eat, that is, to accept that which he is given. With the 
shame and the fear of being naked comes the sense of the Other’s imposing presence, of 
which the Subject perceives himself a victim. What he rightly confesses is that his 
action was determined entirely by forces outside his control. Unwittingly, man 
recapitulates the entire mechanism of the shadow plot, from the institution of gender to 
the acquisition of knowledge, and by doing so, confirms that Yahweh’s plan has 
succeeded.
The short interrogation of woman in 3:13 is strikingly different from the 
questioning of hd’dddm, for Yahweh is neither looking for her, nor inquiring about her 
nakedness. Asking, mah-zd’t ‘asit, ‘What is this that you have done?’, he treats woman 
as if she were still partly invisible, equating her subjectivity with her role in the 
transformation of man. Once again, Yahweh’s question appears rhetorical, for he 
already knows from man what she has done. However, since man has withheld the fact 
that woman too ate of the forbidden fruit before giving it to him, Yahweh’s question is
100 Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f Sexuality, pp. 118-19.
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not entirely pointless. Inasmuch as it is seeking to verify man’s accusation, it also gives 
woman a chance to fill in the blanks with her own account.
It is more difficult to access woman’s point of view precisely because of her 
‘invisibility’ during the previous discussion. Was she there when haadam spoke to 
Yahweh about her? If so, is she feeling resentful of her partner’s betrayal? Similarly, 
does she now realise that she has been used, objectified by Yahweh, who gave her to 
man in the same way as one might pass on an object, a fruit of a tree? These questions 
remain open, adding to the ambiguity of woman’s position. Saying to Yahweh, ‘The 
serpent deceived me and I ate’, she does not show any knowledge of the previous 
dialogue, and does not mention that she gave of the fruit to man -  the action of which 
man has just accused her. In fact, her version of the event does not include man at all. 
For Trible, by ignoring man, woman indicates her separation from him, their unity of 
one flesh having been split apart by the disobedience.101 Another way of looking at it is 
to suppose that woman’s sharing of the fruit with man was an involuntary response, 
inherent in her role of ‘helper’, a part which Yahweh intended her to play from the start. 
The fact that she misses out her act of mediating when speaking to the deity means that 
she does not consider it to be the subject of mah-zo’t ‘asit and an offence against 
Yahweh. r
t
The only action that woman admits to is eating. In doing so, she follows the 
pattern of man’s confession, blaming another for what she has done: ‘The serpent 
deceived me and I ate’. However, in her case, the accusation does not quite ring true. 
The reader knows that though woman was provoked by the serpent’s subversive 
remarks, she did not eat until she had examined the tree for herself. Ultimately, it was 
her own experience and desire of understanding that made her break the divine 
command. Moreover, the serpent’s role could hardly be described as deception. Woman 
can see that two of the serpent’s predictions -  ‘you shall certainly not die’ (3:4) and 
‘your eyes will be opened’ (3:5; cf. 3:7) -  were accurate. The fact that she and man are 
still alive suggests that the deceiver was not the serpent, but Yahweh with his death 
warning. What, in that case, makes woman say that the serpent has deceived her?
The semantic range of the Hebrew verb n a sa  ’, ‘to beguile, seduce, mislead, 
deceive’, allows a nuanced interpretation of woman’s point of view. On the one hand, 
she indicates that the serpent lured her into disobedience. Unlike man, who receives the 
forbidden knowledge simply because it comes from woman, woman needs to be
101 Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 120.
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persuaded. The mechanism of her disobedience is rational and involves a change in her 
understanding of God. For what the serpent reveals to her is a God who knows good and 
bad and who therefore accommodates contradictory perspectives. This God has lost his 
totality, splitting into two halves -  the one that creates and issues orders, and the one 
that possesses hidden knowledge. It is the desire to be like this other God who knows -  
the desire of understanding -  that draws woman to the tree. From this angle, the serpent 
beguiles woman by showing her the seductiveness of knowledge.
On the other hand, the verb nasa ’ connotes a false deal, a deception. Saying that 
the serpent has deceived her, woman might imply not only that she has been seduced 
but also simply that the serpent has lied to her and that she did not become Tike gods 
who know good and bad’. If this is the case, her statement might be read as an 
assessment of her position with respect to knowledge. This poses the question whether 
woman, seen as separate from man, really becomes the subject of divine knowledge of 
good and bad.
As we have seen, the narrator uses the couple’s awareness of being naked as an 
iconic sign of their knowledge of good and bad. This iconic knowledge is first 
associated with man and woman together (‘they knew that they were naked’, 3:7), then
only with hd’pdam, both in his own and in Yahweh’s speech (‘I was afraid because I
\
was naked’, 3:10; ‘who told you that you were naked?’ 3:11). Finally, at the end of the 
narrative, Yahweh admits that ha’adam has acquired the divine knowledge of good and 
bad (‘ha’adam has become like one of us, knowing good and bad’, 3:22). Strikingly, at 
no point does the narrator refer to woman’s own, individual knowledge or awareness. In 
3:7 the unmarked plural of wayyecf'u, ‘they knew’, conceals her subjectivity. Unlike 
man, woman does not declare her nakedness to Yahweh. It is ironic that woman, who 
brings knowledge to ha ’adam and who herself explicitly desires understanding (cf. 3:6), 
does not seem to benefit from the consequences of her actions and does not come to 
possess knowledge of her own accord.
Outside the garden narrative, the Hebrew Bible displays a similar trend of 
dissociating woman from knowledge. Linguistically, the verb y d ‘ is usually attributed to 
a male subject. Man has the ability to know in all its different forms, whether it is 
cognitive, spiritual, sexual knowledge, or practical skills. The omniscient God, being 
grammatically male, epitomises the power of knowledge: he knows good and bad (3:5), 
he knows the heart and the thoughts of human beings (lKg 8:39; Ho 5:3; Ps 139:4; Jb 
11:11); he knows the ways of the righteous (18:19; Dt 34:10; Jer 1:5; Ps 1:6; 37:18). In
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parallel to God who knows good and bad, man’s ability to know is regarded as a virtue, 
a quality of an active and mature subject. On the other hand, the absence of knowledge 
in man is a negative characteristic, usually indicating deficient motivation and lack of 
responsibility. Thus, Cain renounces responsibility for his brother (‘I do not know,’ 
4:9); Jacob admits his ignorance (‘God was in this place I did not know’, 28:16), while 
Lot and Judah are oblivious of the identity of their sexual partners (‘for he did not 
know’, 19:33,35; 38:16).
Unlike man, woman in the Hebrew Bible is very rarely ascribed the faculty of 
knowledge. On the few occasions when the verb yd ' is applied to a feminine subject, it 
typically denotes sexual knowledge or intercourse, and is presented as a vice or a 
deficiency. In 19:8 Lot’s testimony that his daughters have not known a man implies 
their higher value. In Nm 31:17-18, 35, Moses commands the Israelites to kill every 
Midianite woman who ‘has known man’, and to spare the 32,000 women who ‘have not 
known man’. The massacre of the inhabitants of Jabesh-gilead in Jg 21:11-12 follows 
the same pattern. Similarly, the fact that Jephthah’s daughter in Jg 11:39 ‘knew no man’
i
is a merit which makes her death more lamentable for the narrator. In what concerns 
woman’s carnal knowledge of man, not to know is an unquestionable virtue.
The disjunction between feminine subjectivity and the verb yd ' in the biblical 
text is not limited to the sphere of sexual experience. Whenever yd ' is used in the sense 
of awareness and discrimination, it is predicated to a woman by a negative grammatical 
construction. Thus, the foolish woman in the Proverbs ‘does not know anything’ (Pr 
9:13), and Hosea’s unfaithful wife does not know who provides her with food and wine 
(Hos 2:10). Even the prudent wife of the Proverbs, the most likely female figure to be 
credited with knowledge, is never characterised by y d ‘. With woman’s sexual 
knowledge regarded as an anti-value, and her cognitive capacity mentioned only to be 
denied to her, the Hebrew Bible systematically dissociates woman from the ability to • 
discriminate and experience.
In the context of the garden narrative, this tendency of ‘gendering’ the ability to 
know has important implications. Woman, after all, appears to be right when she says 
that the serpent has deceived her. By giving knowledge and experience to humanity, she 
has succeeded in doing what Yahweh expected of her, yet her own subjectivity remains 
invisible. By herself, she does not become like God who knows. Without knowledge 
and boundaries of her own, she cannot assert her nakedness in front of Yahweh. That 
would mean coming out of the shadows, being seen, becoming the Subject. Structurally,
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she is confined to the figure of the Other, the one in relation to whom the Subject draws 
his boundaries and whose role is to give, be it knowledge, identity, or a fruit of a tree.
The Final Balance: Judgment and Expulsion (3:14-24)
Following his interrogation, Yahweh pronounces a judgment on the serpent, 
woman, and man (3:14-19). This judgment, together with the expulsion of ha’adam 
(3:22-24), gives resolution to the narrative. The scene follows the legalistic logic of 
crime and punishment. First, Yahweh explicitly states the crime: ‘because... you have 
eaten from the tree about which I commanded you, “You shall not eat from it’” (3:17; 
cf. ‘because you have done this’, v. 14). Next, he announces the destinies of the serpent, 
woman, and man, which are all marked by adversity, pain, and domination and 
therefore appear as punishments. Speaking as a judge, Yahweh sentences, one after 
another, all the participants of the shadow plot for the roles they played in the breaking 
of his commandment.102
At the same time, Yahweh’s position as a judge is compromised by his own 
involvement in the human ‘fall’. It would be narratologically inconsistent to think that 
he punishes the protagonists for playing the parts he has assigned to them in his drama. 
Alternatively, could his sentences be another instance of double communication and 
therefore only appear to be punitive? Is Yahweh radically changing the status of his 
creatures, or is he only stating the fact, presenting the new order as a logical outcome of 
knowing good and bad? In Trible’s opinion, Yahweh does not prescribe punishment, 
but describes the consequences the serpent and the human couple have already brought 
upon themselves.103 Similarly, Bal interprets Yahweh’s punishment as an ‘explicit 
spelling out of the consequences of the human option, as another representation of the 
reality of human life’.104 One might argue that Yahweh’s judgment simultaneously 
acknowledges the new order of life brought about by the transgression (shadow plot), 
and condemns human disobedience to his command (leading plot). Yahweh, a master of
102 Here I disagree with Westermann, who maintains that the punishments of Gn 3:14-19, being a later 
addition to the narrative, ‘have no direct relationship with the offence’. Westermann holds that in the 
original plan of the narrative the only punishment for human disobedience was their expulsion from the 
garden (see Westermann, Genesis 1-11, pp. 256-57).
03 Trible presents these consequences as chaos and living death, ‘the disintegration that results when 
limits are exceeded’, a view that appears simplistic given the inherent ambiguity of the text (Trible, God 
and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 123; see also Meyers, Discovering Eve, pp. 95-122).
104 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 125.
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ambiguity, who in Genesis 2 sets in motion the two opposing plots, at the end of 
Genesis 3 establishes their final balance, turning, as Fewell and Gunn observe, ‘natural 
consequences into divinely controlled repercussions’.103 *05 The construction of gender is 
thus achieved. In 3:14-19 woman and man stop being characters and become archetypal 
roles, bearers of features, the validity of which, it is implied, transcends the world of the 
narrative.
The Serpent’s Curse (vv. 14-15)
Of all the characters of Genesis 2-3 taking part in the offence, Yahweh first 
addresses the serpent. Notably, Yahweh judges it following woman’s testimony, 
without questioning the serpent itself. Bai holds that by not asking the serpent what it 
has done, Yahweh limits its position as a character, treating it as a speechless animal.106 
Another way to understand this omission would be to link it to the absence of the crime 
as such: unlike woman and man, the serpent did not eat of the tree (cf. 3:6, 12,13), and 
therefore has, strictly speaking, nothing to confess. Yet an ellipse like this could also 
indicate Yahweh’s own problematic stance vis-à-vis the serpent. If the serpent fulfilled 
Yahweh’s secret plan by inciting the desire of knowledge in woman, it is hardly 
surprising that Yahweh should avoid bringing it to the surface. According to Fewell and 
Gunn, God does not interrogate the serpent because he does not want the cycle of blame 
to come to rest on himself with the counter question, ‘Why did you put that tree in the 
garden?’107 By treating the serpent as speechless, Yahweh silences his own shadow 
voice. His explicit, authoritative perspective -  prohibiting knowledge -  on the surface 
remains unchallenged.
In the absence of proper confession, Yahweh himself formulates the serpent’s' 
charge in v. 14 in a way that is remarkably elusive: ki ‘àsità zd ’t  ‘because you have 
done this’, zd ’t here might correspond to woman’s accusation in v. 13 (‘the serpent 
deceived me and I ate’), but it could also be used intentionally, as a reference to 
something that only Yahweh and the serpent know and do not name - a sign of
103 Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, p. 35.
06 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 126. Along similar lines, Cassuto interprets this omission as a statement of the
inferiority of the serpent vis-à-vis Yahweh, consistent with the general attitude o f the Torah rejecting the 
mythological image of the serpent or primordial monster rising against the creator (see Cassuto, Genesis
\hfP-  158-59).
Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, pp. 33-34.
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intimacy, of a secret pact between Yahweh’s Self and his Shadow. The outer layer of 
meaning in this double communication is negative: in punishment for its non-stated 
guilt, the serpent is cursed. But the term ’arur, ‘cursed,’ has its own contextual depth. 
The serpent becomes ‘cursed more than any beast and any wild animal’ in a clear echo 
of 3:1, where it was ‘wiser than any wild animal Yahweh God has made’. The 
words ’arur and ‘arum, ‘wise’, are linked by their superlative form as well as by 
assonance, and the assonance also brings in ‘erom, ‘naked’. Linguistically, the curse 
recapitulates the entire shadow plot, pointing simultaneously to the serpent’s wisdom 
and to the human knowledge of nakedness, which this wisdom has brought about.108 In 
this context, the serpent’s curse could be interpreted in two ways. Seen as a punishment, 
the curse commits the serpent to the lowest structural position: brought down to the 
level of the ground, it has to walk on its belly and eat dust. Leviticus interprets this 
position as a permanent sign of abomination (‘whatever walks on it belly... is 
detestable’ (Lv 11:42); elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible the metaphor of licking dust 
describes the state of conquered enemies (Ps 72:9; Is 49:23; Mic 7:17). Yet on the other 
hand, the physical closeness to the earth gives the serpent’s wisdom a new connotation, 
pointing to its chthonic character. Landy points out that, like the serpent’s chthonic 
wisdom, ‘the fruit and thus the temptation of the tree is the product of the earth’.109 One
i
could state that the serpent is wise, or discerning, because of its closeness to the earth, 
the source of wisdom and the substance and origin of all differentiated life forms. 
Eating dust, ‘agar, is a sign of this, as it manifests a renewal of the serpent’s symbolic 
function. The word ‘agar here is reminiscent of ‘agar min-ha*damah, ‘dust from the 
earth’ -  the undifferentiated and lifeless matter from which haadam was created in 2:7. 
It also anticipates ha’adam's return to dust in 3:19. The serpent’s digesting or 
transforming of the dust symbolically unites the beginning and end states of ha ’adam 
and points to the central role the serpent plays in the transformation of the Subject.
The serpent’s curse also involves a broken relationship, or enmity, ’ebah, 
between the two accomplices, the serpent and woman. Woman’s offspring will crush 
(swg) the serpent’s head, and the serpent, in return, will strike (swg) them on the heel 
(3:15). The rare verb swg is difficult to translate, and its meaning is usually seen as 
parallel to a similar root s ’g, ‘crave, desire’, which is occasionally translated as ‘crush’ 
(Jer 14:6, Am 2:7). Most commentators interpret swg in 3:15 as ‘crush, tread upon’ in
108 The chain of associated constructs will be extended further in Gn 3:17. Here Yahweh curses the earth 
( rurah ha *damah, Gn 3:17) which creates a link between the earth and the serpent.
109 Landy, Paradoxes o/Paradise, p. 255.
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illustration of the enmity between the two characters.110 Following this translation, the 
entire speech is often interpreted as an etiological narrative explaining the present-day 
relation between humans and snakes. There is, however, a case for a different reading of 
3:15. Given that the prevalent meaning of s ’g  is ‘desire’, the antagonistic relation 
between woman and the serpent might connote, paradoxically, their drive toward each 
other. One possible way of dealing with the semantic ambiguity of swjy has been 
suggested by Cassuto. For him, woman’s offspring ‘crushes’ the serpent, while the 
serpent ‘craves’ the woman’s seed.111 There is, however, no textual support for 
attaching different meanings to the actions of woman and the serpent. Given the 
narrator’s particular attention to parallel composition, one might argue that the two
3>
actions are symmetrical, despite their being aimed at different parts of the opponent’s 
body, and equally contain aspects of both attack and desire.
The concepts of r ’os, ‘head’, and ‘aqeb, ‘heel’ bring additional symbolism to the 
curse of the serpent. Both Hebrew terms are semantically polyvalent, and connote 
respectively the ideas of top and bottom, beginning and end, front and rear.112 On the 
one hand, the images of head and heel imply a vertical hierarchy. Walking on its belly, 
the serpent occupies a horizontal plane closest to the ground, while woman’s offspring 
walk on their feet (cf. ‘heel’), holding an upright, vertical position. As the serpent uses 
its head/mouth to strike at woman’s heel, she uses her foot/heel to strike the serpent’s 
head.113 It is as if the strikes were exchanged simultaneously, wounding both characters 
and tying them together. Yet the use of ‘aqeb, ‘heel’, could indicate a more complex 
symbolic transaction. Through its semantic association with ‘rear’, ‘aqeb connotes 
hiddenness and subversion of the normal order of things. The patriarchal narratives of 
Genesis will use these symbolic implications of the ‘heel’ to construct the name and 
identity of Jacob, the supplanting brother (ya^qob literally means ‘takes by the heel’ or 
‘deceives’, cf. 25:26, 27:36). The account of the birth of Esau and Jacob in 25:25-26 is 
particularly interesting in this respect, since, like 3:15, it displays the semantic 
opposition r ’s : ‘qb. Esau is bom first, ri’son, and is therefore associated with r ’s. 
Jacob, in his turn, is linked to ‘qb, since he comes out after Esau, grasping his brother’s 
heel. The brothers’ respective positions at birth determine the dynamics of their future
110 Westermann offers a brief overview o f scholarly opinion on the subject in Genesis 1-11, pp. 259-60; 
see also Wenham, Genesis 1-15, p. 80.
111 Cassuto, Genesis I, p. 161.
1,2 BDB, pp. 784,910-11; DCH  VI, pp. 540-42.
113 Early Christian commentators beginning with Irenaeus saw Gn 3:15 as the first messianic prophecy, or 
Protoevangelium, with its image of the Virgin Mary crushing the head of the serpent.
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relationship, at the centre of which lies Jacob’s deception or taking ‘by the heel’. In the 
conflict between woman and the serpent in 3:15, the fact that the serpent strikes woman 
on the heel seems to parallel the eponymous action of Jacob. In this context, the manner 
of the serpent’s attack in 3:15 might signify its subversive role in the dialogue with 
woman in 3:1 -5, which she later described to Yahweh as deception (3:13).
It is difficult to understand the meaning of woman’s gesture towards the serpent 
in the context of their previous interaction. It seems nevertheless significant that 
Yahweh presents the two characters being involved in a symmetrical relationship, 
simultaneously mirroring (swjofswp) and contrasting each other ( ‘aqeb/r’os). Their 
subversive interaction in 3:1-5 is a creative space where new meaning and knowledge is 
bom, it is also the space where Yahweh reveals his other side. Woman and the serpent 
are cross-determined in their shared role of ‘helper’ and in the dialogical character of 
their communication. The association between the two will also be implicit in the 
linguistic link between havvah and the Aramaic word for snake, hiwya when woman 
receives her proper name in 3:20.
Woman and Gender Roles (v. 16)
\1
Unlike the sentence upon the serpent, the punishment of woman at first seems 
unrelated to her offence. Abmptly, without a ki clause, Yahweh assigns to her the task 
of reproduction and emphasises the suffering it brings: ‘I will greatly multiply your toil 
and your conceptions, in pain you will give birth to children’ (3:16a).114 The pain that 
taints the life-giving power of woman is twice conveyed by the same root ‘sb ( ‘issabon, 
eseb, ‘pain, toil’). It is notable that neither ‘issabon nor ‘eseb is commonly used in the 
Hebrew Bible to describe the pain of childbirth. In prophetic literature, for example, a 
variety of terms convey woman’s suffering in labour, such as hul, ‘to writhe (in pain)’ 
(cf. Is 26:17, 18; 45:10; 54:1; 66:7, 8; Mi 4:10; Je 4:31; 6:24), hebel, ‘pain, pangs’ (Is 
13:8) and ?ir, ‘distress’ (Is 21:3). The non-specific term ‘issabon will reappear in 3:17, 
where it will characterise the subsistence of ha’addm. It would appear that woman’s 
suffering, though linked to procreation, is rooted in the general adversity of the human 
condition after transgression, and is the only thing she shares with man.
1,4 As Trible argues, Yahweh makes no charge against woman because he has already charged her during 
the interrogation, for his question, ‘What is this you have done?’ implies her guilt (God and the Rhetoric 
o f  Sexuality, p. 126).
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Two conclusions could be drawn here. On the one hand, the punitive vocabulary 
conveys Yahweh’s judgmental, negative attitude to knowledge, consistent with the 
leading plot, and yet on the other hand, by choosing non-specific terms to describe 
woman’s suffering, the narrator introduces a semiotic distance between punishment 
( ‘asab) and procreation (harah, yalad). Hence, though tainted with pain, woman’s 
childbearing in itself is not a punishment, but a logical consequence of her 
transformation. Her role, gendered and specific, stems from the couple’s discovery of 
nakedness in 3:7. The knowledge of sexual differentiation translates into the task of life- 
giving. One observes here a remarkable structural discrepancy: in v. 7, it was ‘the two 
of them’ who shared the knowledge of gender, and yet this knowledge, binary by 
nature, translates into the task of life-giving only for woman. Gender and the creative 
function it implies become woman’s exclusive prerogative. The other side of this 
transaction is that man is dissociated from fertility and life-giving. The new structure of 
life lacks the concept of father.115 haadam corroborates this in 3:20, naming his wife 
‘the mother of all living’, without any reference to himself as father. With respect to the 
creative power of the female, the male functions only as its product, i.e. a son (tefdi 
bantm, lit. ‘you will bear sons’), the idea that Eve will assert in 4:1, saying, ‘I have 
created a man (Ts) with^Yahweh’. In this respect, the garden narrative contravenes the 
idea of patriarchal succession, which elsewhere in Genesis allocates the life-giving 
function to men (5:3-32; Genesis 10; 11:10-26).
An interesting compositional detail of v. 16 is that it starts with the grammatical 
construction infinitive absolute + imperfect of the hiphil form of rabah, ‘become great, 
increase’. Altogether in the garden narrative, this construction is used four times (2:16, 
17; 3:4, 16). With its emphatic character, it seems to mark important stages in the 
progression of the plot.
’akoltok’el, ‘you shall surely eat’, 2:16
mottamut, ‘you shall surely die’, 2:17
Id’-motfmutun ‘you shall surely not die’, 3:4 
harbah 'arbeh ‘I shall greatly increase’, 3:16
The sequence captures the multivocality that lies at. the heart of the story. The 
concepts ‘eat’ and ‘die’ in the first two phrases oppose the concepts ‘not die’ and 
‘increase’ in the second two. The sequence ends with Yahweh’s authoritative ‘I shall 
greatly increase’ that is also semantically ambiguous. The negative context of
1,5 The word ’ab, ‘father’, is used once in Gn 2:24, where the phrase ‘his father and his mother’ points to 
man’s origins rather than his own ‘fathering’.
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punishment -  the increase of suffering -  is juxtaposed here to the semantically positive 
idea of increase as reproduction, reminiscent of the task to ‘be fruitful and multiply 
buy humankind received in the first creation account. The two voices of Yahweh 
come together in his address to woman in a way that fulfils the blessing of 1:28. The 
narrative’s (and Yahweh’s) self-subversive logic reveals dying as non-dying, and the 
eating of the forbidden fruit as a way to the divinely ordained increase of humankind.
The two statements at the centre of the sequence - Yahweh’s mot tamut_ (2:17) 
and the serpent’s Id’-mot fmutun (3:4) - are directly opposite and represent two 
contradictory perspectives on knowledge. However, these statements are not 
grammatically uniform, which opens a gap for interpretation. While Yahweh addresses 
the human being in its singular state (tamut, 2 pers. sing,), the serpent speaks of both 
woman and man (Id’-mot fmutfin, 2nd pers. pi.). Yahweh’s warning could be accurate in 
the sense that knowledge is incompatible with a singular, undifferentiated subject, for 
whom the act of discernment would constitute symbolic ‘death’. Semiotically, the 
singular ha ’adam faces either stagnation (lack of knowledge) or death (transformation), 
which explains why Yahweh considers its singular state, Fbad, as ‘not good’ (2:18). 
Consequently, he creates woman in order to ensure that the Subject, by becoming 
plural, is capable of both knowing and living. This is precisely what the serpent says in
i
3:4. Its words ‘you shall certainly not die’ do not contradict Yahweh’s earlier statement, 
since they are applied to a different Subject. If Yahweh is right, so is the serpent: to the 
binary Subject, the attainment of knowledge signifies experience and growth, the 
opposite of death and stagnation.
The full implication of this argument becomes clear in 3:16. The semiotic 
process to which the serpent refers opposes death to the differentiation and discernment 
that are embodied by woman and achieved through her. The same semiotic process now 
gives woman the ultimate responsibility for the continuation of life. Her structural role 
of ‘helper’, who has brought knowledge and life to the sterile, stagnant and 
undifferentiated hd’adam, is now epitomised in her ‘greatly increased’ conceptions and 
her childbirth.116 Hence, ha’adam recognises woman as the source of life for all when 
he, following Yahweh’s speech, names her hawwah, ‘mother of all living’ (3:20). 
However, alongside the universal aspect of hawwah, woman is also specifically
116 Clines argues that child-bearing is the only help which woman provides. In the narrative, he states, she 
‘exists for the procreation of children. This is what Eve does to help’ (Clines, What Does Eve Do to 
Help?, p. 36). I only partly agree with this statement. Above, I have aimed to demonstrate that woman’s 
help is first and foremost to give to ha adam the knowledge of good and bad. Her procreation is an 
expression of this primal function.
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established as a source of renewal and reinstatement for male subjectivity. Through her 
births of sons, foretold in 3:16 and actualised in 4:1, 2, 25, ’is is reborn. In this, 
woman’s position as man’s helper receives a new meaning: through her man not only 
acquires divine knowledge, but is continually brought to life and therefore symbolically 
escapes death.
Following the description of woman’s pregnancies, Yahweh moves on to 
establish sexual roles for both woman and man: ‘your desire shall be for your husband 
( ’is), and he shall rule over you’. It introduces a radically new dynamic into the 
relationship of the primal pair, being, as Bird has stated, ‘the Bible’s first statement of 
hierarchy within the species’.117 One of the most direct statements of patriarchy,118 
3:16b has exercised enormous influence over social and cultural perceptions of gender, 
endorsing gender inequality by the authority of a divine’ decree.119 Although the 
androcentric message of this text seems obvious, some aspects of it stand in tension 
with the rest of the narrative and therefore warrant our attention.
The first difficulty concerns the human, gendered as ’is. In 3:16, as elsewhere in 
Genesis 2-3, his presence is problematic. Yahweh uses ’is as a semiotic object needed to 
formulate woman’s destiny (notably, it is woman, and not the gendered ’is, who is 
instructed about the ma(e rule). Of all the aspects of subjectivity in the narrative, his is
i _
the least established and acknowledged, ’is is not linked, like ’adam, to the earth, or 
like ’issah, to the serpent, and is never specifically named or directly addressed by 
anyone. His only companion is woman: of the four times 'is is found in Genesis 2-3, 
each time it appears in connection with ’issah (2:23, 24; 3:6, 16). Both literally and 
semiotically, he is woman’s creation, her ‘son’ (3:16; cf. 4:1). As a character,- ’is has 
proved to be weak and unmotivated, while ’issah has shown initiative and independent 
judgment. Yet, paradoxically, Yahweh gives this weak and schematic male subject 
unequivocal ascendancy over woman.
The rise to power of ’is in 3:16 is less surprising if one considers that a linguistic 
convention underlying biblical narrative regards male subjectivity as primary. Here, as 
Fewell and Gunn indicate, ‘values associated with being a “man” (or “masculine”,
117 Bird, ‘Bone of My Bone and Flesh of My Flesh’, ThTo 50 (1994), p. 527.
118 Meyers sees it as ‘perhaps the most problematic in all the Hebrew Bible from a feminist perspective’ 
(Meyers, Discovering Eve, p. 113).
119 Trible disputes this evaluation, saying that ‘male supremacy is neither a divine right nor a male 
prerogative ’. Instead, she sees both male supremacy and female subordination as signs o f the unresolved 
tension, in which man and woman have to live as a result o f their disobedience (Trible, God and the 
Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 128). Although this point is valid, it remains unclear why man’s transgression 
leads to his superior position.
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“male”) are assumed to be a neutral standard or the norm, and are unmarked, while 
values associated with “woman” (or “feminine”, “female”) are negative, abnormal, 
inessential -  in short, inferior -  and are marked’.120 It is because of his primary position 
that ’is does not have to be specifically established -  he is the Subject ‘pre-existent’ in 
hd’ddam and central to the implied reader’s point of view -  whereas ’issah, the Other, 
has to be characterised, named and renamed to reflect the Subject’s changing 
perception. It is therefore only through an act of defining woman’s place, in other 
words, of ruling over her, that the primary Subject can establish and maintain his own 
identity. For Bal, ‘self is defined by exclusion of what is perceived as other’.121 The 
ambiguous identity of ’is - superfluous and passive yet endowed, disproportionately, 
with power and authority -  reflects the basic paradox of the patriarchal mind, defined by 
the same female reality that it is rejecting.
Narratologically speaking, the idea of the patriarchal rule of ’is over ’issah is 
consistent with an attitude toward woman that ha ’adam has demonstrated from onset. 
As we have previously observed, in 2:23-24 ha’addm sees woman as part of himself, 
flesh of his flesh. Later in 3:12, interrogated by Yahweh, he blames woman for his own 
actions, projecting his guilt onto her and dissociating himself from both. Whether man
is moved by love or by fear, he shows an egocentric attitude, denying woman autonomy
t
and thus negating her as a subject. It would appear that the relationship of dominance, 
msl, of man over woman in 3:16 epitomises this perspective of the Self which, in its 
expansion, takes over the subjectivity of the Other. Perhaps one of the reasons why ’is is 
not told about his superior role is because he has been living it out all along. Benno 
Jacob comes to a similar conclusion about woman’s position. He argues that woman’s 
role as man’s helper, established before her creation, presupposes both her 
subordination and the dominating position of man. By proclaiming man’s rule in 3:16, 
Yahweh does not effect any real change, but endorses the gender hierarchy already at 
work.122
The second difficulty concerns woman’s desire that binds her to man {fsuqdh). 
Scholars have commonly interpreted the meaning of fsuqdh in 3:16 as sexual desire. 
Their readings range from ‘lust’ (Everett Fox) and ‘apparently unbridled sexual desire’ 
(Lemer) to sexual and loving desire (Brenner) or longing for sexual intimacy (Terence
120 Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, p. 17.
121 See Bal, ‘Introduction’, in Mieke Bal (ed.), Anti-Covenant: Counter-Reading Women’s Lives in the 
Hebrew Bible (JSOT SS, 81; Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989), p. 15.
122 Benno Jacob, The First Book o f  the Bible: Genesis (trans. Israel I. Jacob and Walter Jacob; Jersey 
City: Ktav, 2007), p. 30.
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Fretheim). For Trible, woman’s sexual desire expresses her yearning for the original 
unity of male and female as one flesh (cf. 2:23-24), the unity that has been disrupted by 
disobedience.123 24 It is often argued that Yahweh introduces woman’s sexual desire in 
order to perpetuate procreation. Meyers links the institution of desire in 3:16 to 
women’s social-economic function of replenishing the community by repeated 
childbearing. Having procreation as her primary role, woman needs desire to 
compensate for the risks of pregnancy and birth.125 126In this way, the pains of childbirth 
do not preclude her from further sexual relationship with her husband, to whom she 
feels relentlessly attracted. From this perspective, woman appears totally objectified, 
used as a tool of procreation, bound to man both socially, by his domination, and 
emotionally, by her own desire. Even more than man’s rule, woman’s desire for man 
epitomises the patriarchal ideal.
And yet it does not quite ring true. Unlike the concept of msl that reverberates 
with the male perspective throughout the narrative, the desire woman feels in 3:16 is 
inconsistent with her previous characterisation. On the one hand, the reader knows 
woman as the one who desires, fsuqah in 3:16 shows semantic continuity with ta^wah, 
‘desire’, and hamad, ‘to delight in’, which communicated woman’s desire of seeing and 
understanding in 3:6 (cf^also the possible reading of sup_ in 3:15 as ‘desire’). Woman’s 
desire for knowledge is her key characteristic on which the entire narrative is hinged, 
the feature that enables her to ‘help’ ha’adam. Yet on the other hand, at no point in the 
story has woman desired man in any of his guises, either as ha’adam or as ’is. She has 
never addressed him and, apart from giving him the fruit to eat, she has not related to 
him at all. While hd’ddam is oriented towards woman from the moment he sees her 
(2:23-24), she appears to all but ignore her partner. One might ask why woman, whose 
interests and desires belonged elsewhere before 3:16, should start feeling desire for man 
now, just after he has betrayed her to Yahweh (3:12)? If anything, the couple’s 
knowledge of nakedness gave rise to the feelings of shame and fear, not those of desire, 
making the overall mood of the narrative cold and non-affective.
123 Everett Fox (trans. and comment.), The Five Books o f  Moses: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, 
Deuteronomy. A New Translation with Introduction, Commentary, and Notes (Schocken Bible, 1; New 
York: Schocken, 1995), p. 23; Lemer, Eternally Eve, p. 112; Athalya Brenner, The Intercourse o f  
Knowledge: On Gendering Desire and ‘Sexuality ’ in the Hebrew Bible (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 21; 
Terence E. Fretheim, ‘The Book of Genesis: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,’ NIB I, p. 363.
124 Trible, God and the Rhetoric o f  Sexuality, p. 128.
125 Meyers, Discovering Eve, pp. 116-117.
126 From a different angle, Bal sees the reversed order in which woman’s desire for man is placed in Gn 
3:16 after her labour as an indication that the relationships of desire and domination are judged ‘less 
important, perhaps less fatal, than the pain o f labor’. Seen this way, the process of life-giving appears to 
be fundamental to woman’s nature and emphasised over sexual relations (Lethal Love, p. 126).
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Another interpretative possibility regarding woman’s role in 3:16 has been 
suggested by Joel Lohr. In a recent article, he questions the reading of fsuqah as sexual 
desire.127 128In his view, this term, found only three times in the Hebrew Bible (3:16; 4:7; 
Sg 7:11), connotes the idea of ‘return’ and is therefore synonymous to fsubah. A 
number of early textual witnesses interpret fsuqah in 3:16 as ‘turning’ or ‘return’: such 
is the translation of LXX {apostrophe),128 the Old Latin (conversio), the Peshitta, and 
the Ethiopian version of Jubilees {megba’, ‘place of refuge’ or ‘place of return’, Jub 
3:24). Among the examples of the early Hebrew usage of the term, Lohr quotes the non- 
biblical Rule o f the Community (IQS 11:21-22). First, it alludes to the creation of the 
human being out of dust, and then describes human longing (fsuqah) for dust. The 
meaning ‘return’ seems more appropriate here, especially in the context of the human 
return {fsubah) to dust in 3:19. All of the remaining six occurrences of the term in the 
Qumran manuscripts likewise suggest a nuanced meaning of ‘return’. Accordingly, 
Lohr understands fsuqah as a movement ‘to an appropriate or natural place, almost as if 
part of the genetic makeup of the one (or thing) returning’.129 Woman’s fsuqah in 3:16 
might therefore signify her return to man as her origin in a movement that reverses the 
creation of woman from ’is (2:23; cf. 2:21-22). For Lohr, this return has a sense of
finality, and may signify a fulfilment of woman’s mission with respect to man. Indeed,
\
woman’s role as helper for ha’adam is now completed on both levels: as a provider of 
knowledge, she has brought about his transformation, and as a provider of sons, she is 
given the task of assuring his continuous existence. Her function is set, and there is no 
need, from the narrator’s point of view, to construct her character any further. Outside 
this function, she has no life or identity. With the non-sexual reading of fsuqah, female 
subjectivity is subordinated or ‘returned’ to man not because of her intrinsic desire or 
need of him but due to her predetermined narrative and social role. Contextual 
repercussions of such a reading become clear when one compares woman’s ‘return’ to 
her husband to man’s return to the earth, announced in 3:19.
127 Joel H. Lohr, ‘Sexual Desire? Eve, Genesis 3:16, and npltffn’, JBL 130 (2011), pp. 227-46.
128 The LXX seems to be reading fsubah  for fSuqah in Gn 4:7 {apostrophe, ‘return’) and in Sg 7:11 
(epistrophe, ‘turning, conversion’). V. P. Hamilton observes this in The Book o f Genesis: Chapters 1-17 
(NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), p. 201.
129 Lohr, ‘Sexual Desire?’ p. 246.
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ha’adam and ha,adam3h (w . 17-19)
In contrast to the gender-specific destiny of woman, man’s sentence in 3:17-19 
seems to be gender-neutral. It describes the general processes of human subsistence and 
death, marked with the same pain as woman’s labour: ‘in toil ( ‘issabon) you shall eat of 
it [the earth]’, ‘by the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you return to the earth’. 
Van Wolde suggests that Yahweh’s words in 3:17b-19 ‘also bear on woman and so on 
man in general’.130 Nevertheless, Yahweh clearly treats woman and ha’adam as 
separate subjects (cf. ‘because you have listened to the voice of your wife’). This 
upholds the ambiguous status of ha’adam: as a general human being, he is placed above 
gender, and yet remains grammatically and structurally male. Woman, on the other 
hand, is removed from this ‘general’ destiny of humanity. Instead, she is mentioned 
here as a mediator of man’s destiny, in echo of her original role of helper. Having 
conceived woman with a particular task in mind, Yahweh now recapitulates the role she 
played before discharging her of her duty. If this is correct, then the result of her 
intervention - the sentence of ha’adam - should reveal what Yahweh really wanted to 
happen all along, the idea that underlies his creation of humankind and gender.
So what happens to man as a result of woman’s ‘help’? Once again, Yahweh 
declares a curse, but man, unlike the serpent in 3:14, is not cursed directly. In an 
unexpected twist, the earth, ha “damcth, is punished in place of ha’adam (‘cursed is the 
earth on your account’, 3:19). Why should the earth, which did not play any part in 
man’s transgression, take on man’s punishment? The following text provides an 
immediate explanation, describing how the earth’s curse has a knock-on effect on man’s 
mode of subsistence. The curse affects the fertility of the earth, which will from now on 
produce for him ‘thorns and thistles’. The abundant provision of the garden, where man 
could simply ‘take’ his food of the trees (3:6), gives way to the meagre subsistence on 
the grass of the field, obtained by painful toiling.131 It would appear that Yahweh’s real 
target is not the earth, but man, who bears the consequences of the earth’s reduced 
fertility. •
ha^damah is, however, more that a mere instrument of Yahweh’s judgment. 
The notion of the earth has a semiotic depth that one cannot access without going back
130 van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis, p. 182.
131 Notably, the sentence of man, as well as his guilt, is dominated by the concept of eating: the verb ’akal 
is used here five times in the space of three verses.
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to the narrative of the creation of ha’adam in 2:5-7. In 2:5 the earth is a cosmic element 
which pre-exists humanity, and yet, without human services, its state is incomplete. The 
earth ( ’eres) is lifeless, with no vegetation on it, because there is ‘no ’adam to serve 
ha^damah'P2 Even before the earth-creature is brought to life, the narrator determines 
its particular relationship with the earth, in which the latter has a higher semiotic status. 
It is in order to fulfil the earth’s need that Yahweh fashions ha’adam from the dust of 
ha^damah (2:7). The obvious linguistic association between the two terms marks their 
semantic correspondence. On the one hand, ha ’adam, the one who tills, or serves, the 
soil, is united by function to ha *damah as the arable land. On the other hand, ha ’adam 
is an ‘earth-creature’, a being of the same substance with ha^damah, united to it by 
nature. For Westermann, this double correspondence ‘attests that human beings and 
earth belong together, that the earth is there for humanity and human beings are there to 
populate it, Is 45:18’.132 33 It also implies that the ability to till the land presupposes the 
Subject’s consubstantiality with it. Only as an ‘earth-creature’ can the human being 
serve the earth.
Strikingly, both aspects of the earth-human relationship outlined in 2:5-7 
reappear in the scene of the judgment of ha ’adam (3:17-19). First, it is crucial that at the 
end of the narrative, man finally fulfils his role in relation to the earth. Vegetation
i
serves as a link between the two, ensuring their mutual dependence: ha ’adam eats the 
plants that the earth yields for him, giving the earth his service (toil) in exchange (3:17- 
19).134 The vocabulary of 3:18 clearly echoes that of 2:5 (cf. ?amah, ‘sprout’, and ‘eseb 
hassadeh, ‘grass of the field’), but in contrast to the initial situation, which described the 
lack of grass and of sprouting, both concepts emerge as part of the new structure of life. 
Retrospectively, the garden appears as a transitional domain where a direct relationship 
with the earth is not possible. While subsistence in the garden is mediated and regulated 
by Yahweh, who sprouts (§amah) fruit trees from the earth (2:9), and issues dietary 
rules, subsistence outside the garden is mediated by the earth itself, which now can 
finally sprout vegetation. In 3:17-19 Yahweh relinquishes his responsibility for feeding 
man, making the earth his direct source of food and his metaphorical ‘master’. At the 
closure of the episode, when Yahweh sends ha’adam ‘out of the garden of Eden to
132 According to Brett, the verb ‘bd in all these cases should be taken in its more common meaning ‘to 
serve’, as opposed to ‘till’ or ‘work’, which are used in most English translations of Genesis 2:5, 15; 3:23 
(Genesis, p. 30).
133 Westermann, Genesis 1-11, p. 206.
134 See van Wolde, ‘Facing the Earth: Primaeval History in a New Perspective’, in Philip R. Davies and 
David J.A. Clines (eds.), The World o f  Genesis: Persons, Places, Perspectives (JSOT SS, 257; Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), p. 30.
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serve the earth from which he was taken’ (3:23), hâ^dâmâh appears to have taken 
Yahweh’s place in more than one respect.
Second, Yahweh’s judgment in 3:17-19 also refers to the human being’s origin 
as an ‘earth-creature’. For Dévora Steinmetz, the curse of the earth in 3:17 connotes its 
organic unity with man: ‘Earth could be cursed through Adam’s sin because earth 
( ’adamah) and Adam were of the same substance’.135 Earth is the undifferentiated 
substance of all created life forms (humans, plants, and animals); it is also that which 
human beings return to in the end (‘till you return to the earth, for from it you were 
taken’, v. 19). Both at the beginning and at the end of his life, hâ’âdâm merges with 
hâ^dâmâh, assuming a state marked by the absence of form, differentiation, and 
boundaries. This state corresponds to the earth’s initial ‘lifeless’ condition, symbolised 
by the notion of dust. Just as the lifeless earth -  dust -  became the raw material of 
humanity (‘for you are dust’), so the human being, in death, returns to its primordial 
unity with the earth (‘to dust you shall return’, v. 19). Arguably, the perfect symmetry 
between the beginning and the end situations suggests that the dominant idea here is not 
the end of human life, but human unity with the earth.
It is noteworthy that despite the clear connotation of death in w . 18-19 Yahweh 
does not mention the verb mût, ‘to die’ in his judgment of hâ’âdâm. This has interesting 
implications with regard to Yahweh’s death warning in 2:17. Was Yahweh accurate in 
his prediction mot tâmût, ‘you will certainly die’? Here, as elsewhere, the text is 
ambiguous. On the lexical level it seems to emphasise not the death of hâ’âdâm, but his 
life, hayyîm. The semantic sequence yôm -  ’âkal -  mût, present in the prohibition (cf. 
‘on the day you eat from it you shall certainly die’, 2:17) is replaced with the 
sequence 'âkal -  yôm — hayyîm (‘in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life’, 
3:17). In the last balance, instead of the certain and immediate death that hâ’âdâm 
should have experienced on the day he knew good and bad, he is given a lifetime of 
toiling on the earth that culminates in his return to earth as his origin.
As the above analysis suggests, the narrator of Genesis 2-3 translates the 
linguistic association between ’âdâm and "dâmâh into a relationship of both 
provenance and interdependence. On the one hand, the earth is presented as the ultimate 
foundation of human existence; on the other hand, it requires human service in order to 
produce life. The theme ‘man versus earth’ links the beginning and the end of the 
narrative, and the change in human status vis-à-vis the earth constitutes the main
135 Dévora Steinmetz, ‘Vineyard, Farm, and Garden: The Drunkenness of Noah in the Context o f the 
Primeval History’, JBL 113 (1994), p. 196.
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transformation of the story. From this perspective, the entire narrative structure of 
prohibition-disobedience-punishment appears to be constructed with the purpose of 
bringing the human being closer to the earth. Similarly, Jobling’s structural analysis of 
Genesis 2-3 defines the main narrative programme of Genesis 2-3 not as ‘creation and 
fall’, but as ‘a man to till the earth’.136 137 disagree, however, with Jobling’s assessment of 
Yahweh as a villain who unsuccessfully tries to stop man from tilling the earth by 
prohibiting knowledge. In my view, Yahweh’s motives are more complex. Plotting on 
two levels, Yahweh simultaneously orchestrates the ‘fall’ of ha’adam and distances 
himself from it. Repressed by the narrator and Yahweh himself, the programme that 
brings man to serve the earth is, nevertheless, what Yahweh really wants. Accordingly, 
the judgment of ha’adam in 3:17-19 demonstrates a success, rather than failure, of 
Yahweh’s plans.
If this is correct, and Yahweh’s ultimate goal in Genesis 2-3 is to establish a 
relationship between humankind and the earth, then the thrust of the narrative moves 
from the moral to the cosmological domain. At the centre of it is not human 
transgression, but Yahweh’s progressive creation, in which ha’adam and the earth come 
to occupy the precise places in the world order that Yahweh designed for them from the 
start. Paul Rjcoeur, who takes the opposite view, reading the ‘Adamic myth’ as an
i
irruption of the irrational into the perfect and complete universe of Genesis 1, pinpoints 
the ‘either - or’ choice required in approaching the narrative. For him, ‘the idea of a 
“fall” of man becomes fully developed only in a cosmology from which any creation- 
drama has been eliminated’. In my opinion, the opposite is also true: since one cannot 
eliminate Yahweh’s crucial involvement from the drama of human disobedience, the 
idea of ‘fall’ loses its grounds. From this angle, what Ricoeur has seen as an irrational 
human choice disrupting the perfect creation, could be treated instead as part of the 
ongoing process of creation, through which Yahweh continues to organise the elements 
of the cosmic order and their relationships.
136 Jobling, The Sense o f  Biblical Narrative, pp. 21-29.
137 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism o f Evil (trans. Emerson Buchanan; New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 
p. 172. See also Mettinger, The Eden Narrative, p. 81.
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Gender Relationships and the World Order in Genesis 2-3
In the new structure of life described in 3:14-19, the relationship between man 
and earth (ha ’adam - ha ’adamah) displays a striking similarity to that between man and 
woman ( ’is - ’issah). Various degrees of that similarity have been observed in biblical 
scholarship. Francis Landy, for instance, states that in Genesis 2-3 man’s ‘relationship 
with woman is a precise parallel to that with the earth’.138 In her detailed semiotic study 
of Genesis 2-3, van Wolde analyses different levels of correspondence between earth, 
man, and woman.139 To begin with, ’is shows the same phonetic resemblance to ’issah 
as ’adam does to "damah. Next, at a grammatical level, the feminine ending -ah  found 
in both ’issah and *damah points to a certain semantic analogy. Van Wolde interprets 
the morpheme -ah as an iconic sign of the life-giving function that woman and earth, 
have in common. The third, sememic level of correspondence exists between the 
pairs ’adam - ’“damah and ’is - ’issah. The two pairs demonstrate, each in its turn, a 
relation of interdependence. The earth brings forth ha ’adam (2:7) and is the source of 
his sustenance (3:18), while woman is destined to bear sons and therefore, implicitly, 
brings forth ’is (3:16; cfj 4:1). Neither woman nor earth can produce life without their 
partners, ’is and ’adam, who are respectively assigned the tasks of ruling over ’issah 
(3:16) and tilling (serving) ^damah (3:17-17). For van Wolde, these tasks display 
constructive, governing involvement of the male character with respect to his partner, 
which she defines as management. The relations of interdependence between the two 
pairs could be summarised in the following formula:
’adam : * damah
_____________  = management : giving life
’is : ’issah
Imaging the earth in its life-giving aspect as a mother figure is recognised across 
different cultural contexts: from Gaia, the goddess of the earth of Greek mythology to 
the earth as the universal mother in Native American creation myths. In Sumerian
138 Landy, Paradoxes o f  Paradise, p. 255. See also Clines, The Theme o f  the Pentateuch (JSOT SS, 10; 
Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1978), p. 75.
139 van Wolde, A Semiotic Analysis, pp. 183-86.
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mythology, the Mother Goddess is known as Ki, the earth, who, having espoused An, 
the sky god, gives birth to all the other gods and the vegetation and takes part in the 
creation of man. In the biblical myth of creation, the attribution of gender characteristics 
to the earth is more subtle than in other traditions. The earth in Genesis 2-3 is gendered 
through semantic associations between narrative elements rather than through clear 
taxonomy. The narrator constructs the earth as a ‘metaphorical female’ by making its 
relationship with humanity structurally parallel to that between woman and man. This 
process hinges on the ‘split personality’ of ha’adam: being a figure of generalised 
humanity, standing for both male and female, ha’adam is also a particular male 
character in the story. On the one hand, his subjectivity is defined by a disavowal of 
gender, and yet, on the other hand, it is reaffirmed as male in his relation to the earth. 
Similarly, the female reality, whether it is subsumed in the general definition of 
humankind or excluded from it, survives as a projection in the image of the 
metaphorical female - the earth. Because of this structural discrepancy, as Brueggemann 
has stated, ‘the natural partner of man is “ ’adama”, not “ ’issa”’.140
In addition to the sememic parallels demonstrated by van Wolde, earth, 
ha ’adam, and woman are united by a hierarchy of provenance. They correspond to the 
three progressive stages of creation/differentiation of the Subject that took place in 
Genesis 2. There, in the first instance, Yahweh fashions a human from the dust of the 
earth, differentiating it from its larger environment ( “damah —► ’adam). In the next 
stage, woman was created from a side of ha ’adam ( ’adam —► ’issah). The following 
diagram modifies van Wolde’s formula in a way that takes account of the derivative 
links between its elements:
Fig. 6
“dàrnàh <•••••>
A
’adam
A
y V
’issah < • • • • • >  ’is
derivation
functional (sememic) analogy 
< .......... •> interdependence
140 Brueggemann, ‘O f the Same Flesh and Bone’, p.538.
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In the hierarchy of creation in Genesis 2, the earth is the origin of humanity, and 
woman, its most differentiated form. Notably, each successive element of the 
progression "damah —> 'adam —*■ ’issah fulfils a particular purpose with respect to its 
predecessor. Thus, ha ’adam has to till (serve) the earth to make it fertile, and woman 
has to be hd’addm's helper. As I have argued above, woman’s intervention or ‘help’ 
creates the conditions that enable man to serve the earth. In this, the entire progression 
is directed back towards the earth.
This idea is finalised in Genesis 3:16-19, where the hierarchy of creation is 
traced back to its beginning. Here the woman’s destiny is placed in the context of her 
relationship with her husband, whereas the lot of ha ’adam is defined by his association 
with the earth. Like woman’s labour with its toil ( ‘is$dbdri), the relationship between 
hd’addm and ha^damdh is tainted with pain: ‘in toil ( ‘issabon) you shall eat of it’, 
3:17). If, as Lohr has argued, fsuqah in 3:16 means ‘return’ and is used in parallel to 
sub in 3:19, then, structurally, both woman and ha’adam perform the same movement, 
going back to where they have come from: ’issah to ’is, and ha ’adam to ha"damah. 
Given its narrative association with ’is, ha’ddam becomes a link in a progression ’issah 
—* ha’ddam —* ha^damah that brings together woman and the earth. At the end of 
Genesis 3, Yahweh’s creation has gone full circle, returning more differentiated forms 
of subjectivity back to their previous, less complex forms. The earth features at the end 
of this circle in its primal, lifeless state of dust (‘for you are dust and to dust you shall 
return’, 3:19).
A problem that complicates the chiastic relationship between earth, man, and 
woman in w . 16-19 is the serpent’s function. Defined by its closeness to the earth and 
by its enmity towards woman, the serpent’s role does not fit into the pattern ‘derivation 
vs. return’. Still, the serpent relates in one way or another to each of the participants of 
the new cosmic order. Being a creature of the earth like ha ’adam, the serpent remains 
closely related to it. Like the earth, the serpent is cursed, and the curse closes up the 
distance between them, almost merging them together, for now the serpent has to walk 
on its belly and eat dust (of the earth). Similarly, the dust that the serpent consumes 
links it to hd’ddam, and to his origin and destiny as an ‘earth-creature’ (cf. 3:19). Yet 
most graphic of all is the serpent’s relation to woman (3:15). Due to the semantic 
uncertainty of the verb sug, their mutual enmity is highly ambiguous: they either 
simultaneously attack each other, or are drawn to each other by desire.
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Notably, the verbs sun (twice in v. 15), sûq (v. 16), and sub (twice in v. 19), 
used respectively in the sentences of the serpent, woman, and man, are linked by both 
alliteration and assonance. The striking repetition of sound draws attention to these 
three actions and suggests a certain degree of continuity between them. This has 
implications for how one understands the overall semiotic order constructed by the 
narrator of Genesis 2-3:
Fig. 7
nahàs
strikes/desires (i«£) ^  | strikes/desires (s%)
u
’issah
is taken from (Iqh) ^  | desires/retums to (sûq)
m  Î |
’âdam/’îs
is taken from (Iqh) A  , returns to (Sub)n
**damah
In this model, the serpent stands at the top of the functional hierarchy. By 
introducing duality of meaning into human experience, it acts as a refractor, turning the 
semiotic chain * dam ah —* ’adam —> ’issah back onto itself. This role is not limited to 
the dialogue in the garden: it is perpetual, applied to z a r a the progeny of both woman 
and the serpent. In the cosmic order that Yahweh announces at the end of Genesis 3, the 
subversive wisdom of the serpent is the force that turns the wheel of creation, makes it 
an ongoing process, returning woman to man, and man to earth, so that the cycle can 
start all over again.
The naming of woman in 3:20 could offer additional support to the above 
interpretation. Here the narrator’s gloss derives woman’s name hawwah from the root 
hayyah, ‘to live’, describing her as the ‘mother of all living’. Sama sees the name 
hawwah as an archaic form of hayyah, ‘living’ (fem. sing.), and interprets it in the 
context of 3:20 as ‘living thing, i.e. life personified, or propagator of life’. 141 In a
141 Sama, Genesis, p. 29.
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narrow sense, this name simply designates woman’s reproductive function, her 
responsibility for the continuation of life, established in 3:16. Compared to the first, 
generic naming of ’issah in 2:23, hawwah is a proper name and reflects man’s 
understanding of the identity of woman, who is from now on, in the words of Bal, 
imprisoned in motherhood.142 However, looking at the place 3:20 occupies in the 
composition of the scene, one might adopt a wider perspective on woman’s name. 
Although man learns about woman’s reproductive role in v. 16, he delays naming her 
‘mother of all living’ until he has received his own judgment in w . 17-19, the judgment 
that introduces death and return to dust as an inevitable part of his experience. This 
presents the proclamation of life in the naming speech of ha ’adam as a counterbalance 
to the death penalty he received in the previous verse. Though man clearly needs to wait 
for Yahweh to finish his speech before any naming could be done, it is difficult to avoid 
looking at man’s discourse as a reaction to the entire series of judgments, or as a sort of. 
digest. Seen in this way, the name of frawwah not only points to woman’s life-giving in 
3:16 but also plays on the general idea of life renewed through the cyclic rhythm of 
creation and return that underlies all the sentences in 3:14-19. The words ’em kol-hay, 
‘mother of all living’ support this universal connotation.
If the above argument is valid, man’s naming of woman puts her at the centre of 
the new cosmic order as the epitome of life and renewal. The existential threat to the 
subjectivity of ha adam -  the threat of annihilation associated with the unity of 
ha’adam and ha’“damah in 3:19 -  is made less urgent through hawwah. Being a 
universal mother, she is also the personal saviour of ha ’adam, the one who redeems him 
from dust and restores, over and over again, his transient identity. In that respect, the 
structural role of hawwah parallels that of Yahweh in 2:7, where he differentiated 
ha ’adam from the earth by breathing into him the breath of life (hayyim) and making 
him a living being (neges hayyah). Bal understands this structural similarity as a 
‘functional analogy between the two creative forces’. For her, woman’s role as the 
climax of creation and as the future creator of ‘all living’ may be signified in the 
phonetic resemblance between her name and the name of Yahweh. Accordingly, the 
phoneme HW that characterises the creators is opposed to the phoneme DM that 
characterises the creatures.143 The semantic ground for the rapprochement between the 
two names lies in the concept of life, with the sequence yhwh, hayyim, hayyah (2:7) 
reflected in the sequence hawwah, fray (3:20).
,42 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 128.
143 Bal, Lethal Love, p. 129.
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This cross-determination of concepts and characters becomes even more 
complex when one observes a linguistic link between hawah and the serpent. The 
Aramaic word for snake, hiwya’, resembles the Hebrew hayyah, ‘to live’ (cf. also the 
Arabic hayyatun, ‘serpent’).144 In Bereshith Rabbah, this association between the two is 
used to bolster a negative evaluation of woman. Here, Rabbi Aha describes hawwah as 
Adam’s serpent, i.e. seducer.145 However, it is the concept of life and not that of 
seduction that forms the semantic basis for their relationship. In various cultural 
traditions, the image of the snake shedding its skin has been interpreted as a symbol of 
the renewal of life. In the Hebrew myth, the serpent’s role is similar: by introducing 
death as a means of renewal, the serpent, paradoxically, ensures the continuity of life. 
For woman and the serpent, ‘life’ is a shared signifier.
It would appear that towards the end of Genesis 2-3 the narrative establishes a 
chain of semantic correspondences between the characters of woman, Yahweh, and the 
serpent on the one hand, and the concept of life on the other. Having used the serpent to 
instigate, and woman, to actualise his shadow plot, Yahweh succeeds in establishing a 
new structure of life. At the centre of this structure lies a relationship between ha ’adam 
and ha^damah, the desired outcome of Yahweh’s plotting. Structurally, in their 
reciprocal relationship both man and the earth absorb each other, as man incorporates
j
the earth through eating and the earth incorporates man through death. While this unity 
is achieved through the narrative mediation, or ‘help’, of woman and the serpent, it is 
also constantly disrupted by their symbolic function. For it is only through the medium 
of woman, the creator of new life and the semiotic bearer of difference, and of the 
serpent as the agent of subversion and change, that man and the earth can remain 
differentiated, and their relationship renewed. Woman and the serpent keep the process 
going. As such, their role is indispensable.
Concluding Observations
In view of this long examination of Genesis 2-3, how could one account for its 
profound ambiguity and its double narrative structure? Why should Yahweh speak with 
two voices, and why should his real intentions be communicated in a repressed, implicit
144 Cassuto, Genesis I, pp. 170-71.
145 Genesis Rabbah 20:11; 22:2.
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way, in an almost exact contradiction of his pronouncements? At a diachronic level, one 
might see here an example of what Brett calls the ‘intentional hybridity’ of the Genesis 
narrative and defines more specifically as the technique of juxtaposing alternative points 
of view, used by the final editors in order to undermine the dominant voices and 
ideologies.146 From the perspective of gender, ‘intentional hybridity’ simultaneously 
establishes and puts in question the decreed dominance of ’is.
This diachronic explanation could not account, however, for the extent of cross­
determination that exists between the two alternative plots. Ambiguity here seems to be 
not only an editorial technique but also a key principle that guides the construction of 
subjectivity at every stage of the narrative. According to this principle, Yahweh emerges 
as a contradictory, composite character who occupies simultaneously the centre and the 
margins of the narrative world. As the central figure, he has absolute power and 
authority, and exercises them through the acts of creating ('ásáh, yñsar) and decreeing 
(?áwáh). This centre sets out boundaries and embodies the concepts of justice and 
judgment. In this sense, Yahweh of Genesis 2-3 is akin to the transcendent creator of 
Genesis 1 who, in Landy’s words, is ‘rational, determined, and uninvolved’.147
On the other hand, the same Yahweh introduces the seeds of subversion into the 
world by planting the tree of the knowledge of good and bad alongside the tree of life. 
The centre of the garden,' occupied by the two trees, is split from the beginning. Seeing 
it as the symbolic centre that epitomises Yahweh’s own identity, the concepts of Life 
and Knowledge convey the union of dualities that only Yahweh can possess. His 
knowledge of good and bad constitutes his other side, his Shadow that is pushed out to 
the margins. However, it is this repressed knowledge that motivates Yahweh’s further 
creation. By judging human singularity as Id’-fob, Yahweh also acknowledges the 
deficiency of his own totality-based discourse. Creating gender, Yahweh expresses and 
shares his own duality. The new world order that comes as a result of Yahweh’s 
marginal, shadow plot, accommodates the dualities of male and female, good and evil, 
life and knowledge.
In this respect, the resolution of Genesis 2-3 shows some interesting dynamics. 
Here, following the success of his shadow plot, Yahweh’s leading position is weakened. 
He finds himself vulnerable, afraid that the new, evolved human might now eat of the 
tree of life and live forever (3:22). Although this idea is structurally impossible -  by 
getting to know good and bad, the human beings have entered the cycle of birth and
146 Brett, Genesis, p. 32.
147 Landy, Paradoxes o f  Paradise, p. 260.
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death and so, by definition, have lost immortality — Yahweh’s fear is not without 
significance. It prompts Yahweh to redraw the boundaries and to return to his central 
discourse, expelling ha’adam from the garden and placing the cherubim to guard the 
tree of life. Yet is he left unaffected? The tree of knowledge, the symbol of Yahweh’s 
repressed, marginal identity, seems to have disappeared from the text and from the 
garden. Could this signify the end of ambiguity in Yahweh’s discourse? Is the garden 
now freed from distinctions, with only the tree of life in the centre? And where is Eve at 
the crucial moment when the boundaries are drawn?
I would argue that the absence of woman in the closing scene of 3:22-24 marks a 
change in the narrator’s attitude that moves the narrative balance towards the central, 
dominant discourse. The fact that woman does not explicitly leave the garden has 
potential semiotic implications. By leaving her out of the picture, the narrator conceals 
the mediating and transforming function of gender in the new world order, which from 
now on will be presented as a gender-neutral relationship between man and the earth. 
To an extent, woman as an acting, thinking subject is left behind, her significance 
confined to the garden narrative and its shadow plot. The immediately following 4:1, 
where Eve is celebrated as a creative, life-giving force within humanity, is an exception
that confirms the rule, for it is also the last time Eve is mentioned in Genesis and the
\
Hebrew Bible. While ha ’adam is banished from the garden, hawwah is banished from 
the subsequent history of humankind. Female reality in the cosmological myths of 
Genesis 4-11 exists only as a conjecture, an occasional generic reference to wives and 
daughters in the context of male genealogies (4:17, 19-23; 6:1-4). To complete her 
banishment, woman is deprived not only of name and presence but also of the life- 
giving function that she has been associated with in the garden. Instead of the ‘mother 
of all living’, it is ’adam and his descendants that go on regenerating themselves 
through the lengthy tofdoi (Genesis 5; 10; 11:10-26). For Mary Daly, this 
‘multiplication of males’ is part of the narrative strategy that denies female reality in the 
cosmic order.148 This strategy is ratified by Yahweh, who in the flood narrative transfers 
the blessing to ‘be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth’ from the unity of male and 
female (1:27-28) to the males across their generations (9:1; cf. 9:7). By the end of the 
cosmological accounts of Genesis 1-11, Yahweh seems to have no further use for 
gender. The ambiguous God who knows good and bad has remained in Eden, giving 
way to the God of the patriarchs.
148 Mary Daly, Gyrt/Ecology: The Metaethics o f  Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), pp. 37- 
38.
75

Chapter 2
The Subject, the Other, and the Land in the Abraham Cycle
The Matriarchal Succession
Following the cosmological myths of Genesis 1-11, the stories of Genesis 12-50 
communicate a myth of ethnogenesis that traces the origin of Israel back to the chosen 
line of forefathers. The subject matter of these narratives, formally presented as tdledot, 
‘generations’ of Terah, Isaac, Esau, and Jacob (11:27; 25:19; 36:1, 9; 37:2), ultimately 
lies in the account of a patrilineal descent: Abraham is succeeded by Isaac, Isaac is 
succeeded by Jacob, and Jacob’s twelve sons become the fathers of the twelve tribes of 
Israel. This account of succession is complicated by the tensions between the patriarchal 
Subject and his opponents. The destabilising presence of the Other is constantly
i
acknowledged and expressed by the narrative through the figures of the other brothers -  
Lot, Ishmael, and Esau -  who have to be removed from the land and cut off from the 
identity of Israel, giving origin to the neighbouring nations. Needless to say this central 
plot does not include female characters. The promise that stuctures the patriarchal 
narratives concerns only male succession, and women find their way into the story 
mainly as mothers that produce (male) heirs and ascertain the right descent. This 
function is as crucial for the construction of the patriarchal identity as it is undermined 
by the patriarchal strategies of the narrator. The tension that arises from the reluctance 
of the narrative consciousness to acknowledge woman’s role in procreation finds its 
perhaps clearest expression in the image of the sterile mother.149
Strikingly, the narrative dynamic of Genesis 12-50 starts not with God’s 
promise, but with a contradiction associated with a female character. 150Indeed, the very
149 In her analysis of the theme of sterile matriarch in the patriarchal narratives, Cheryl Exum argues that 
presenting the matriarchs as sterile is a strategy used by the narrator in order to undermine then- 
significance (Fragmented Women, pp. 120-36).
159 According to Westermann, the call of Abraham ‘follows immediately on 11:30’, being not a 
beginning, but part of the extended unit 11:27-12:9 (Genesis 12-36 [trans. John J. Scullion; Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Press, 1985], p. 148).
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appearance of a female character at the beginning of the patriarchal stories is in itself a 
surprise. From the story of Adam and Eve up to the tôlêdôt of Terah (11:27-32), the 
biblical text has dealt exclusively with men. The genealogies of Adam (5:1-32) and of 
Shem, Ham, and Japhet (10:1-32; 11:10-26) completely omit women’s names.151 In 
those rare cases when women receive a mention, their presence in the narrative is only 
nominal, deprived of any subjectivity.152
The situation changes with Sarah. Even before she assumes a meaningful 
narrative presence, the name of Sarai has been reiterated alongside that of Abram153 and 
the reader has been informed about her sterility (11:29, 30, 31; 12:5). The fact that the 
first woman to be mentioned by name is a sterile wife becomes an obstacle, which stops 
the smooth flow of male genealogies. Sarah is the wife who is not able to fulfil the 
function, which so many other women, concealed behind the toledoth, invisibly fulfilled 
before her. The reader who, since Eve, has been invited to take female fertility for 
granted, comes here to a startling realisation that a woman is required for the line (and 
life) to continue. Sarah’s deficiency makes her visible, and by doing so, reveals a 
narrative in need of female subjectivity.
Similarly to Sarah, the next two matriarchs will be marked by the same flaw.
\
Jacob’s mother Rebekah is originally sterile (25:26); so is Rachel, mother of Joseph 
(29:31). For the three generations of matriarchs, sterility seems to be a precondition of 
their import: to become significant in the narrative, a woman has to lose, even if only 
temporarily, what men assigned to her as her raison d ’être.
From the point of view of social representation within the narrative, sterility of 
the matriarchs undermines the patriarchal establishment. Both Abraham and Isaac 
attempt to choose the right wives for their sons, driven with the single concern for the 
continuance of their line (24:2-9; 28:1-5) but in both cases the narrative resists that 
concern by making the chosen wives unable to produce offspring.
151 Exum holds that omitting women’s names in genealogies is one of the strategies used by patriarchy in
order to ‘affirm the paternal claim to offspring’ (Fragmented Women, p. 111). . . .
152 Like that o f Adah and Zillah, the wives of Lamech, and Zillah’s daughter Naamah (4:19-24). In the 
story of the flood, the wives of Noah and his sons are only mentioned in parallel with all animals, birds 
and creatures taken by pairs, male and female, into the ark (7:7,13; 8:16,18). The daughters mentioned 
among the descendants of Shem belong to the category of nameless ‘other sons and daughters’ 
(11:11,13,15,17,19,21,23,25).
153 Henceforth, the names o f Sarah and Abraham will be used to designate the characters, who in the 
biblical text are called Sarai and Abram until Genesis 17.
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What is the narrative function of the recurrent motif of the sterility of the 
mother?154 It seems that the issue of sterility allows a woman’s perspective to enter the 
story, and signals from the outset the radical difference of that perspective. Those 
women, who are marked with sterility, resist generalisation, they become, to various 
degrees, real and distinctive narrative presences, engaging and remarkable characters 
not because of, but despite their being mothers.155
It is interesting that all three sterile matriarchs -  Sarah, Rebekah, and Rachel -  
have fuller characterisation and are distinguished by the narrative long before they 
become mothers. They are all depicted as beautiful women (12:11; 24:16; 29:17); 
Rebekah and Rachel, moreover, are loved by their husbands (25:67; 29:18, cf. 29:20, 
30). Why is it so? It is obvious that they do not need to be so closely focused on in order 
to produce offspring. In the narrative shaped by a need to perpetuate the father, all that 
is required from the ‘right wife’ is to come from the right lineage, the lineage of 
Abraham. The contrast with Leah, the unloved wife of Jacob, is instructive. She makes 
her appearance in the story as an impostor bride, and her primary narrative function is 
that of bearing children. Unlike her predecessor Rebekah, and her rival sister Rachel, 
she conforms much more to what the institution of patriarchy requires of a woman.
I
Though they formally serve the purposes of patriarchy by producing offspring 
and securing the purity of the line, the matriarchs acquire subjectivity of their own 
whenever they show resistance to the structures of dominance and authority. Sterility, 
laughter, deceit, theft, and sacriledge are the responses women give to the world of 
men’s power. And these responses count, they produce consequences, they are part of 
the narrative strategy that accepts them as valid without moral evaluation. These 
women’s weapon and their power lie in alterity.
We are dealing with a situation where authority, that is, power institutionalised 
by society, rests with the patriarchs, but where the women (matriarchs) exercise 
considerable personal influence over the course of events.156 Significantly, most of their
154 Alter includes the motif of the birth of the hero to his barren mother among other biblical type-scenes. 
(Alter, The Art o f  Biblical Narrative [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981], p. 51).
155 Exum sees this distinctiveness of the matriarchs as a sign of their ambiguous status and the problem 
they present for the narrator. As real characters, ‘they resist any simple narrative resolution that would 
confine them entirely to the mother’s place, which in the case of the genealogies means being absent, not 
being remembered’ (Fragmented Women, p. 112).
156 The anthropological distinction between authority and power has been successfully adopted in biblical 
studies of gender (see Meyers, Discovering Eve, pp. 40-44, 181-87; Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 136- 
MO; Fewell and Gunn, Narrative in the Hebrew Bible, p. 73; for a bibliography of earlier studies see 
Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 29 n. 22).
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verbal exchanges with their men consist in their giving orders, instructions or advice, 
always using the grammatical imperative, while we have no instances of the patriarchs 
addressing their wives in a similar way. Could such a persistent use of the imperative by 
the female characters within the family point to some other kind of authority the 
matriarchs are endowed with? Or, alternatively, is it a narrative way of making their 
voices heard?
According to Abraham in 20:12, Sarah is his half-sister, the daughter of his 
father Terah, but not of his mother.157 Nothing is known about Sarah’s (or Abraham’s!) 
mother. Sarah, the first matriarch, does not succeed anyone but rather she herself starts a 
matriarchal succession, constituted by women with names, intentions, and roles to play. 
That succession is structurally different from the patrilineal succession from Abraham 
or, for that matter, from any other genealogy in Genesis in that it is not lineal, and 
instead is constructed by a repeated narrative pattern.158
On the one hand, the matriarchs as ‘right’ wives are chosen from the lineage of 
Abraham in Haran. Thus, Rebekah is the daughter of Abraham’s nephew Bethuel; Leah 
and Rachel are daughters of Bethuel’s son Laban. Insisting on the wife from the same 
kin, the patriarchal narratives accept the importance of both father and mother for the 
purity of descent. The niatriarch is a woman included in the making of the nation.
On the other hand, the matriarchs succeed each other ‘narratively’ rather than 
genealogically. The narrator never mentions the succession of the matriarchs, instead, 
their stories follow one another, witnessing to their continuous presence. That presence 
is so crucial that whenever one of them is about to leave the stage the ‘successor’ has 
already been or will soon be appointed. Such is the case with Rebekah, whose wooing 
and marriage to Isaac come immediately after the death of his mother Sarah. Rebekah 
effectively replaces the mother for her husband: Isaac takes her ‘into his mother Sarah’s
157 In the larger context of the cycle, Abraham’s claim in 20:12 appears unsupported, and has been 
regarded as a lie by Clines ( What Does Eve Do to Help?, p. 76). Unlike Nahor’s wife Milcah, who is 
introduced in 11:29 as a daughter of Haran, Sarah appears in the same verse without a genealogical 
reference. Nina Rulon-Miller considers the absence of Sarah’s genealogy in 11:29 a deliberate omission 
that highlights the ambiguity of Sarah’s position of wife-sister in Genesis 12 and 20 (‘Hagar: A Woman 
with an Attitude’, in Philip R. Davies and David J. A. Clines [eds.],.77ie World o f  Genesis: Persons, 
Places, Perspectives [JSOT SS, 257; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998], p. 68). For Exum, who 
reads the scene from a psychoanalytic-literary perspective, the key issue is not the truthfullness of the 
patriarch, but the fact that the brother-sister relationship is imagined by the narrative consciousness 
(Fragmented Women, p. 167).
1581 need to emphasise that my point here is entirely narratological. From an anthropological point of 
view, which I shall refer to later in the study, the succession o f mothers in the patriarchal narratives 
results from the institution of matrilineal marriage and serves the idea of endogamy underlying the self­
understanding of the Israelite community. For a presentation of the discussion on the patterns of marriage 
and descent displayed in the patriarchal narratives, see Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 114-15.
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tent’, and his love for Rebekah comforts him ‘after his mother’s death’ (24:67). It is 
noteworthy that it is only after the new matriarch, Rebekah, has been successfully 
installed in Sarah’s place that Abraham takes a new wife and has children by her (25:1- 
6).
Twice in the narrative the new matriarch is chosen by a complex betrothal 
procedure. In the case of Rebekah, Isaac is represented by Abraham’s servant Eliezer; in 
the case of Rachel, by the bridegroom Jacob himself. Significantly, both women are 
recognised as the chosen brides when visiting a well: the type-scene ‘meeting at the 
well’ is a sort of a narrative ritual that serves to prepare the woman for a change of 
status. As in the case of Rebekah (24:4), kinship between bride and groom is stressed 
here as well. Isaac tells Jacob: ‘take a wife for yourself there from among the daughters 
of Laban, your mother’s brother’, 28:2, and when Jacob meets her at the well in Haran, 
he perceives her to have that very quality of a bride: ‘Jacob saw Rachel daughter of 
Laban, his mother’s brother’ (29:10). 159 At the same time, once Jacob has met his 
destined bride, his mother’s matriarchal role comes to an end. This change is signalled 
by repeated references to Jacob’s mother at the beginning of the scene (29:10, 10, 10, 
12, 13), and by her complete disappearance from the moment when Jacob meets Rachel 
onwards. )
The three matriarchs who form this succession, Sarah, Rebekah, and Rachel, are 
singled out by their beauty, initial sterility and the power they exercise over their 
husbands. In addition, Rebekah and Rachel are both betrothed by the well and 
subsequently loved by their husbands. Hagar and Leah, the other wifes of Abraham and 
Jacob, do not share these characteristics. As I shall show below, the narrator uses them, 
each one in a different way, to introduce rivalry into the construction of female 
subjectivity and, by doing so, foregrounds the ‘right’ mother (Sarah and Rachel). Yet, 
for all the emphasis and subversive characterisation that the matriarchs receive, they 
never divert from their purpose of giving birth to chosen sons and ensuring their 
succession.160 In her detailed analysis of the role of the matriarchs in Genesis 12-35, 
Exum has stressed the incomplete and fragmented nature of their stories, which are ‘no
159 The triple repetition of the formula ‘Laban, his mother’s brother’ in v. 10 stresses the fact that Jacob 
has reached the place where he was commissioned to go both by his mother (27:43) and by his father 
(28:2).
160 Hagar, who subverts her role of mother when she abandons Ishmael in the desert (21:15-16), is the 
only exception here (see below for an analysis of Hagar’s role).
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more than parts of the larger and more coherent stories of their husbands and sons’.161 
The matriarchs’ alterity and their very presence in the narrative are put to the service of 
the narrator’s main agenda, that is, the construction of the patriarchal and ethnocentric 
Subject. They add complexity and credibility to the acts of succession, in which the 
younger sons Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, favoured by the narrative, become one after 
another the protagonists of the national myth.
Because of its subordinate character, the matriarchal succession comes to an end 
together with that of the patriarchs. Jacob, the last patriarch to receive the promise 
(35:10-12), is also the last one to pass on the patriarchal blessing to his sons (Genesis 
49). The narrative construction of Israel’s identity is completed with the birth of the 
twelve sons of Jacob, the eponymous ancestors of the twelve tribes of Israel. With the 
patriarchal succession ended, there is no longer any role to play for powerful mothers in 
the structure of the narrative. There will be, therefore, no matriarchs in the story of 
Joseph, whose Egyptian wife Asenath, ‘daughter of Potiphera, priest of On’, receives 
but a fleeting mention, necessary to explain the birth of Joseph’s sons, and never 
becomes a character in her own right (41:45,50).
tJ
The Call of Abraham and the Land (12:1-3)
The call of Abraham marks the beginning of a new kind of discourse in the 
account of the generations of Shem and Terah. In 12:1 Yahweh tells Abraham to leave 
his land, his kindred, and his father’s house and go to the land, which Yahweh promises 
to show to him. The divine command implies a radical departure from the present 
identity of Abraham son of Terah, conveyed through the markers of ‘land’, ‘relatives’, 
‘father’s house’, towards a new identity, signified by the land that is, for now, only a 
vision. The immediate context suggests that the land Abraham has to leave is Haran, 
where Abraham is staying at the moment of the call (12:4), and the destination is 
Canaan, where Abraham will go in response to the divine command (12:5). Yahweh’s 
speech, however, does not name either of the two lands and its references to Abraham’s 
relatives and father’s house are not as clear as they seem. What is, in any case, the land 
of Abraham? Haran could hardly be considered as such, since 11:31 presents the
161 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 96.
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family’s stay in Haran as a temporary stopover on the way from Ur to Canaan, the 
journey started by the father of Abraham, Terah. Mentioned in conjunction with his 
kindred and his father’s house, understood as lineage, the phrase ‘your land’ in 12:1 
seems to denote Abraham’s native land, the land of his father, that is, Ur of the 
Chaldeans. In this case, as Fewell and Gunn have pointed out, it is ironic that Yahweh 
tells Abraham to leave his native land, which he has already done, and go to the land 
that had been his destination from the beginning.162 63 Brett notes along similar lines that 
Abraham’s journey to Canaan is his father’s initiative, and by undertaking it, Abraham 
demonstrates less his split from his father than he shows his continuity with him.164
Along with the idea of Abraham’s land, the narrative destabilises the concepts 
bet ha’ab, ‘father’s house’, and moledet, ‘kindred, relatives’. It appears significant that 
Yahweh’s call comes immediately after the death of Abraham’s father Terah has been 
announced (11:32), and although Terah’s life-span of 205 years suggests that he should 
still be alive at the time of Abraham’s departure (cf. 11:26, 32; 12:4), the reader’s 
immediate perception is that Terah is no longer there. This makes Abraham’s separation 
from the ‘empty’ house of his father much less radical than Yahweh seems to suggest. 
In addition, Abraham’s obedience to Yahweh’s command, which has traditionally been
deemed unquestionable, appears less certain given the number of relatives and the
j
amount of possessions that he takes with him when he leaves Haran. In fact, Abraham 
seems to directly disobey Yahweh’s command to leave his kindred behind by taking 
with him not only his wife Sarah but also his nephew Lot, along with all their 
possessions they have amassed and all the slaves they have aquired in Haran.165 
Resisting a simplistic or literal interpretation, Yahweh’s command stands in tension 
with its narrative context, destabilising the identity of the Subject.
Sarah’s sterility, announced in 11:30, is another indicator of the Subject’s 
instability. Her lack unveils the dysfunctional dynamics of the male genealogies by 
pointing directly at the absence of the Mother. The father’s house or lineage is tainted 
with (Sarah’s) sterility. From a structural perspective, the metaphor of the father’s land 
carries a connotation of emptiness: deprived of the fertility of the Mother, it holds in
162 The father’s house, bet ha ’ab, could signify not only a family home but also a more general idea of 
family or lineage. In either case, the meaning of Yahweh’s command is affected by the preceding 
reference to the death o f Terah.
163 Fewell and Gunn, Narrative in the Hebrew Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 91.
164 Brett, Genesis, pp. 47-48.
165 Lyle Eslinger sees the repeated use of pronominal suffixes (‘with him', ‘his wife’, ‘his nephew’, ‘their 
possessions’, ‘their people’, 12:4-5) in the description of Abraham’s departure as an indication that 
Abraham is not cutting off his old identity but carries it with him: ‘Abram’s social bridges are portable, 
not burnt’ (‘Prehistory in the Call to Abraham’, Bibint 14 (2006), pp. 196-97; the citation on p. 197).
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itself no potential, no possibility of growth. This quality of emptiness and stagnation is 
accentuated by the announced deaths of Haran (11:28) and Terah (11:32). In this light, it 
is ironic that Abraham comes on stage under the name Abram, meaning ‘exalted father’. 
At the beginning of his journey, at the start of the patriarchal succession, the Mother is 
sterile and the Father is dead.
The structurally unstable and semantically empty concept of ‘father’s land’ is 
contrasted in Yahweh’s speech to another concept of the land, the land to which 
Abraham is sent. The description of the destination is strikingly non-specific, referring 
to the patriarch’s future experience of seeing or being shown the land 
(ha'ares *ser *r ’eka) rather than a geographic location or a direction in space. In a 
way, Abraham’s destination is constructed around him as a potential of his self- 
realisation (cf. lek-Fka, lit. ‘go to/for yourself, 12: l).166 As a metaphor of a new 
identity, or ‘name’ (12:2), this land is tantamount to Abraham’s becoming a ‘great 
nation’ and an epitome of God’s blessing for ‘all the families of the earth’ (12:3).167 At 
this stage, the promise of nationhood is succinct but it introduces the theme of 
exceeding fertility and numerous descendants that will be reiterated throughout the 
Abraham narrative. Metaphorically, the promised land seems to oppose the land of the 
Father in the same way ^s fertility and growth oppose sterility and stagnation.
From the perspective of gender, one might see the beginning of the patriarchal 
narratives as the point where the suppression of the feminine at the level of subjectivity, 
apparent in the preceding genealogies, begins to hinder the further development of the 
story. The proper story of the patriarchs, the story of ‘filling the earth’, can happen only 
when the female reality finds its way through the metaphorical aberrations and is 
acknowledged by the narrative consciousness. In a way, the whole idea of Abraham
166 This Hebrew form, called the ‘ethical dative’, is used with personal pronouns in order to emphasise the
significance of the verb for a particular subject (see GKC, § 119s). T. Muraoka describes this usage as 
having ‘an effect o f focusing on the subject’, creating ‘the impression on the part of the speaker or author 
that the subject establishes his own identity, recovering or finding his own place by determinedly 
dissociating himself from his familiar surroundings’ (‘On the So-called dativus ethicus in Hebrew’, JTS 
29 (1978), pp. 495-98); see also Emphatic Words and Structures in Biblical Hebrew (Jerusalem, The 
Magnes Press, 1985), p. 121-22. *
167 Here I follow the reading of R. W. L. Moberly, who, following a number o f others, has argued that Gn 
12:3b refers not to Abraham’s mediating God’s blessing to the nations, but to the nations using the name 
of Abraham as a synonym of blessedness. For Moberly, ‘the concern is not to “save” or “reconcile” other 
nations. It is to establish Israel in their midst, a people where the reality of God’s presence may be 
acknowledged by others’ (The Bible, Theology and Faith: A Study o f  Abraham and Jesus [Cambridge 
Studies in Christian Doctrine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], p. 126; see also 
Westermann, Genesis 12-36, pp. 175-76; Bruce Vawter, On Genesis: A New Reading [London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1977], p. 177). For a detailed presentation o f the discussion on Gn 12:3, see Keith N. 
Grilneberg, Abraham, Blessing and the Nations: A Philological and Exegetical Study o f  Genesis 12:3 in 
its Narrative Context (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 176-90.
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leaving the father’s land could be seen as a search for the absent Mother, for the 
suppressed and stagnant aspect of the Subject’s identity, for that without which the 
Subject is lifeless. With its interplay of the concepts of land and fertility, Yahweh’s 
promise seems to hold an opening, a possibility of achieving a new balance between 
male and female subjectivity.
The Land as ‘Own’ and ‘Foreign’
In the myth of the national origin of Israel related in Genesis 12-36, the concept 
of the land is loaded with the connotation of identity. The link between the two is 
expected: nations commonly derive their name and distinctiveness from the lands they 
occupy (e.g. the Egyptians, the Canaanites, the Edomites, the Ammonites, and the 
Moabites of the biblical text). In the case of the patriarchs, the connection is more 
complicated and works the other way round. Their story has to show their entitlement to 
the land that is originally not their own, so that, as a result, it is a narrative of the nation 
that eventually gives a name and an identity to the land of Israel. Unlike the lands of
other peoples, the promised land of the patriarchs is not positively defined as a spatial
I
category, but is shaped primarily by their experience. Starting off as a non-entity, a 
potential, a promise without a proper name, this land grows together with the patriarchs 
as their journey progresses, its identity becoming a function of theirs. This is shown in 
the numerous instances of the patriarchs naming places after their experiences, and will 
become epitomised in the naming of Israel.168 At a certain level, one could see here the 
identity of the land constructed as a narrative projection of the patriarch’s Self. The 
internal dynamics of the patriarch’s psyche leaves an imprint on the land that is an 
object of appropriation but simultaneously a metaphor of the very identity of the 
Subject.
The process of symbolically appropriating the land begins with Abraham’s 
arrival in Canaan in 12:5-6. Compositionally, the narrator contrasts the movement to the 
land to the experience of being in the land: the expression aresah kena ‘an, ‘to the land of 
Canaan’, used twice in v. 5, sets off the double occurrence of ba’are?, ‘in the land’, in 
the following v. 6:
168 Cf. 16:14; 19:22; 21:31; 22:14; 26:20,21,22, 33; 28:19; 31:47-49; 32:2,28, 30; 33:17; 35:7-8,15.
85
12:5.. .they set forth to go to the land of Canaan. When they had come to the land of Canaan,
12:6 Abram travelled in the land to the place at Shechem, to the oak of Moreh. At that time the
Canaanites were in the land.
It is interesting that the word kena‘an, which is used twice to indicate the 
direction of Abraham’s journey, is not used after his arrival with the expression bà 'ares. 
This more general expression invites the reader to look at the land from the inside, as an 
enclosed space that contains, holds phenomena within its boundaries. Having found 
himself in this space, the patriarch experiences it not as Canaan, but as ‘the land’, and 
thus, presumably, recognises it as the land of Yahweh’s promise. He begins by 
appropriating it symbolically by building altars while passing through the land (bà’àre§) 
from the north (Shechem, 12:6-7) to the south (Bethel and on towards the Negeb, 12:8- 
9). The narrator, however, makes apparent the ambiguity of Abraham’s status in the 
land, which is already ‘filled’ with the indigenous people (‘the Canaanites were then in 
the land’, v. 6). The juxtaposition of Abraham and ‘the Canaanites’ within one land 
suggests a tension, a possible rivalry between the two parties. Having found himself ‘in 
the land’, the patriarch has to establish his identity vis-à-vis the people whose claim to 
the land precedes his own.
At this point Yahweh promises to Abraham, ‘To your offspring I will give this 
land’ (12:7). In Yahwèh’s speech, the land is an object, an externalised item of 
ownership, devoid of its content (the inhabitants). In the language of the promise, the 
land appears as empty, ‘formless and void’, an experiential space that is yet to be 
shaped by Abraham’s wanderings (cf. the emphasis on the physical expanse of the land 
in Yahweh’s utterances in 13:14, 17). Brett finds it ironic that the promise of the land is 
announced ‘at a site that was probably sacred to the original owners of the land’ and, 
figuratively, in their presence (12:6b).169 Though a conflict seems inevitable, the 
narrator omits any notion of rivalry between Abraham’s progeny and the Canaanites. 
This ambiguity will persist throughout the Abraham narrative, where Yahweh will 
repeatedly affirm his promise of the land to the patriarch (13:14-15; 13:17; 15:7; 15:13, 
16; 15:18; 17:8; 22:17) amidst reminders that the land is already inhabited, and thus 
belongs to someone else (cf. 13:7; 15:18-21).
In fact, the narrator never questions the prior entitlement of the indigenous 
groups to the land. As a national myth, the Genesis narrative contradicts the ‘ideology
169 As Brett convincingly argues, the terebinth o f Moreh, mentioned alongside ‘the Canaanites’ in v. 5, 
might be referring to a local cult of sacred trees and, if so, reinforces the ‘Canaanite’ presence (Brett, 
Genes is, p. 51).
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of dispossession’ permeating the books of Deuteronomy and Joshua.170 The presence of 
the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hittites, and the Philistines is less problematic for the 
narrator of Genesis than it is for the patriarch himself. Despite Abraham’s wariness of 
the locals in 12:12 and 20:11, the narrative often shows them doing their utmost in order 
to accommodate Abraham and his descendants and win their favour. They are portrayed 
as symbolic donors, not only beneficial, but crucial for the survival of Abraham’s clan 
(Pharaoh in 12:10-20; Abimelech king of the Philistines in Genesis 20, cf. 26:6-11; 
Melchizedek king of Salem in 14:18-20; Ephron the Hittite in 23:3-18). Structurally, 
they are part of the land, so much so that the land is treated according to their 
righteousness. The story of Sodom, where the land is obliterated for the sins of and 
together with its inhabitants (19:24-25, 28), stands in direct contrast to the idea 
presented in Deuteronomy that the wickedness of the indigenous peoples should be 
punished by their being ‘driven away’ from their land (Dt 9:4-5).
Instead of developing a strong ideology of national identity with clear 
distinctions between ‘own’ and ‘foreign’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, the Genesis myth 
focuses on the patriarch’s relationship with the land. In this relationship, the land 
together with its inhabitants is seen as an immediate experiential horizon, a space that 
needs to be ‘filled’ with a new meaning in a process of constructing the identity of the 
Subject. The lack of a clear distinction between ‘own’ and ‘foreign’ is reflected in the 
absence of clear territorial demarcation of the promised land. On the one hand, in 17:8 
Yahweh identifies it as ‘the land of Canaan’, and his promises concerning ‘this land’ 
implicitly point to Canaan (12:7; 13:14-17; 15:18). On the other hand, Yahweh rarely 
defines the land geographically, and instead relates it to the immediate experience of the 
patriarch (‘the land that I will show you’, 12:1; ‘all the land that you see’, 13:15; ‘walk 
about the land’, 13:17), or simply uses a demonstrative pronoun { ’eres hazzd’i  ‘this 
land’, 12:7; 15:7,18; cf. 26:3-4). On the one occasion when Yahweh promises to give to 
Abraham the land of Canaan, the word ‘Canaan’ follows the description ‘the land of 
your sorjoumings’ (17:8). However, the area where Abraham sojourns extends far 
beyond Canaan into Egypt and Gerar (12:10; 20:1; 21:23; 21:34; cf. 26:3). As Clines 
observes, ‘the patriarchal narratives take place outside the promised land almost as 
much as inside it’.171 If all the territories where Abraham and his descendants will be 
staying are included in the promise, a much wider picture of the promised land emerges.
170 The fact that Abraham worships Yahweh by the terebinth (12:7; cf. 13:18), also hints at the 
coexistence of cultic practices specifically forbidden by Dt 16:21 (see Brett, Genesis, p. 51).
171 Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, p. 49.
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This picture is supported by 15:18-21, where Yahweh promises to hand over to 
Abraham’s descendants the territory stretching ‘from the river of Egypt to the great 
river, the Euphrates’. Since, as Brett points out, this ‘inflated’ image of the promised 
land has no relation to the historic boundaries of Israel, it blurs the distinctions even 
further. For Brett, the patriarchal narratives show little evidence to support seeing Egypt 
and Gerar as foreign lands, a feature that is more expressive of the ideological concerns
172of Deuteronomistic redactors.
A similar situation is found in 26:1-6, where Yahweh extends the Abrahamic 
promise to Isaac. The scene focuses on the concept of the land (the root Vy is used six 
times in 26:1-4), yet looks at it from two different angles. On the one hand, the territory 
where Isaac seeks refuge from famine is specified as the land of the Philistines (‘Isaac 
went to Abimelech, king of the Philistines, to Gerar’, v. 1). On the other hand, while 
Isaac is in the land that belongs to the others (cf. 15:18-21), Yahweh tells him to settle 
‘in this land’ and promises to give ‘all these lands’ to him and to his descendants (w. 3- 
4). The resulting suspense is centred on the question how Isaac will interpret the 
promise, in other words, where he is going to reside:
‘. .. do not go down to Egypt,
settle in the land that I shall tell you (v. 2).
Reside as an alien in this land...
for to you and to your seed I shall give all these lands... (v. 3).
For to your seed I shall give all these lands__
and in your seed all the nations of the earth will be blessed’ (v. 4).
And Isaac stayed in Gerar. (v. 6)
While the limits of the land ( ‘ere?) in Yahweh’s speech are not specific and 
clearly expanding (cf. ‘this land’ - ‘these lands’ - ‘the earth’), they are unequivocally 
linked to the patriarch’s immediate experience. The logic of w . 2-6 seems to suggest 
that Gerar is (or at least is part of) the land of the promise. The Philistines who inhabit it 
play the same role as the Canaanites in 12:6: their background presence as part of the 
land does not interfere with the patriarch’s universal claim.
While, on the one hand, the lands of Abraham’s wanderings all seem to be 
equally included in the promise, on the other hand, they all seem to be equally foreign 
to him. The term nekar, ‘foreigner’ mentioned twice in the account of the covenant of 
circumcision, indicates a person who is not ‘of the seed’ of the patriarch (17:12, 27), 
and therefore suggests at that stage everybody except Ishmael. Strictly speaking, the 172
172 Brett, Genesis, p. 57.
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only foreigner here is the patriarch himself, a figure of a ‘wandering Aramean’ (Dt 
26:5), whose claim to identity and to the land is based on his personal relationship with 
the deity, unfamiliar to the locals. Not only does Abraham reside in Egypt and Gerar as 
an alien (12:10; 20:1; 21:34), but he also remains an alien while living in Canaan, which 
he himself declares during the negotiations with the Hittites: ‘I am a stranger (ger) and a 
sojourner (tosab) among you’ (23:4). The text of 35:27 also uses the verb gur, ‘to 
sojourn’, to describe the residence of Abraham and Isaac in the Canaanite area of 
Hebron (35:27).
One might conclude that the promised land in Genesis is not a pre-determined, 
specific territory, but an emergent, fluid idea that takes shape via the Subject’s 
experience. It is defined by Abraham’s sojoumings ( ‘ere? rrfgureyka, 17:8), but is not 
made his possession. The few instances when actual purchases of the land take place 
(21:22-34; 23; 33:19-20) make a weak foundation for the idea of legal ownership.173 To 
the patriarchs, tied to it by Yahweh’s promise, the land remains an existential horizon 
rather than an object of appropriation or conquest.
The Gendering of the Land
i
From the moment of Abraham’s call, the divine promise of the land appears in 
the narrative alongside the themes of numerous descendants and of the lasting 
relationship between the patriarch and Yahweh.174 175Clines finds that the thematic 
element of the land occupies a subsidiary role in Genesis, compared to its dominant role 
in Numbers and Deuteronomy. This undoubtedly is the case if the land is regarded as 
a specific territorial entity and an object of ownership. At the level of symbolic 
representation, however, the land concept plays a pivotal part in the patriarchal stories 
in Genesis. Here the patriarch’s unstable, developing subjectivity is constructed in 
direct relationship with the equally unstable and fluid reality of the land. If the narrative 
programme of Genesis 2-3 can be described as ‘human being to serve the earth’, the 
narrative programme of Genesis 12-36 is ‘the patriarch in the land’.
173 Joseph Blenkinsopp points this out in The Pentateuch: An Introduction to the First Five Books o f  the 
Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1992), pp. 101-2.
174 For an exhaustive presentation of the three elements of the promise see Clines, The Theme o f  the 
Pentateuch.
175 Clines, The Theme o f the Pentateuch, p. 49.
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From the perspective of the promise, the land .associated with the patriarch 
receives universal connotations, becomes limitless in parallel to the equally unlimited 
expansion of the Subject. With Abraham (and later Jacob) positioned in the centre, this 
land stretches out ‘to north, and south, and east, and west’ (13:14; cf. 28). Even a more 
specific description of the land in 15:18-21 expresses a similar idea. Here Yahweh 
promises to give to Abraham’s descendants the land ‘from the river of Egypt to the 
great river, the river Euphrates’-  the entire expanse of the Fertile Crescent, the inhabited 
universe of the ancient Near East -  and completes the picture with a substantial list of 
the nations whose territories are to pass over to Abraham’s descendants. The expansion 
of the land is paralleled by an equally universal multiplication of Abraham’s offspring: 
his descendants are going to be countless ‘like the dust of the earth’ (13:16), and like the 
stars in the sky (15:5), he will be made ‘exceedingly fruitful’ and will become ‘nations’ 
(17:6). Both concepts -  the land and the progeny that is going to inhabit it -  in the., 
language of the promise acquire a cosmic significance. The reader finds another 
instance of such an expansion in 26:2-4, where the sequence ‘this land -  these lands -  
the earth’ parallels the transfer of the blessing to ‘all the nations of the earth’ through 
Isaac’s innumerable seed. Not only is the patriarch to achieve and channel a blessing for 
all humanity, but in a way he becomes a figure of humanity, and as such is invited to 
populate or fill not only the land but also, figuratively, the whole earth (ha ’ares). In this 
respect, Yahweh’s promise to the patriarchs echoes the original blessing of humankind 
to ‘be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the earth [ha’ares]' (1:28). From God’s point of 
view, the ultimate purpose of the Subject in both cases is to expand to the limits of the 
earth.
Described in universal,'cosmological terms, the relationships ‘humankind -  
earth’ and ‘patriarch -  land’ arguably carry gender connotations. On the one hand, the 
active subject of the relationship is male (implicitly, as humankind, ha ’adam; actually,' 
as the patriarch). The male subject is ascribed the quality of excessive fertility, of self­
propagation (cf. ‘I will make you exceedingly [bim’od me’5d\ fruitful’, 17:6). This 
misattribution of fertility stems from the same narrative attitude that underlies the 
genealogies of Genesis, where the female role in procreation is taken over by men’s 
‘begettings’. On the other hand, the land, signified by a grammatically feminine noun 
ha ’a r e plays the role that structurally corresponds to the lexical construction neqebah, 
‘female’. Athalya Brenner has drawn attention to the etiology of the term rfqebah, 
derived from a root denoting ‘hole’ or ‘orifice’; in this joint biological and social
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representation, a ‘female’ can be conceived of as an opening that requires to be filled. 
Ilona Rashkow sees this etiological connotation as an essential expression of biblical 
views on female sexuality, suggesting that ‘throughout the Hebrew Bible the biblical 
female is treated as a “hole” or “cavity”’.176 77 The idea of the earth being a receptacle to 
be filled by the multiplying humankind of 1:28 fits well within this understanding of the 
feminine, pointing to what Philip Davies describes as ‘the gendering of the earth 
(whether "dama or ‘ere?) as female’.178
The idea of the patriarch’s innumerable descendants filling the land follows 
the structural blueprint of 1:28. The narrator draws particular attention to the patriarch’s 
staying or moving about in the land (overall, the words ba 'ares and be 'ares are used 33 
times in relation to the patriarchs in Genesis 12-36). The image of the land as a 
receptacle holding the Subject within its borders is particularly graphic in 13:6, where 
the land literally cannot ‘carry’ the symbolic weight of Abraham and Lot staying 
together. Another example of symbolic gendering is found in 26:12, where Isaac sows 
‘in that land’, and reaps a hundredfold. Elsewhere in the stories of the patriarchs, the 
root zr \  ‘to sow’, refers to the patriarch’s offspring or ‘seed’, and plays a central role in 
the affirmation of male fertility. In 26:12 the narrator reinforces this idea by making the 
land play a gendered role of receiving the symbolic ‘seed’ of the patriarch; ha 'ares is
I
also gendered in the way its owh fruitfulness, implied in the dramatic harvest, is not 
clearly acknowledged, and is projected instead onto to patriarch’s action of ‘reaping a 
hundredfold’. Semiotically, ha ares provides ‘room’ for the realisation of the exceeding 
fertility of the male subject, who sows and reaps ‘in the land’. The same idea is voiced 
by the patriarch himself in the naming of the well in 26:22. Here Isaac names a well 
‘Rehoboth’, saying, ‘Now Yahweh has made room (rhb, lit. ‘made wide’) for us, and 
we shall be fruitful in the land’. With the patriarch, simultaneously virile and fruitful, 
and the land with its repressed fertility, seen as a vehicle for the multiplication of the 
male ‘seed’, the relationship between the Subject and the land in 26:12, 22 takes on 
structural characteristics of the model of male procreation in Genesis.
At this point in the analysis, it is possible to distinguish two levels of the 
narrative representation of the feminine in Genesis 12-36. On the one hand, the 
narratives of the patriarchs present female characters -  the wives and daughters of the
176 Brenner, The Intercourse o f  Knowledge, pp. 11-12.
177 Ilona N. Rashkow, Taboo or not Taboo: Sexuality and Family in the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2000), p. 37.
178 Philip R. Davies, ‘Genesis and the Gendered World’, in Davies and Clines (eds.), The World o f  
Genesis, pp. 7-15 (9).
176
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patriarchs -  whose narrative identity is invariably shaped, by their ability or inability to 
produce male heirs and bring about a right succession. Like woman in Genesis 2-3, the 
matriarchs are constructed in relation to their task and not the patriarch. On the other 
hand, Yahweh’s voice in the narrative foregrounds the relationship of the patriarch to 
the land in a way that is structurally reminiscent of the male-female relationship. The 
land concept is constantly referred to, placed at the top of the Subject’s agenda. It is a 
symbolic and creative ‘space’ that he has to experience; it is also an object that he will 
eventually appropriate and fill with his own meaning and identity.179 The land’s 
expanse, or ‘wideness’ (rhb) complements the patriarch’s ‘weight’ (kbd) and is a 
necessary condition of his fruitfulness (26:22). While the matriarchs are ‘completed’ 
through their bearing sons, the patriarch and his ‘seed’ are ‘completed’ through their 
relationship with the land. In this sense, the link between the patriarch and the land in 
Genesis 12-36 is reminiscent of the pairing of ha’adam and ha^damah as male and. 
female in Genesis 2-3. It is possible to interpret this pairing as a result of the Subject’s 
unifying discourse that is structured by repression of female reality at the level of 
characters. In this light, positing the land as the patriarch’s metaphorical counterpart 
might be seen as a compensation for his refusal to see a real counterpart in woman.180
179 The related ideas of the land’s being objectified and gendered as feminine have been widely discussed 
in postcolonial studies. Anne McClintock has argued that, in the colonial discourse, the ‘myth o f the 
virgin land is also the myth of the empty land, involving both a gender and a racial dispossession’ ' 
(Imperial Leather [London: Taylor and Francis, 1995], p. 30; see also Paul Hjartarson, “‘Virgin Land”, 
the Settler-invader Subject, and Cultural Nationalism: Gendered Landscape in the Cultural Construction 
of Canadian National Identity’, in Lorraine Dowler, Josephine Carubia and Bonj Szczygiel [eds.], Gender 
and Landscape: Renegotiating Morality and Space [London: Taylor and Francis, 2005], pp. 203-20). 
Similarly, Renée Dickinson speaks about féminisation of the land in modernist novels, which make ‘the 
land (and, by association, women’s bodies) an empty, abject lack that must need filling, conquering, and 
containing’ (Female Embodiment and Subjectivity in the Modernist Novel: The Corporeum o f  Virginia 
Woolf and Olive Moore [London: Taylor and Francis, 2009], p. 8).
Other instances of the land’s being gendered as feminine in the Hebrew Bible are found in prophetic 
literature and the Song of Songs. The metaphorical figure of the wife in Hosea 2 has been interpreted as 
the land of Israel (see Brad E. Kelle, Hosea 2: Metaphor and Rhetoric in Historical Perspective [Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2005], pp. 83-86; Francis Landy, Hosea [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1995], p. 37). The garden landscape in the Song of Songs becomes a metaphor o f the woman’s 
body (Exum, Song o f  Songs, p. 59; Kenneth I. Helphand, “‘My Garden, My Sister, My Bride”: The 
Garden of “The Song of Songs’” , in Dowler, Carubia and Szczygiel [eds.], Gender and Landscape, pp. 
254-68).
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The Wife-Sister Ruse: Appropriation of Fertility
The patriarch-land relationship starts off on a negative note, for Abraham 
initially experiences the land of Canaan as sterile. In 12:10 the narrator twice reports a 
famine ir à  ‘ab )  in conjunction with the land:
There was a famine in the land, and Abraham went down to Egypt to sojourn there,
for the famine was severe in the land (12:10).
Structurally, the land of the patriarch is perceived as ‘empty’ or ‘lacking’, 
whereas the land of Egypt is presented as a refuge, a place , where the patriarch goes 
looking for resources to counteract and ‘fill up’ the emptiness of the land where he 
lives. One could see in this ‘empty’ condition of the famine an indication of the 
deficient state of the patriarch’s identity vis-à-vis the feminine. In., both its 
representations as a female character (Sarah) and as a metaphorical female (the land), 
the feminine subject withdraws its fertility from the patriarch. At the onset of the 
narrative, the Other is not integrated, which poses a problem for the Subject and his 
promised status, since becoming a ‘great nation’ depends on fertility of both woman and
the land.181 * *
\
On the whole, the patriarchal narratives present a series of three parallel 
accounts, which ail describe a temporary sojourn of the patriarchs (Abraham and Isaac) 
in the lands of Egypt and Gerar and feature the so called wife-sister motif (12:10-20; 20; 
26:1-33). Twice in those episodes the patriarchal family moves to another land because 
of famine (12:10; 26:1). In the wife-sister type-scene, the patriarch presents his wife to 
the locals as his sister, fearing that his life otherwise would be in danger from rival men. 
The king of the land takes her in his house (or just contemplates this possibility, 26:1- 
33), but when the truth comes out, the wife is returned, and the patriarch is offered a 
rich compensation.
Until the late 80s the three parallel accounts were examined in the scholarly 
literature from the diachronic point of view, as a result of combining materials from 
different sources or variant traditions. More recent synchronic studies look at the role 
this recurrent narrative pattern or type-scene plays in the overall story of the patriarchs, 
highlighting the ideological agenda and psychological tensions that underlie the
181 Talia Sutskover makes a similar argument in her semiotic analysis of Ruth, where the markers of 
fertility and sterility are shared by both the woman (Naomi, Ruth) and the land (Moab, Bethlehem) (‘The 
Themes of Land and Fertility in the Book of Ruth’, JSOT 34 [2010], pp. 283-94).
For a brief overview of this approach see Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 148-49,152-53.
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construction of the characters.183 In the following analysis I shall adopt a similar 
approach attempting to establish the structural and psychological implications the wife- 
sister ruse has for the formation of patriarchal identity.
At the centre of the type-scene lies a misrepresentation, a lie of the patriarch 
about his wife. Misrepresentation of a character is not uncommon in the patriarchal 
narratives: Jacob poses as Esau, Laban passes off Leah as Rachel, Tamar pretends to be 
a prostitute, and Joseph hides his real identity from his brothers. In most cases, the 
whole masquerade serves to achieve a certain pragmatic objective that is linked to the 
desirable status of the one whose identity is being assumed, and that in one way or 
another is going to benefit the person behind the ruse. Similarly, in the wife-sister type- 
scene, what is falsified here is not the identity of Sarah and Rebekah as such, but their 
status vis-à-vis their respective husbands. From the semiotic point of view, the episode 
is not about the matriarch in question, but about the patriarch's conception of her 
function and of its pragmatic value with respect to himself.184
Instead of a closed unit, ‘husband-wife’, the patriarch presents his relationship to 
the matriarch as an open unit, ‘brother-sister’. Considered from the perspective of 
kinship structures, the latter model presupposes the act of giving the woman away. A 
brother can be a dispenser of the bride alongside her father (cf. 24:55), and in the 
absence of the father, as it is in Sarah’s case, becomes solely responsible for arranging 
her marriage. This leads us to the question of the patriarch’s intention, which is essential 
for understanding the scene. Is he really concerned about his safety, or else, is he 
actively arranging the removal of Sarah from his house? As a wife and possession of the 
patriarch, Sarah is disowned; as a sister, she becomes a thing for another and an object 
of exchange, and is immediately recognised as such and taken away.185 There is no 
doubt in the patriarch’s mind as to the value of that object. Abraham is certain that 
Sarah will be desired by the Egyptians (‘I know that you are a woman beautiful in 
appearance’, 12:11; cf. Isaac’s analogous ‘the men of the place might kill me for the 
sake of Rebekah, because she is attractive in appearance’, 26:7). While the beauty of the 
wife is regarded as semiotically negative, presenting an existential threat to the
183 Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help? pp. 67-84: Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 148-69; Fuchs, Sexual 
Politics, pp. 118-50. See also Ann Marmesh, ‘Anti-Covenant’, in Bal (ed.), Anti-Covenant, pp. 48-54. 
Robert Alter examines the narrative function of type-scenes in The Art o f  Biblical Narrative, pp. 55-78.
184 The old scholarly designation o f the wife-sister theme as ‘the Endangered Ancestress’ has been rightly 
refuted by Clines and Exum, who emphasise the patriarch’s interests as central to the narrative (cf. Clines, 
‘The Ancestor in Danger: But Not the Same Danger’,, in What Does Eve Do to Help, pp. 67-84; Exum, 
‘Who Is Afraid of “The Endangered Ancestress’” , in Fragmented Women, pp. 148-69).
185 In Genesis 26 the wife, Rebekah, is not taken away, but the narrative revolves around that possibility.
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patriarch, the beauty of the sister is a positive category, a currency to trade and a 
potential source of well-being.186 187
Though the narrator is reticent about the role of the husband in the actual 
removal of the wife from his house, it is implied that he consents to it. Ann Marmesh 
suggests that because Abraham and Isaac do not condemn the wife abduction, ‘they are 
complicit in breaking the taboo’. In my view, their complicity goes much further 
since they appear to have devised the whole scheme for personal gain. To make it 
worse, the patriarch cannot even be sure that his wife will ever be returned to him. 
Initiating the exchange, he does not anticipate that the truth would come out, neither can 
he expect that the foreign ruler would prove to be righteous and refuse to keep his wife, 
for it is the patriarch’s belief that ‘there is no fear of God in this place’ (20:11). As far as 
the patriarch is concerned, he might be losing his wife forever. But may be this is really 
what he wants.
Looking at the patriarch’s behaviour from a psychoanalytic-literary perspective, 
Exum regards it as an expression of man’s ambiguous attitude to woman’s sexuality, 
which he both fears and desires, and which he feels compelled to expose to another man 
as a means to work out his unconscious fantasies.188 The conflicting psychological 
drives of fear and desire could also be applied to the patriarch’s dysfunctional 
relationship to the feminine at a more general level. By repeatedly disowning his wife 
he might be expressing his fear of the feminine as the Other, and his unconscious wish 
to dispose of her. Structurally, he does it by constructing the feared Other as part of 
Self, that is, as his sibling, a projection and an extension of his own subjectivity. The 
misrepresentation of the wife might be seen, at the level of the narrative psyche, as a 
symptom of a deep-seated dysfunction of the Subject, incapable of binary relationship. 
His irrational fear of death by the hands of ‘the men of the place’ might therefore be a 
projection of an entirely different fear, the fear of alterity, manifested in a wife and 
suppressed in a sister. The danger may not be coming from murderous and godless 
rivals as the patriarch suggests, it may not even be coming from outside at all. As Clines 
observes, the danger is all in the patriarch’s mind.189
186 The example of Tamar, Ammon’s beautiful sister, is different in this respect, for in 2 Sam 13:1-22 
there is no male rival involved to pose danger for the male subject. Tamar’s beauty, being a temptation to 
Ammon, does not endanger anybody but herself.
187 Marmesh, ‘Anti-Covenant,’ p. 50.
188 Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 157-69.
189 Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, p. 68. Exum develops this point at length, adding psychoanalytic 
depth to the characters who serve as ‘vehicles for the narrative neurosis’ (Fragmented Women, pp. 157- 
59).
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The patriarch’s perspective is therefore characterised by the following structural 
correspondences:
wife = Other = death : sister = Self = life/well-being
Exum speaks of the wife-sister ruse as a possible example of incest fantasy, 
arising from a desire of unity with the other, from a ‘narcissistic striving toward 
completeness or wholeness’.190 The unified identity is achieved through disavowing the 
other (wife) and constructing her as part of self (sister). One finds a similar example of 
imaging wife as sibling in the designation ‘flesh of my flesh’, attached by hà’àdàm to 
the newly created woman (2:23-24).191 In both cases, the male subject constructs a 
patriarchal ideal of a wife who is also, literally or metaphorically, ‘flesh of his flesh’ 
and therefore, an extension of his identity. Whether or not Sarah is really Abraham’s 
sister as it is claimed in 20:12, the wife-sister motif functions as a potent symbol of 
patrilineal endogamy -  the preferential kinship structure of the patriarchal narratives 
where men choose wives from their father’s lineage in order to protect the identity and 
inheritance of the clan from outsiders.192
This brings us to the dynamics of identity and assimilation that underlie the story 
of Israel’s origin. Following Exum’s approach of treating the characters in the story as 
split-off parts of the narrative psyche,193 the figure of the wife might be seen as an 
aspect of the Subject’s consciousness that is engaged in and affected by the processes of 
assimilation. The patriarch’s fear for his life and well-being might be expressing the 
narrative concern about the identity of Israel vis-à-vis the people of the land. The Other 
inherent in conjugality is perceived as an unstable element threatening the androcentric 
and ethnocentric identity of the Subject and is therefore expelled. The ultimate horror 
for Abraham is that he, the male bearer of identity, would be killed, while his female 
Other would live, presumably, assimilated, among the people of the land (Abraham 
takes it for granted that Sarah should be equally horrified at the idea, 12:12). Time after 
time the Subject plays out his ‘death by assimilation’ fantasy, and each time, the ruler of 
the land is imagined to prevent the assimilation and restore the. matriarch to her original
190 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 167.
See the analysis of the speech of hâ ’àdâm in Chapter 1.
192 See Naomi A. Steinberg, ‘Alliance or Descent?’, JSOT  51 (1991), pp. 52-53; Kinship and Marriage in 
Genesis: A Household Economics Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), pp. 10-14; Exum, 
Fragmented Women, pp. 107-10; Exum, ‘Hagar en procès', p. 4 n. 12.
3 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 155.
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position. By the end of each account, the threat, is neutralised, the Other, integrated, and 
the patriarch has reaffirmed his identity and gained in material wealth.
At this point, one might ask why this affirmation of identity by manipulating 
female subjectivity needs to be repeated over and over again. Exum considers the 
function of repetition in the text from the perspective of psychoanalysis, where the 
repetition compulsion is seen as a symptom of a deep-seated neurosis. Applying this 
idea to the wife-sister sequence, Exum argues that repeating the story offers a ‘semiotic 
cure for the neurosis by working over a particularly difficult problem until it is 
resolved’.194 In what sense, then, can we speak of the Subject being cured by the ruse? 
What does the narrative psyche achieve by each enactment of the wife-sister motif? 
Noting the changes in the narrative pattern from one episode to the next might provide 
an insight into the nature of the semiotic cure they effect. It would appear that, while the 
male subject remains unaffected, the changes each time concern the representation of 
the feminine in its two forms, that is, the wife and the land.
The sequence of the three episodes shows a progression in the woman’s 
changing family status. In the first episode, Sarah is a sterile wife, the state that, 
according to Clines, makes her expendable.195 This state has changed by the time the 
family comes to stay in Gerar in Genesis 20:1. In 17:16, 21 and 18:10, 14 Yahweh 
announces to Abraham that Sarah will give birth to a son, the heir to the promise, and 
the combined chronological references in 17:21, 18:10, and 21:2 suggest that Sarah 
must be pregnant with Isaac at the time when she is taken into Abimelech’s house.196 In 
this context, Abraham’s actions are not only morally reprehensible, they also pose a 
direct threat to the birth of the promised heir. This might be the reason why the 
information about Sarah’s pregnancy is suppressed in Genesis 20. By doing so, the 
narrator avoids casting doubt over the purity of Isaac’s descent. For the same reason, the 
narrator stresses the righteousness of Abimelech, who does not approach Sarah 
sexually.
In the third episode, the matriarch comes on stage having already fulfilled her 
family role. The preceding narrative tells us of Rebekah’s giving birth to the twins Esau 
and Jacob (25:21-26), and of their growing up (25:27), and the context of Genesis 27 
implies that, at the time when Isaac and Rebekah stay in Gerar, both sons must be still
194 Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 154-55.
195 Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, p. 69.
196 Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, pp. 75-76; Peter D. Miscall, The Workings o f  Old Testament 
Narrative (Semeia Studies, 12; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), p. 32.
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living with their parents. Once again, the account of the patriarch’s ruse supresses the 
crucial information about the woman’s status, since the presence of the twins would 
have made it impossible for Isaac to claim that Rebekah was his sister.
Exum sees the suppression of the fertility of these women as one of the 
disturbing problems exposed by a contextual reading of the three episodes.197 Since, 
following her reading, man’s unconscious fantasies revolve around woman’s sexuality, 
not her fertility, the theme of motherhood might be seen as an impediment to the 
realisation of these fantasies. One might also argue that the mother represents here the 
essential otherness of the feminine subject, the feature that the patriarch is trying to 
obfuscate in his wife by calling her his sister. The ‘mother’ aspect of the matriarch 
therefore has to be taken out of the picture. And yet the narrator acknowledges, albeit 
indirectly, the growing mother status of the wife by gradually reducing the degree of her 
exposure to outsiders. Thus, in Genesis 12, the sterile Sarah is taken into Pharaoh’s 
house ‘as a wife’, which implies that she has a sexual relationship with the ruler; 
however, in Genesis 20, Sarah, who has received the promise of a son and may already 
be pregnant, is taken into the house of Abimelech but is protected by Yahweh from 
sexual contact. Here the narrator stresses her complete vindication before her people 
that includes the price of a thousand shekels of silver paid by the ruler to acquit her of 
all guilt (20:16). In Genesis 26, Rebekah the mother is not taken at all, and, instead, the 
patriarch himself openly enjoys sexual intimacy with her in 26:8.
The last scene is particularly interesting because it employs a pun on the 
patriarch’s name yi?haq: here Isaac is described as ‘caressing [me$aheq] his wife 
Rebekah’. The sexual connotation, which the verb ?hq, ‘to laugh’, normally lacks,198 in 
26:8 is indicated by the reaction of the king, who interprets Isaac’s action as a sign of 
conjugality. However, since the direct meaning of the term is uncertain, its implicit play 
on Isaac’s name acquires more weight. From a semiotic perspective, in 26:8 Isaac acts 
out his identity. And since the use of the particle ’et suggests a transitive meaning, 
Isaac’s gesture might be read as a symbolic projection of his identity onto Rebekah, or 
literally, as making her ‘Isaac’. The gendered Other becomes, literally, the ‘image and 
likeness’ of the Subject, and her integration is witnessed and, therefore, confirmed by a 
male outsider, Abimelech. By the end of the series, in which the patriarch repeatedly 
treats his wife as his sibling and his own flesh, unified model of subjectivity is achieved,
197 Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 152-53.
198 BDB, p. 850.
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in which woman’s motherhood is simultaneously realised and hidden from view, and 
her threatening difference is subsumed, integrated in the Subject’s identity.199
In parallel with the wife’s growing fertility and integration in the wife-sister 
sequence, there is also a progressive increase in the fruitfulness of the land and in the 
extent of the patriarch’s association with it. At the beginning of the first episode, the 
patriarch’s land is sterile, like his wife, and both cases of sterility receive double 
emphasis (‘there was famine in the land’, ‘the famine was severe in the land’, 12:10; cf. 
‘Sarai was barren; she had no children’, 11:30). Egypt, by contrast, is presented as a 
land of plenty, where the family finds refuge from the famine. As a territorial and 
symbolic entity, Egypt has clear boundaries, which the narrator stresses when Abraham 
arrives in Egypt (12:10, 11, 14) and departs from it (13:1), making it clear that Egypt is 
not the promised land and the patriarch can associate with it only temporarily. In this 
‘other’ land, Abraham receives from Pharaoh a symbolic equivalent of his wife -  the 
gift of sheep, oxen, male donkeys, male and female slaves, female donkeys, and camels 
(12:16) -  which he takes back to the land of Canaan after he has been expelled from 
Egypt (12:19). The previous ‘empty’ condition of the patriarch’s land is thus 
counteracted, the land being filled with the semiotic ‘weight’, provided by Egypt. At the 
lexical level, this is apparent from the parallel between the former ‘heaviness’ of thei
famine {kabed hara'ab, 12:10) and the ‘heaviness’ of the wealth that characterises the 
patriarch on his return (v f ’abram kabed me,dd, 13:2). Below I shall attempt to show 
how this ‘weight’ of Egypt gives rise to the narrative strands of Lot and Hagar and thus 
becomes a key narrative factor in the construction of the Other.
In the second episode, the patriarch sojourns in Gerar, in the land of the 
Philistines (20:1). Situated half-way to Egypt, on the southern borders of Canaan, Gerar 
is simultaneously distanced from Egypt and reminiscent of it.200 Here the degree of 
‘wife-exposure’ is reduced, but the degree of compensation increases, so that it now 
includes not only sheep and cattle and male and female slaves (20:14) but also a 
thousand shekels of silver (20:16). But, most importantly, instead of being expelled, the 
patriarch is now allowed to settle freely in the land (‘My land is before you; settle
199 Analysing the progression from a different angle, Fuchs sees in it a gradual decline in the degree of 
threat that the idea of woman’s adultery poses to the institution of patriarchal marriage. With each 
episode, the threat becomes less and less real, which shows that the final goal of the narrative is ‘the 
reinstitution of the proper conjugal relationship, namely the wife’s re-inclosure within the control of her 
proper husband’. That this is the desired outcome for the narrator is evident from the increased wealth 
that accompanies the restoration of the wife to the patriarch (Fuchs, Sexual Politics, pp. 122-23).
200 The association between Egypt and the Philistines is first introduced in the genealogy of Ham, where 
Egypt (mifrâyim) is said to be the father of Casluhim, the ancestor of the Philistines (Gn 10:13-14).
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wherever you like’, 20:15). Here, for the first time, the, locals sanction Abraham’s 
sojourn in the land, which until now has only been based on Yahweh’s instructions.
In the last episode, the relationship between the patriarch and the land reaches its 
highest point, becoming fruitful. Once again, there is a famine in Canaan, and Isaac 
goes to Gerar, the land of the Philistines. Egypt features in 26:2, but only as a reminder 
of Abraham’s previous journey and an occasion for a taboo. This time the wife, who is 
now the mother of Esau and Jacob, is not taken, and so there is no compensation, but 
the patriarch becomes ‘very wealthy’ afterwards, when he sows in the land of the 
Philistines and reaps a hundredfold (26:12-14). The source of wealth here is not the 
ruler of the land -  the Other injts rival, masculine representation -  but the land in its 
feminine aspect of bearing crops. Both the matriarch and the land have now become 
productive. The life-giving aspects of the feminine that the patriarch was lacking at the 
beginning of the series -  the fertility of the wife, the productivity of the land, and the 
apparently endless resources of water in the wells that he digs (26:18-25) -  have now 
become realised and symbolically appropriated.
In the light of the above observations, one might see the whole wife-sister series 
as a gradual construction of the patriarchal Subject in his relationship with the land. The 
ruse brings no immediate change in the position of the wife, who is consistently restored 
to her husband. By contrast, every time the patriarch hands over his wife to the other 
man, his position vis-à-vis the land improves, as he either receives a concession to settle 
in the land or acquires more of its wealth. Central to this process is the figure of the 
local ruler (Pharaoh, Abimelek), who represents the people living in the land and with 
whom the patriarch has to negotiate his right to settle. The ruler, who possesess the 
land, stands in structural parallel ter the patriarch, who possesses his wife. Like the right 
to the woman, the right to the land is contested by the male Subject and the (equally 
male) ruler. The fact that Abraham and Isaac decline their ownership of the woman 
might imply, in the context of the rivalry over the land, that they invite their rivals to do 
the same with their property, that is, to renounce, if only partially, their ownership of the 
land, making the land and its wealth available to . the patriarchs. The desire for the 
woman that the patriarch ascribes to his rival might be a projection of the Subject’s own 
desire for the land. The triangular relationship between the patriarch, the woman, and 
the male rival thus reflects the implicit tensions within the triangular relationship
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between the patriarch, the land, and its inhabitants.201 The matriarch functions here as a 
symbolic object, the entitlement to which reflects and indirectly brings about the 
entitlement to the land.
Fig. 8
Subject male
rival
woman
ruler of 
the land
What is, in the end, the object of the patriarch’s desire? Is it directed at the 
woman, whom he subsumes as his sister-wife, or at the land, the symbolic space that 
belongs to others and where he looks to find ‘room’ for himself? I suggest that the 
symbolic transaction in which the wife is offered to the local ruler is related at another 
level to the dynamic of identity that is central to the collective psyche. What the 
patriarch imagines as a danger to his life might represent a different kind of danger, 
namely, the threat that settling among outsiders poses to the identity of the community 
through both antagonism and assimilation. Significantly, as the series ends, the land 
releases its abundant crops and water resources to the patriarch and not the Philistines 
(26:12-14, 18-22, 32-33). When Isaac names one of the wells ‘Rehoboth’, his naming 
speech not only states his separation from the locals but also proclaims that a long 
sought-after association with the land has been achieved: ‘Now Yahweh has made room 
for us and we shall be fruitful in the land’ (26:22).
There is one last, important observation to be made regarding a contextual 
reading of the series. It is notable that each wife-sister episode is followed by an account 
of conflict or separation between the male rivals or brothers within the clan. The 
narratives of Abraham and Lot in Genesis 13, Isaac and Ishmael in Genesis 21, Jacob 
and Esau in Genesis 27 describe how one of the two brothers in each successful 
generation is removed from the chosen line and, eventually, from the land. The strategy 
of placing these ‘brother’ narratives immediately after the wife-sister episodes seems to 
work in support of the unified identity of the Subject: in the first movement, the
201 Here I draw on Exum’s application o f the Girardian model of triangular desire to the wife-sister 
narratives (Fragmented Women, pp. 163-65).
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patriarch subsumes the female Other and appropriates her fertility; in the second 
movement, he excludes his male Other, his rival brother, from the possibility of shared 
identity. By the end of the sequence, the boundaries of the andrò- and ethnocentric 
Subject have been triply re-established.
What Is Lot’s Place?
At the beginning of the cycle, Lot is an insignificant figure who shadows 
Abraham without playing any part in the unfolding events. And yet, insignificant as it 
would appear, Lot’s presence is remarkably persistent. He comes on stage almost 
simultaneously with Abraham (11:27) and follows his movements from Ur to Haran 
(11:31), from Haran to Canaan (12:5). He also, presumably, accompanies the patriarch 
during his stay in Egypt (cf. 13:1). That Lot holds particular importance for the 
narrative becomes clear in 12:1-5, where Abraham takes his nephew with him to 
Canaan despite Yahweh’s order to leave his kindred behind. Laurence Turner has found 
Abraham’s action in Genesis 12:4-5 ‘inherently contradictory’, amounting to 
Abraham’s disobeying Yahweh’s will.202 What makes Lot so important that Abraham, 
who shows model obedience to Yahweh in all other respects, disregards God’s order 
concerning his nephew?
Commentators largely agree that Abraham takes Lot with him to Canaan 
because at that point Abraham considers Lot to be his only heir.203 Since Sarah has been 
declared barren in Genesis 11:30, Lot, the son of Abraham’s deceased brother Haran 
and the sole grandson of Terah, is the only relative who can continue the lineage. If 
Abraham sees Lot as his heir or even ‘surrogate son’ (Turner), then he might believe
202 Laurence A. Turner, Announcements o f  Plot in Genesis (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), 
p. 62; cf. also Davies, Whose Bible Is It Anyway? (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), p. 97; 
William John Lyons, Canon and Exegesis: Canonical Praxis and the Sodom Narrative (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2002). For a detailed analysis see also Andrew G. Vaughn, ‘And Lot Went 
with Him: Abraham’s Disobedience in Genesis 12:l-4a’, in Bernard F. Batto and Kathryn L. Roberts 
(eds.), David and Zion: Biblical Studies in Honor o f  J. J. M. Roberts (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2004), pp. 111-24.
203 Turner, Announcements o f  Plot in Genesis, p. 62; Genesis (2nd edn; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 
2009), p. 59; ‘Lot as Jekyll and Hyde: A Reading of Genesis 18-19’ in David J. A. Clines, Stephen E. 
Fowl and Stanley E. Porter, The Bible in Three Dimensions: Essays in Celebration o f  Forty Years o f  
Biblical Studies in the University o f  Sheffield (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), p. 86; Brett, 
Genesis, p. 56; Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, pp. 69-73; Steinberg, Kinship and Marriage in 
Genesis, pp. 48-52; Larry R. Helyer, ‘The Separation of Abram and Lot: Its Significance in the 
Patriarchal Narratives’, JSOT 26 (1983), p. 82; Nachman Levine, ‘Sarah/Sodom: Birth, Destruction, and 
Synchronic Transaction’, JSOT 31 (2006), p. 140.
102
that Yahweh intends to make him a great nation through Lot. Similarly, Clines argues 
that in the first wife-sister story (12:10-20) the narrator projects onto Lot the role of 
possible successor of the childless Abraham, of one through whom the promise can still 
find its way, diverted though it might be, towards fulfilment. For Clines, barren Sarah 
becomes expendable in Egypt because of the implicit presence of Lot.204
The same logic has been attributed to Abraham in 13:8-9, where he offers Lot 
the choice to occupy the land of Canaan to the left (the north) or to the right (the south) 
of Bethel. Joseph Blenkinsopp maintains that by offering to share the land with his 
nephew, Abraham treats him as his presumptive heir.205 Later in the cycle, Abraham 
shows remarkable commitment to his nephew’s welfare. In Genesis 14 Abraham starts a 
military campaign to rescue Lot who has been taken captive by foreign kings, and in 
18:20-33 he bargains with Yahweh, trying to spare Lot’s city Sodom from looming 
destruction. For John Lyons, this special association between Abraham and his nephew 
can be understood only in terms of Lot’s position as Abraham’s heir.206 Lou Silberman 
summarises this view, seeing the Lot strand in the narrative as the ‘teasing motif of the 
presumed heir’, which serves to forward the plot, building up the tension between 
Yahweh’s promise and the lack of the conditions, necessary for its fulfilment.207
It is not possible, however, to interpret all of the Lot material in terms of his 
status as Abraham’s heir. Early in the cycle, Lot places himself outside the promised 
land: in Genesis 13 he chooses to dwell to the east of Canaan, in Sodom.208 If Lot has 
ever had a claim to inherit the land of Canaan, now he must have relinquished it. 
Yahweh himself indicates this when he waits until Lot has left before showing the 
promised land to Abraham (13:14-17). Abraham, for his part, in his conversations with 
Yahweh will never name Lot, thinking that first Eliezer of Damascus (‘one bom in my 
house’, 15:2), and then his son Ishmael (17:18) would inherit after him. Yet losing the 
claim to the land does not diminish the interest Lot presents to the narrator. A large 
portion of the narrative -  chapters 14 and 19 -  is dedicated to the description of what 
happens to Lot after his separation from Abraham. Lot’s story becomes a lengthy 
sideline or, in the words of Silberman, a diversionary or retarding novella that appears
204 Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, p. 69.
205 Blenkinsopp, The Pentateuch, p. 101. See also Lyons, Canon and Exegesis, p. 132; Turner, 
Announcements o f  Plot in Genesis, p. 67; Genesis, p. 63.
206 Lyons, Canon and Exegesis, p. 132.
207 See Lou H. Silberman ‘Listening to the Text’, JBL 102 (1983), p. 19.
208 Clines considers the valley of the Jordan to be ‘unquestionably a part o f the land’, meaning the land of 
Yahweh’s promise (Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, p. 72). I would argue that the internal geography 
of Genesis 13 separates Canaan from the valley where Lot chooses to settle (cf. 13:12).
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to have no bearing on the main plot.209
If the idea of Lot as a possible descendant of Abraham does not justify this 
elaborate story, could there be another explanation? The etiology that concludes the Lot 
story (19:30-38) links it to the historic consciousness of Israel, tracing the ancestry of 
Moab and Ammon back to Abraham. Clines sees this episode as the first sign that the 
Abrahamic promise of becoming ‘a multitude of nations’ is beginning to be fulfilled 
(17:4; cf. 12:2). For him, this fact in itself justifies the narrator’s attention to Lot.210 
Brett expresses a similar opinion, reading the incest episode as ‘an extravagant 
fulfilment of the promise’.211 This being so, Abraham’s deep engagement with his 
nephew suggests that Lot’s function in the narrative might be more immediate, having a 
direct bearing on the identity of the patriarch himself.
As a starting point for re-examining Lot’s place, I suggest going back to the 
genealogical data in 11:27-32. In the account of the generations of Terah, the three sons 
of Terah -  Abraham, Nahor and Haran -  feature alongside his grandson Lot, the son of 
Harafi. Although a similar genealogical formula presenting three or more successive 
generations at once could be found elsewhere (4:18; 10:7; 24), the mention of Lot 
stands out in the strictly formulaic sequence of Genesis 11. What follows is even more 
specific: Lot’s father Haran,dies in the presence of his father Terah in the land of his 
birth (11:28). From a narratological point of view, Haran’s story is cancelled out, 
reverted to its beginning, and his place passes on to Lot. By standing in his father’s 
place as one of the heirs of Terah, Lot acquires a parity of status with Abraham and 
Nahor. The following narrative juxtaposes Abraham and Lot as the two male members 
of the family whom Terah takes with him to Haran: ‘Terah took Abram his son, and Lot 
the son of Haran, his grandson, and Sarai his daughter-in-law, his son Abram’s wife’ 
(11:31).212 With Sarah sterile, and Nahor absent, Lot is, indeed, the most likely
209 Silberman,‘Listening to the Text’, p. 20.
2.0 Clines, What Does Eve Do to Help?, p. 73.
2.1 Brett, Genesis, p. 69. -
212 It is notable that Nahor and his wife are not mentioned as part o f the group leaving for Canaan. They 
will also be absent at Terah’s arrival in Haran, at the time of his death and at the moment o f Abraham’s 
call. Never getting a chance to act and become a character in his own right, Nahor will reappear later as 
the originator of the clan that will provide brides for Abraham’s descendants (22:20-24; 29:5). By then 
Nahor will have settled in Aram (cf. “Aram-naharaim, the city o f Nahor”, 24:10) as will his son Bethuel 
(cf. “go to Paddan-aram, to the house of Bethuel, 28:2, cf. 28:5), and the place of the residence of Nahor’s 
clan will be further specified as Haran (cf. 27:43; 29:4-5), the town where Abraham’s journey started. 
This suggest that Nahor might have after all travelled with Terah in 11:31, but was left unmentioned. By 
leaving Nahor out, the text emphasises the connection between Abraham and Lot, the two male members 
of the family who would make it to Canaan.
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candidate to continue the lineage. However, the lineage Lot represents is that of Terah 
and not of Abraham.
Arguably, this distinction holds for the rest of the Abraham cycle. Put from the 
start in the position of Abraham’s brother, Lot never comes to represent the line of 
Abraham, but features alongside him as his equal and potential rival. This becomes 
most apparent in the scene of their separation in Genesis 13. Here Lot matches Abraham 
in wealth and, arguably, in status. The two of them have brought abundant possessions 
from Egypt: Abraham is now ‘very rich in livestock, in silver, and in gold’ (13:2), and 
so is Lot, who has flocks and herds and tents (13:5). Their parity of status leads them to 
separate, as the land cannot ‘carry’ both of them living together (13:6), the detail that 
parallels the account of the separation of another pair of brothers, Jacob and Esau 
(36:7). And so Abraham, calling Lot his brother (13:8), suggests that they go their 
opposite ways -  the proposition that amounts to splitting the land in half (‘if you take 
the left hand, I will go to the right; if you take the right hand, I will go to the left’, 13:9). 
Contrary to the above mentioned conclusion of Blenkinsopp and Turner, this offer 
makes better sense if Lot is seen not as an heir -  an heir does not come into possession 
of the land until the death of the predecessor, in which case the land is left undivided - 
but as a brother, equal in status to Abraham. Such is the view of Steinmetz, who sees 
Lot as Abraham’s surrogate brother and competitor.213 Tha!t Lot does not take 
Abraham’s offer to take the land either to the right (south) or to the left (north) of 
Bethel, and instead moves eastwards (miqqedem), links him to the motif, recurrent in 
Genesis, of ‘the eastward movements of the dispossessed’.214 This motif features 
displaced brothers, who have to leave in order to free the space for the chosen heir. 
Fitting into this pattern are Cain, who moves to the east of Eden (4:16), the sons of 
Abraham’s concubines sent by their father to the east country (25:6), and Esau, who 
settles to the southeast of Canaan, in Seir (36:8). The spatial marker ‘east’ brings in the 
connotation of both otherness and rivalry, associated in the historic consciousness of 
Israel with the peoples dwelling east of Canaan (cf. the expression ‘sons of the east’ that 
designates the tribes hostile to Israel in Judg 6:3,33).
Playing the role of Abraham’s surrogate brother, Lot is also constructed as the 
patriarch’s structural shadow. This is indicated in Genesis 18-19, where Lot’s story runs 
parallel to that of Abraham, forming an antithesis to it. One after the other, both men are
2,3 Devora Steinmetz, From Father to Son: Kinship, Conflict, and Continuity in Genesis (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1991), p. 90.
214 Turner, Genesis, p. 62.
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visited by Yahweh’s messengers and both show hospitality to them. In Abraham’s case, 
the positive encounter leads to the announcement of the miraculous birth of the true heir 
to his aged and barren wife Sarah. Lot, in his turn, also welcomes the messengers, but 
his hospitality is compromised by the attack of the Sodomites, and he himself has to be 
rescued and led by the hand out of the doomed city. Unlike Abraham’s strand with its 
positive promise of a descendant and an assertion of his wife’s fertility, Lot’s story ends 
on a low note. His wife turns into a pillar of salt when she looks back at the perishing 
Sodom, his house and possessions are lost and his land is destroyed. Although the 
episode concludes with an account of the births of Lot’s sons (cf. the announcement of a 
birth of a son to Sarah in 18:10, 14), it is overshadowed by incest. Lot ends up living in 
isolation in a cave with his two daughters and fathers their children, the eponymous 
ancestors of Moab and Ammon, the two neighbouring nations hostile to Israel (19:30- 
38).
Why does the narrative of the promise need Lot, a passive and weak shadow of 
Abraham, who is besieged by disasters and constantly needs rescue and assistance? One 
possible way to understand the relationship between Abraham and Lot would be to see 
it as a mediator for the deeper tensions surrounding the issues of identity and the land.
In the following analysis I propose that the significance of Lot in the Abraham narrative
Varises in the context of Israel’s ambivalent attitude to Egypt. The figure of Lot -  and of 
Hagar later in the cycle -  will be seen as a narrative outlet for disposing of the symbolic 
‘weight’ of wealth and fertility, carried by Abraham out of Egypt, and purging its 
‘contamination’. To be able to proceed with this argument, it is necessary to consider 
briefly the unique place Egypt occupies in the narrative of Israel’s origin.
Egypt plays a special role in the construction of Israel’s national identity on 
more than one level.215 In the patriarchal narratives, Egypt appears as a place of refuge, 
the country that provides vital resources and assures the survival of the chosen line. The 
narrative memory of Israel endows Egypt with a connotation of prosperity and fertility. 
The narrator stresses that after Jacob’s family had settled in the region of Goshen in 
Egypt, ‘they gained possessions in it, and were fruitful and multiplied exceedingly’ 
(47:27). The same theme continues into the book of Exodus, which states that during 
their four hundred years of sojourn in Egypt the Israelites were ‘fruitful and prolific; 
they multiplied and grew exceedingly strong, so that the land was filled with them’ (Ex
215 Pieter de Boer stresses the ambivalence of the biblical image of Egypt in his article ‘Egypt in the Old 
Testament: Some Aspects of an Ambivalent Assessment’ (see Pieter de Boer, Selected Studies in Old 
Testament Exegesis (ed. C. van D uin; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp. 152-67).
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1:7). The original blessing ‘be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth’ (1:28) is realised 
in Egypt in the way it is not realised anywhere else. In this process of ‘filling the land’ 
the Israelites form their identity, becoming ‘a great, powerful, and numerous nation’ (Dt 
26:5). Diana Lipton follows the Passover Haggadah in her conclusion that Israel as a
*S 1 £
nation becomes ‘distinguishable,’ in Egypt. In Num 22:5,11 this powerful imprint on 
Israel’s identity is acknowledged when the king of Moab describes the Israelites as ‘a 
people who came out of Egypt’.
Notwithstanding its positive connotations, Egypt is also portrayed in the Hebrew 
Bible as the place of captivity and oppression, the exodus from which is seen as 
liberation and the single most powerful factor in the formation of Israel’s self-image (Dt 
26:6-8). The prophetic writings associate Egypt with moral and religious corruption, the 
origin of Israel’s religious ‘whoredom’ (Hos 2:15; Ezek 23:27). In her incisive 
interpretation of the portrayal of Egypt in Exodus, Lipton suggests that this ambivalence 
originates in the Israelite resistance to the powerful attraction exerted by Egypt and to 
the ensuing threat of assimilation.216 17 For her, the danger of Egypt lies not in its 
oppressive treatment of the Israelites, but in being ‘the apex of the seductive other’.218
The thriving civilisation along the Nile, with its developed irrigation and 
agriculture, represents everything the promised land is not. In contrast to Canaan, ‘a 
land of mountains and valleys that drinks rain from heaven’, Egypt is likened to a 
‘garden of vegetation’ (Dt 11:10-11), an image reverberating with the garden of Eden in 
the Hebrew creation myth. The desert experience following the exodus is marked by 
longing for Egypt and its abundance of grain, figs, vines, pomegranates, and drinking 
water (Num 20:5; 21:5), its pots of meat and its bread (Ex 16:3). In their search for a 
land and identity of their own, the Israelites constantly need to confront the desire to go 
back (Num 11:20; 14:2) and to reaffirm their distance from the lost paradise of Egypt.
At the beginning of the patriarchal narratives, the image of Egypt exerts a 
similar appeal. For Abraham, it has become the source of material abundance, profusion 
of wealth. Later in the narrative, it will also give him his first son Ishmael through 
Hagar, Sarah’s Egyptian slave (16:15). To pinpoint the contrast between ‘before’ and 
‘after’, the narrator makes Abraham return to Bethel and build an altar once again where 
he made an altar ‘at the beginning’ (13:3-4; cf. 12:8). With this, Abraham has come
216 Diana Lipton, Longing fo r  Egypt and Other Unexpected Biblical Tales (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
Press, 2008), p. 15, n. 17.
217 Lipton, Longing fo r  Egypt, pp. 13-49.
218 Lipton, Longing fo r  Egypt, p. 14.
107
round a full circle, having appropriated along the way the physical and symbolic 
blessings of Egypt.
It is at this point that Abraham’s ‘brother’ Lot comes into focus. Like Abraham, 
Lot also possesses ‘flocks and herds and tents’ that have arguably come from Egypt 
(13:5). This abundance of wealth makes it impossible for the two to stay together (cf. 
the double negation of the phrase lasebet yahdaw, ‘dwelling together”, 13:6). The 
problem has to do with the land, which literally cannot ‘carry’ them (nasa *) with their 
flocks and herds. This leads to a territorial conflict between Abraham’s and Lot’s 
herdsmen (13:7-8). To resolve the conflict, Abraham suggests separating, allowing Lot 
to choose his part of the ‘whole land’ to the north or south of Bethel. Lot, however, 
looks beyond the hill country of Canaan to the east and chooses to settle in the Jordan 
valley (13:10).
A few observations must be made with respect to Lot’s choice. First, the 
description of the valley carries clear allusions to the garden of Eden. Like the garden, 
watered (sqh) by the river flowing out of Eden in 2:1(3, the valley of the Jordan is ‘well 
watered (sqh) everywhere’ and is compared to the ‘garden of Yahweh’. The reference to 
Eden is also supported by the eastern location of the valley (13:11; cf. ‘Yahweh God 
planted a garden in Eden, in the east’, 2:8). Looking to the east, Lot might also be 
reminded of his native Mesopotamia (cf. ‘Ur of the Chaldeans’, 11:28), the area 
associated with Eden.
Second, the Jordan valley is reminiscent of another image of paradise. It is 
compared to the land of Egypt, which Lot and Abraham have just come back from and 
whose riches weigh so heavily on them that they have to separate. The joint image of 
Eden and Egypt functions as a metaphor of plenty that contrasts with the ideas of 
famine and sterility that the narrator has so far associated with the hill country of 
Canaan. The opposition between Canaan and Egypt is also maintained in the contrast 
between Abraham’s nomadic lifestyle and Lot’s settling ‘in the cities of the plain’ 
(13:12). The land that Lot chooses is everything Canaan is not. An urban culture that 
has developed in a fertile river valley, it carries an imprint of the seductive Other that is 
Egypt.
Third, the enticing images of both Eden and Egypt also bring in a context of 
suspicion. Eden and the east carry the negative connotations of judgment and expulsion, 
with the image of the cherubim with the flaming sword guarding the way to the tree of 
life at the east of the garden (3:23-24). It is also the direction of the land Yahweh
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ordered Abraham to leave at the beginning of his journey. On the other hand, along with 
its bountiful qualities, Egypt is also associated with perceived threat to the life and 
honour of the patriarch as well as his expulsion (12:10-20).219 Notably, the text of 13:10 
shares a common thematic thread with both the Eden narrative and the story of 
Abraham’s stay in Egypt, for each of them communicates an experience of enticement. 
Like woman looking at the tree in the garden (3:6), and like the Egyptians who see the 
beauty of Sarah (12:12, 14-15), Lot looks at the land and is drawn to what he sees.220 
The object of looking is seductive. It is also compromised, as the narrator hurries to 
indicate in parenthesis, telling the reader about the looming destruction of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, and the iniquities of the Sodomites (13:10, 13). The lush and seductive 
image of the valley in the east, so closely resembling both Eden and Egypt, is tainted by 
the wickedness of its inhabitants and an expectation of judgment. The paradise of Egypt 
is no sooner regained than it is renounced.
The narrator upholds the context of suspicion by putting the reference to Egypt 
next to the place-name Zoar, one of the key words in the Lot story. On the whole the 
root ?‘r, ‘be small, insignificant’, is reiterated here thirteen times, of which nine 
occurrences refer to the town Zoar to the south-east of Canaan. Zoar is the place where
Lot initially seeks refuge from the destruction of Sodom, attaching particular
\
importance to its small size, or ‘insignificance’ (19:20-23). Thè repeated allusions to 
Zoar toward the end of the Lot narrative seem to fit in with the general sense of decline 
that characterises the story. In 13:10 the reference to Zoar might hint at the impending 
loss of significance, attached to the potent symbols of the ‘garden of Yahweh’ and the 
‘land of Egypt’.
In this light, one might see Lot’s story as a narrative mechanism that neutralises 
or negates the significance of the seductive Other. The semiotic ‘fullness’ of the foreign 
land (Egypt), which is at one level used to nourish the patriarchal Subject, is at another 
level put under suspicion, problematised by its narrative association with Sodom. From 
a psychoanalytical point of view, the tension between the beneficial and threatening 
aspects of the Other is resolved in terms of projection, whereby the narrator projects 
Abraham’s compromising association with Egypt onto the figure of his surrogate 
brother Lot and disavows this association through Lot’s demise.
219 See Turner, Genesis, p. 62.
220 Steinmetz notes that being enticed is a characteristic that Lot shares with the Egyptians, who ‘follow 
what they see, but what they see leads them to misperceive what they should do’ (From Father to Son, p. 
80). I would resist, however, interpreting experiences of desire and enticement as a mark of moral failure.
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In studies of the Lot narrative, there has been a tendency to picture Lot in 
ethical-theological opposition to Abraham. The fact that Lot chooses to move out of the 
hill country of Canaan into the fertile valley of the Jordan has been interpreted as an 
error of judgment, an act of self-interest that makes him loose his place in the chosen 
lineage.221 In this traditional understanding, as Turner puts it, Genesis 13 communicates 
‘the final rupture between godly Abraham and his hedonist nephew’.222 Fretheim and 
Steinmetz both speak about Lot’s flawed perception, a disjunction between the way he 
sees the land and the negative context in which the land is presented to the reader.223 
Even Lot’s hospitality to the divine messengers in 19:1-3 has attracted opposing views. 
E. Speiser and Sharon Jeansonne in particular have emphasised that Lot’s welcome is 
inferior compared to that shown by Abraham in 18:1-5. In the context of Abraham’s 
intercession for the righteous of Sodom in 18:22-33, Lot’s failure to protect his guests 
might appear as a lack of righteousness, since Yahweh will not spare Sodom for his 
sake.224 In a different vein, Jeansonne and John Skinner have questioned Lot’s righteous 
character with respect to his outrageous treatment ofjris daughters, whom he offers to 
the mob for rape in order to protect his guests.225
These readings share the assumption that Lot’s fate results from his own moral 
failure. In my opinion, Lot’s integrity is irrelevant for the narrator, who contrasts the 
righteousness of Abraham (18:19) with the wickedness of the Sodomites (131:13; 18:20- 
21; 19:4-11,13). Linked to the sin of its inhabitants, the fate of Sodom is predetermined 
and does not depend on Lot’s actions. Remarkable in this respect is the scene of 
intercession in 18:22-33, where Abraham tries to persuade Yahweh to spare Sodom. It 
is surprising that Abraham, who in Genesis 14 sprang to the rescue of his nephew, now 
does not plead for Lot or even mention him. Instead, he focuses on Sodom as a whole, 
hypothesising on the number of righteous people sufficient to stop the destruction of the 
city. Yet his intercession stops at the minimum of ten, which makes it impossible to
221 Helyer, ‘The Separation of Abram and Lot’, p. 86; G. W. Coats, ‘Lot: A Foil in the Abraham Saga’, in 
J. T. Butler et al. (eds.), Understanding the Word: Essays in Honour o f  Bernhard Anderson (Sheffield: 
JSOT Press, 1985), p. 127.
222 Turner, Announcements o f  Plot in Genesis, p. 69. While he too contrasts Lot and Abraham, Turner 
nevertheless disagrees with the scholarly consensus that, by moving eastwards, Lot loses his right to the 
promised land. For Turner, the plain of the Jordan is arguably included in the land promised to Abraham 
after the separation (pp. 67-68).
223 Terence E. Fretheim, Abraham: Trials o f  Family and Faith (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2007), p. 67; Steinmetz, From Father to Son, p. 80.
224 Speiser, Genesis, pp. 138-39, 143; Sharon Pace Jeansonne, ‘The Characterisation of Lot in Genesis’, 
BTB 18 (1988), p. 126. At the opposite end of the controversy is T. Desmond Alexander, who sees Lot 
consistently pictured as righteous (T. Desmond Alexander, ‘Lot’s Hospitality: A Clue to His 
Righteousness’, JBL 104 [1985], p. 290).
225 Jeansonne, ‘The Characterisation of Lot in Genesis’, pp. 31-32; Skinner, Genesis, p. 307.
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know whether or not Lot is found among the righteous. For even if Lot and all his 
relatives were righteous, that would only make six people in total and Sodom would still 
be doomed. It seems that by not letting Abraham go below the number of ten righteous, 
the narrative avoids the necessity of judging Lot either way. Lot’s actions in Genesis 19 
are not portrayed as intrinsically wrong or right. Instead, they clearly demonstrate his 
non-belonging with the Sodomites. The narrator takes pains to separate Lot from the 
wicked city.226 The fact that Lot remains an outsider at every stage of the narrative 
suggests that the unfolding drama is centred not on Lot, but on the fate of Sodom, the 
land where he has chosen to settle.
The assumption about the primary importance of Sodom over Lot receives 
support from the fact that Abraham shows no concern for Lot following the destruction 
of the city. In 19:28 Abraham looks toward ‘all the land of the valley’ and sees ‘the 
smoke of the land going up like the smoke of a furnace’, yet he does not question the 
fate of his ‘brother’. Does this reticence mean that he presumes Lot has perished 
together with Sodom? Or could it mean,, alternatively, that Abraham has seen all he 
needed to see, that is, that the land Lot had once chosen has been wiped out? Strikingly, 
the picture of devastation that Abraham sees stands in clear antithesis to the description 
of the valley as seen by Lot in 13:10.
Fig. 9
13:10
Lot lifted up his eves 
and he saw
all the valley of the Jordan 
well-watered everywhere 
before Yahweh destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah 
like the garden of Yahweh 
like the land of Egypt
The antithetic parallelism between the two verses suggests that the movement 
that started with the separation of Lot is now completed. The very essence of the land’s 
former appeal is negated, as the irrigated valley turns into its opposition, a burnt
226 Lot is a resident alien (ger, 19:9) in Sodom, and the narrative presents a number of spatial indications 
of his separate status. At the beginning, he is positioned at the gateway to the city (19:1) and later argues 
with the Sodomites at the entrance to his house, after which he takes refuge behind a closed door; at the 
end, he escapes from Sodom and goes to the hills, separating himself from the inhabitants of the plain.
19:28
Abraham looked down 
and he saw, and behold, 
all the land of the valley 
the smoke of the land 
toward Sodom and Gomorrah 
like the smoke of a furnace
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wasteland, an aftermath of destruction that reminds the reader of Yahweh’s undoing of 
creation by the flood.227 Where Lot once saw the lush paradise of Egypt, Abraham finds 
a smoking furnace. Egypt, that came on stage as the land of plenty, bestowing on the 
patriarch its ‘heavy’ riches (13:2), is thus disposed of, having been condemned and 
punished, its wickedness as exceeding as its wealth (cf. me’od, 13:2, 13). From this 
angle, the story of Sodom appears to be a warning against turning back to Egypt (cf. 
‘you must not go that way again’, Dt 17:15-16), a symbolic antidote to the yearnings, 
embedded in the historic consciousness of the Israelites.
Robert Letellier draws attention to the pronounced dark symbolism of the 
Sodom account.228 In contrast to the divine visitation of Abraham in Mamre that takes 
place at midday (18:1), the divine messengers enter Sodom at nightfall (19:1), and the 
confrontation between Lot and the Sodomites takes place during the night. The sun rises 
only after Lot and his family have been physically removed from Sodom and reached 
Zoar (19:23). Letellier recognises here some elements of the folk motif that Jung 
describes as the ‘night journey’, where the herQ„ undergoes a transformation by 
descending into the underworld or inside a mythical beast. Using the nocturnal 
symbolism is clearly part of the narrator’s strategy, yet this motif in the Lot narrative is 
nuanced by the absence of a positive hero and of clear transformation. Although the 
sunrise sees Lot come out of Sodom, he almost immediately hides himself in the 
darkness of the cave, where, instead of positive transformation, he experiences further 
regression and the confusion of status. This is not surprising if one accepts that the 
character of Lot functions as a projection of Abraham’s identity. Arguably, in the larger 
context of the cycle, the real subject of the ‘night journey’ of Sodom is the patriarch 
himself. For the narrator, the real purpose behind the cosmic obliteration of Sodom is 
not to punish the wicked, but symbolically to dispose of the land that has become ‘the 
apex of the seductive other’.229 By first demonising the inhabitants of the other land and 
then wiping that land out altogether, the narrative advocates both the absolute 
righteousness of the patriarch and the unrivalled value of the land that has been 
promised to him.
227 On the parallels between the destruction of Sodom and the devastation of the flood see Robert Alter, 
‘Sodom as Nexus: The Web of Design in Biblical Narrative’, in Jonathan Goldberg (ed.), Reclaimimg 
Sodom (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 35.
228 Robert Ignatius Letellier, Day in Mamre, Night in Sodom: Abraham and Lot in Genesis 18 and 19 
(Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 223-24.
229 See above, p. 107 n. 218.
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From a semiotic point of view, Lot mediates re-structuring of the narrative 
psyche, representing the part of it that, having fallen for the seductive Other, is then 
committed to destruction. It appears significant that, having survived the catastrophe, 
Lot is nevertheless decidedly ruined. As far as he is Abraham’s projection, he remains 
alive (a fact stressed in 19:29), yet he is reduced first to ‘insignificance’ (Zoar) and then 
to seclusion in a cave. The angels lead Lot out of Sodom stripped of all his possessions, 
the ‘flocks and herds and tents’, which once made Abraham seek separation from him 
(13:5). The fruitful valley that once embodied for him the paradise of Egypt is now 
irretrievably lost, so cut off from the Subject that even looking back at it imparts death. 
It seems logical that Abraham should ‘forget’ about Lot toward the end of the story. 
With Lot, the patriarch cuts off the part of himself that is susceptible of turning back to 
Egypt. Having mediated the Subject’s dissociation from the ‘other’ land, Lot has 
fulfilled his role and is pushed out to the dark recesses of both the narrative world and 
the Subject’s consciousness.
‘There Is No Man in the Land’: Distortion of Gender in Lot’s Story
!
It might be argued that the mechanism of projection underlying the character Lot 
upsets the balance of gender in the narrative. Having projected its hidden yearnings for 
the Other onto the figure of Abraham’s nephew, the narrative consciousness finds 
psychological release by constructing his land, Sodom, as the ‘other’ land -  an anti­
world, where boundaries are blurred and hierarchies reversed, the place of sterility, 
sexual violence, incest, and destruction. Letellier holds that practically every scene in 
Genesis 19 revolves around sexuality. To qualify this remark, I would add that 
sexuality and gender are not the narrator’s primary concern, but serve to signify the 
inverted structure of subjectivity associated with Sodom.
The first notable feature that distinguishes the presentation of gender in Genesis 
19 is its lack of normative patriarchal characters. The weak and passive Lot hardly cuts 
a convincing figure as a patriarch. At the beginning of the episode he has daughters and 
no sons and is, therefore, genealogically ‘sterile’, with no chance of preserving his 
lineage. He has no power to protect his guests or authority to persuade his prospective 230
230 Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 252.
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sons-in-law to join him. In 19:14, his words appear to them as laughable (me$ahéq), as 
did the announcement of childbearing to Sarah in 18:12. He has to be led out of 
Sodom by hand, and loses his wife along the way. After the destruction of the valley, he 
settles in a cave, is made drunk by his daughters, has sex with them, and becomes the 
father of his own grandchildren. .
Male subjectivity is further destabilised by the references, direct or implicit, to 
illicit forms of sexual intercourse, condemned elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, that is, 
homosexuality and incest (Lv 18:6-7, 22; 20:13). It should be noted that, despite the 
long tradition of interpretation that associated the ‘exceeding wickedness’ of the 
Sodomites with practice of homosexuality, the allusion to it in the text is not clearcut. 
On the one hand, the Sodomites’ demand to ‘know’ Lot’s guests (19:5) implies a threat 
of homosexual violence. Among its other meanings, the verb yádá ' denotes sexual 
intercourse performed by a male subject, and it is this meaning that Lot seems to 
corroborate when he offers his two virgin daughters to the crowd, presumably, to be 
‘known’ in the place of his male guests. _
On the other hand, the verb yádá‘ may be used here in the sense of intellectual 
knowledge. As Lyn Bechtel points out, the men of Sodom may simply want to know 
what the two strangers are doing in the city (after all, the latter threaten the very 
existence of their community). Alternatively, they may intend to ‘know’ Lot’s guests 
sexually, in which case, Bechtel argues, the issue is not their homosexual orientation, 
but their desire to establish dominance through rape.231 32 Van Wolde maintains that while 
the Sodomites’ want to know whether the strangers represent a threat to the community, 
Lot interprets their demand in a sexual sense, and this interpretation is confirmed by the 
narrator.233 Although the position of the Sodomites remains ambiguous, Lot’s response 
gives it a particular angle. The reader will find a similarly ambiguous usage of yádá ‘ at 
the end of the narrative, where the phrase Id ’-yáda ‘ indicates Lot’s absence of 
awareness while playing, at the same time, on his passive sexual role in the incest 
episode (19:33,35).234
231 Nachman Levine sees the two instances o f laughing as part of the complex opposition drawn in 
Genesis 18 and 19 between the themes of birth and destruction (‘Sarah/Sodom’, p. 132).
232 Lyn M. Bechtel, ‘A Feminist Reading of Genesis 19:1-11* in Brenner (ed.), Genesis, pp. 117-120.
233 van Wolde, ‘Outcry, Knowledge, and Judgment in Genesis 18-19’, in Diana Lipton (ed.), 
Universalism and Particularism at Sodom and Gomorrah: Essays in Memory o f  Ron Pirson (Ancient 
Israel and Its Literature, 11; Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), p. 96.
234 For further bibliography on the subject of yada' in the Sodom narrative see Exum, ‘Lot and His 
Daughters’, in Plotted, Shot, and Painted, p. 140.
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It is because the sexual connotation of the attack is retained in Lot’s discourse 
that the implications of homosexual rape for the Subject should be examined. In recent 
scholarship the Sodomites’ demand has been linked to their wish to dishonour Lot’s 
male visitors by treating them sexually as women. Directed at the male subject (the 
guests and Lot himself), the Sodomites’ threat carries the ideas of symbolic 
emasculation and sterility through homosexual rape and is therefore abhorrent to 
patriarchal consciousness, of which Lot is a spokesperson. The implied loss of 
masculinity is regarded as a far greater evil for the Subject than a heterosexual rape of 
Lot’s virgin daughters. This is illustrated on a lexical level in the dialogue in 19:7-9. 
Here Lot asks the Sodomites not to act wickedly (rd‘a% and offers his two daughters 
for them to do instead ‘what is good (tó¿)’ in their eyes. In reply, the men of Sodom 
threaten to deal with Lot worse (ra ‘a *) than they would have dealt with his guests. The 
verb rá ‘a ', ‘to be (do) bad’ is used twice to characterise prospective homosexual 
violence, while the word 0b, ‘good’ is associated with heterosexual rape. Lot’s offer 
could thus be seen semiotically as an attempt to counteract the reversal of gender 
hierarchy intended by his fellow citizens. The underlying assumption that the loss of 
masculinity is a greater evil makes the narrator (and generations of later commentators)
ignore the abhorrence of the father’s offering his young daughters to the violent mob.235 637
r
There is, however, an indication of narrative judgment on 'Lot’s disposal of his 
daughters’ sexuality in the incest scene, where the daughters assume control over the 
sexuality of their father (19:30-38).238
From the point of view of the patriarchal Subject, in Genesis 19 the male sexual 
drive as an expression of dominance is turned onto itself, introspected in both its 
homosexual and incestuous guises. Linked to a state of weak or compromised
235 Nathan MacDonald, ‘Hospitality and Hostility: Reading Genesis 19 in Light of 2 Samuel 10 (and Vice 
Versa)’, in Lipton (ed.), Universalism and Particularism, p. 184.
236 Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 252.
237 For an overview of the commentators who either ignore Lot’s offering of his daughters or find it
mitigated by the demands of hospitality, see Rashkow, ‘Daddy-Dearest and the “Invisible Spirit of 
Wine’” , in Brenner (ed.), Genesis, pp. 100-2. On a different note, Bechtel suggests that Lot makes his 
offer ‘in confidence that its incongruity and inappropriateness will stop the action and prevent further 
agression’ (Bechtel, ‘A Feminist Reading’, p. 124). '
238 Brett considers the narrative in 19:30-35 an example of poetic justice, ‘a fitting fate for someone 
willing to bargain away his daughters’ sexuality’ (Genesis, p. 68). Similarly, Weston W. Fields holds that 
in the incest scene Lot is ‘punished measure for measure’ for his earlier treatment of his daughters 
(Weston W. Fields, Sodom and Gomorrah: History and M otif in Biblical Narrative (JSOT SS, 231; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), p. 124). See also Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 187. In her 
psychoanalytic-literary reading of Genesis 19, Exum sees the episode of 19:1-29 as a first, unsuccessful 
attempt of the narrative unconscious to fantasise about the father’s sexual relations with his daughters, ‘a 
prelude to the version in vv. 30-38, in which the fantasy is narratively realised’ (Exum, ‘Lot and His 
Daughters’, in Plotted, Shot, and Painted, p. 140).
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masculinity, this introspection might be seen as a symbolic castration of the Subject 
resulting from Lot’s association with the ‘other’ land. The ‘wicked’ world of Sodom 
represents the realm of the Other, which carries the ultimate danger for the patriarchal 
consciousness and finds its expression in the images of threatened masculinity. 
Ironically, although Sodom is crowded with men, it represents the land where male 
subjectivity is rendered powerless or absent, the idea that Lot’s elder daughter 
encapsulates in her belief that ‘there is no man in the land’. Through Lot’s demise, the 
narrator demonstrates the perils of falling for the Other.
This idea provides an interpretative clue for understanding how the feminine 
subject is constructed. On the one hand, male introspection makes woman as sexual 
counterpart redundant, which is demonstrated in the fate of Lot’s wife -  a fleeting 
character, whose only action in the story is to look back at Sodom before turning into a 
pillar of salt. The petrified figure of Lot’s wife is thus united with the dead land, 
becomes part of it. In this, the wife and the land -  manifestations of the gendered Other 
-  are both committed to death, freeing the space for the realisation of the Subject’s 
incestuous drive.
Lot’s daughters, on the other hand, are regarded as part of the Self and thus 
allow introspection. Accordingly, they have a more lasting presence and role in the 
narrative. Their position is ambiguous: by virtue of being daughters and not sons, they 
represent the Subject’s symbolic sterility but also carry a potential for its cure. In the 
narrative that lacks regular male subjectivity, their function is to re-establish gender 
hierarchy and restore the status of the male protagonist. The task to produce male heirs 
for Lot (v. 32) underlies their desire for a heterosexual relationship that they describe as 
‘the way of the whole earth’ (v. 31). Yet, despite their ‘normative’ sexuality, from their 
first appearance onwards they are withdrawn from a sexual relationship with men. They 
first appear as virgins (they ‘have not known man [ ’if]’); next, they are rejected by the 
men ( *nasim) of Sodom; later, their prospective husbands fail to follow them; and in 
the final episode, Lot’s daughters are cut off from all society and live without a chance 
to find male partners (‘there is no man [ ’if] in the land’, v. 31). This dissociation allows 
feminine subjectivity to be imagined as part of the Subject: the fact that they have not 
known and cannot know man means that they are still ‘flesh of the flesh’ of their father. 
It is in this context that the last scene of incest in 19:30-38 appears.
The loss of masculinity that has been associated with the anti-world of Sodom 
here comes to its climax. Lot ends up living in a cave, which, as Rashkow points out,
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holds a sexual connotation both linguistically, through its association with nakedness, 
exposure, and genitals (e.g. nf'ârâh, ‘cave’; ‘erwâh, ‘genitals’; ‘eryâh ‘nakedness’; 
‘arâr, ‘to lay bare, to strip’), and psychoanalytically, in its reference to the subconscious 
with its suppressed desires. Symbolic of the womb, the cave becomes the space 
where the male Subject is rendered unconscious.239 40 Here Lot is twice described as ‘not 
knowing’ (‘he did not know when she lay down or when she arose’, w . 33, 35). The 
negative form of the verb y  add ', ‘to know’, further compromises Lot’s masculinity, 
symbolically distancing Lot from the male function of sexual ‘knowledge’. As Lot’s 
daughters get him drunk and then take turns to sleep with him in order to conceive, the 
man is placed in a lower hierarchical position, structurally becomes female. 
Accordingly, 19:30-38 reverses the established sexual roles in favour of the female 
characters: the daughters ‘go into’ (bo') and Tie with’ (sdkab 'ini) their father, 
performing the actions that in a sexual context are usually ascribed to men.241
Perhaps more that any other story in Genesis, the narrative of Genesis 19 lends 
itself to psychoanalytical interpretation that can account for its unresolved tensions, 
inversions, and inconsistencies. Scholars have explored the psychoanalytic implications 
of the way the narrator ascribes male functions to the daughters. Analysing the incest
scene in 19:30-38, Robert Polhemus formulates the ‘Lot complex’ as complementary to
'
the Oedipus complex in that it reveals male subconscious projections with respect to 
younger women that is the power to dispose of their sexuality within the legitimate 
father-daughter relationship as well as the subconscious desire to relate to them 
incestuously as sexual partners.242 Exum’s detailed analysis demonstrates how the 
father’s repressed sexual desire, directed at his daughters, governs the events in the 
narrative, creating the conditions for the incestuous relationship while shifting the 
blame to the daughters.243 Along similar lines, Rashkow holds that Lot acts out his 
repressed fantasies under the influence of alcohol.244
The reversal of the sexual roles effects a symbolic cure to the sterile Subject, 
since sons are bom as a result of it, but leaves ‘the father’s seed’ tainted with alterity.
239 Rashkow, ‘Daddy Dearest’, p. 102; Taboo or not Taboo, p. 107. '
240 See Letellier, Day in Mamre, p. 252.
241 Brenner points out that the case of Lot’s daughters in 19:30-38 is the only place in the Hebrew Bible 
where the expression Sdkab ‘im is used with a clear inversion of positions into female subject and male 
object (The Intercourse o f  Knowledge, p. 24). See also Esther Marie Menn, Judah and Tamar (Genesis 
38) in Ancient Jewish Exegesis: Studies in Literary Form and Hermeneutics (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 98.
242 Robert M. Polhemus, Lot’s Daughters: Sex, Redemption, and Women’s Quest fo r  Authority (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 1-47.
243 Exum,‘Lot and His Daughters’, pp. 133-59.
244 Rashkow, ‘Daddy Dearest’, pp. 98-106.
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The story ends with the births of Moab and Ammon, the ancestors of two neighbouring 
nations hostile to Israel and excluded from its congregation (Dt 23:3-4). In the final 
transaction, the narrative consciousness translates the symbolic death of the male 
Subject that the patriarchal consciousness associated with the ‘other’ land, into the birth 
of foreign identity. With this, the mechanism of projection is completed. The paradise 
of Egypt has gone up with smoke and the part of Israel’s collective psyche that had been 
fascinated with Egypt has now become expelled, exteriorised in the image of other, less 
significant and attractive national identities.
Hagar’s Story: Subjectivity and Dominance
The proposition that starts off the dynamics of the Hagar story is Sarah’s wish to 
be ‘built up’ through her slave. In the Hebrew Bible the expression 7bbaneh 
mimmennah, ‘I shall be built up through her’ is twice attributed to childless wives -  
Sarah and Rachel -  who use their servants as surrogate mothers in order to create a 
family (16:2; 30:3). Sarah’s premise seems clear: by acquiring a child through her slave, 
she means to establish, ‘build up’ her own status. Her inability to give an heir to 
Abraham has posed a threat to the realisation of Abraham’s identity as a'father of a 
great nation (12:2). The tension between Yahweh’s promise and Sarah’s barrenness has 
now reached its highest point, since in the previous chapter Abraham complains to 
Yahweh about being childless and in reply is promised offspring as countless as the 
stars (15:4-5). Since the problem is not the sterility of Abraham, but, emphatically, that 
of his wife (11:30; 16:1), everything hinges on Sarah. Sarah’s first words as a character 
reflect this overriding concern of the narrative: she can only picture herself being built 
up by providing Abraham with an heir. In this respect, as Exiun argues, Sarah becomes 
an accomplice of the narrator, deriving her motivation from the androcentric agenda of 
the text.245
Another significant detail introduced in 16:1 is Hagar’s Egyptian origin. Since 
the narrative of Lot (13:10), Egypt has been mentioned only once in the scene 
immediately preceding Genesis 16, where Abraham’s seed was promised the lands of 
the surrounding nations that stretch from the river of Egypt to the Euphrates (15:18-21). 
It is hardly fortuitous that the narrative following this promise will focus on the tensions
245 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 165 n. 33.
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between the first matriarch and an Egyptian woman slave: the issues at stake are not 
only to do with Sarah’s sterility but also (or even primarily?) with the establishing of 
Israel’s dominance with respect to the Other. Sarah’s desire to be ‘built up’ receives 
here another, national connotation.
Sarah thus is posited as the one on whom both Abraham’s progeny and his 
dominance depends, and, in this capacity, she holds authority over the patriarch himself. 
First, she orders Abraham to have sexual intercourse with her slave (v. 2). Next, she 
gives Hagar to Abraham as a wife (v. 3).246 The text of v. 3 highlights the structural 
implications of Sarah’s exchange. It presents a clear family hierarchy, composed of two 
sets of relationships: Sarah/Abraham (‘Sarah, Abram’s wife’), and Hagar/Sarah (‘Hagar 
the Egyptian, her slave’). Sarah mediates the two relationships, restructuring them so 
that Hagar is now put in a relationship with Abraham. In this relationship Hagar loses 
her name and origin, and appears simply as a role (‘as a wife’).
By giving Hagar to Abraham as a wife, Sarah raises the status of her slave to her 
own and at the same time suspends her own conjugal relationship with Abraham. Hagar 
in her role as a wife of Abraham contrasts Sarah whose status as his wife was 
undermined in 12:10-20. Intertextually, the account of Abraham, handing Sarah over to
an Egyptian ruler ‘as a wife’ is echoed when Sarah gives her Egyptian slave ‘as a wife’
I
to her husband. A closer look at the two texts allows one to see the structural similarities 
between Sarah’s transaction and Abraham’s ruse:
Fig. 10
S tructu ral elements 12:10-20 16:1-6
dispenser o f wife-object Abraham Sarah
wife-object Sarah Hagar
hierarchical relationship relinquished husband-wife mistress-slave
parallel relationship assumed brother-sister first wife -  second wife
dispenser’s self-concern ‘it may go well with me 
because o f you’
‘I shall be built up
through her’
receiver o f wife-object Pharaoh Abraham
Yahweh intervenes to re-establish 
the original hierarchy
Pharaoh is punished 
with plagues
Hagar is told to submit 
to her mistress
receiver returns wife-object ‘here is your wife' ‘your slave is in your power’
246 Abraham will obey Sarah’s order only after Sarah has given him Hagar as a wife (w . 3-4). It is 
interesting, however, that Sarah’s command in v. 2 emphasises only the sexual relationship and omits the 
notion of marriage.
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Scholars have commented on the similar positions that Abraham and Sarah 
respectively occupy in the two episodes.247 248Trible has pointed out that Sarah shows the 
same attitude towards Hagar in Canaan as that which Abraham had towards Sarah in 
Egypt: she treats her slave as ‘the object of use for the desires of others’. In both 
cases, the dispenser of the wife-object exploits her qualities of beauty (Sarah) and 
fertility (Hagar), and intends to derive personal benefit from the exchange. In both 
cases, the wife-object is returned to the original ‘owner’. However, each transaction has 
a very different outcome for the initiator of exchange. While the wife-sister ruse works 
for Abraham, making him kabed me’od, ‘exceedingly heavy’ with possessions (13:2), 
Sarah does not seem to benefit from her exploiting of Hagar. When Hagar conceives 
according to Sarah’s plan, Sarah, instead of being ‘built up’, becomes ‘light’ (watteqal) 
in the eyes of her former slave (16:4, 5). The verb qll stands in semantic contrast to the 
‘heaviness’ of Abraham. At the same time, it plays on the connotation of lightness or 
emptiness associated with Sarah as a barren woman, contrasting her to Hagar, who is 
now pregnant and therefore semiotically ‘full’.
A question that arises immediately is why the kind of exchange that was so 
profitable for the patriarch does not work for Sarah. One might find a clue in the
ambiguity of Sarah’s position, split between that of wife-object in the first story and that
I '
of wife-dispenser in the second. Although she can affirm her subjectivity with respect to 
Hagar, she remains a woman, subordinated to her husband, and her exchange ‘builds 
up’ him and not her, giving him his first child while leaving her ‘empty’. As far as the 
needs of patriarchy are concerned, Sarah can be vindicated only by bearing her own 
child.
But the decisive factor in Sarah’s failure to build up her family through her slave 
is Hagar’s rise to subjectivity. It is first postulated in her origin (mi?rit, ’Egyptian’, 16:1, 
3) and in her name, both of which connote her difference. The derivation of the name 
hagar is uncertain, but, as Jeansonne has observed, phonetically it echoes ger, the 
Hebrew word for ‘foreigner’ or ‘stranger’.249 Rulon-Miller sees Hagar as a 
personification of Egypt, a character who represents ‘the foreign land’ for the Israelites
247 Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, p. 45; Amy-Jill Levine, ‘Settling at Beer-Lahai-Roi’, 
in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito (eds.), Daughters o f  Abraham: Feminist Thought in 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001), pp. 21-22.
248 Phyllis Trible, ‘Ominous Beginnings for a Promise o f a Blessing’, in Phyllis Trible and Letti M. 
Russel (eds.), Hagar, Sarah, and Their Children: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), p. 38.
249 Sharon Pace Jeansonne, The Women o f  Genesis: From Sarah to Potiphar's Wife, p. 11.
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and their narrators.250 Above, looking at the separation of Lot in Genesis 13, I have 
examined the significance of Egypt for the construction of Israel’s identity. Now, in 
16:1, by detailing that Hagar is an Egyptian slave {sijyhah), the text reminds the reader 
of the female slaves {fgàhdi), received by Abraham in Egypt as part of Pharaoh’s 
payment for Sarah (12:16) and thus supports the image of Hagar as a substitute for her 
mistress. Yet Hagar’s association with Egypt makes her a problematic substitute. And 
very quickly, only three verses down from her first appearance, Hagar sees herself as 
different from Sarah: ‘when she saw that she had conceived, her mistress became slight 
in her eyes’ (16:4, cf. 16:5). Together with her conception, Hagar acquires, if not a 
voice yet, at least a point of view. Trible observes how words of sight, connoting 
understanding (‘she saw’, ‘in her eyes’), begin and end the sentence, encircling the 
opposition between Hagar and her mistress.251 Looking at her situation, Hagar 
distinguishes between its two opposing agents: herself, pregnant and ‘heavy’, and her 
mistress, sterile and Tight’. This discernment stops her from being subsumed, 
amalgamated into the exploitative structure that ignores her subjectivity and threatens 
her parental rights.252 253At the beginning of the story, Hagar affirms herself as a subject 
and a proper mother of her child and, by doing so, refuses to ‘build up’ Sarah.
In this, she is also different from Bilhah and Zilpah, the other two women in
!
Genesis who occupy the position of servant-made-wife. Bilhah and Zilpah come on 
stage as surrogate mothers and their only actions are to conceive and bear Jacob’s 
children on behalf of his two wives (30:1-13). There everything goes according to plan: 
through their childbearing, Bilhah and Zilpah help to build up the status positions of 
their mistresses and their sons are accepted into the lineage (30:6, 8, 11, 13).254 
Afterwards they will remain in the family as a background presence, and will never 
become subjects in their own right.
250 Rulon-Miller, ‘Hagar’, p. 62.
251 Trible, ‘Ominous Beginnings’, p. 39.
252 Joel Rosenberg, King and Kin: Political Allegory in the Hebrew Bible (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1986), pp. 94-95.
253 Here I disagree with Phyllis Trible who argues that Hagar’s stance in 16:4 reorders her relationship 
with Sarah, making it equal (Phyllis Trible, Texts o f  Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings o f  Biblical 
Narratives [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984], p. 12). While the relationship indeed is reordered, in 
Hagar’s view it is based on another form of inequality - the unequal status of the two women with respect 
to reproduction. The hierarchy of status is replaced here with a hierarchy of fertility.
254 For Exum, the fact that Hagar’s son Ishmael is not integrated into Israel, whereas the sons of Bilhah 
and Zilpah are included among the ancestors of the twelve tribes, may reflect ‘different valuations of 
Israel’s relationship with Mesopotamia and with Egypt in the tradition’ (Fragmented Women, p. 131 n. 
65).
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It is notable that, in affirming her subjectivity against that of her mistress, Hagar 
never rebels against Abraham, who is the ultimate, though undeclared beneficiary of 
Sarah’s scheme. The narrator’s strategy is to limit the conflict to that between the two 
women, contrasting them to each other. Likewise, Abraham refuses to deal with Hagar 
even when Sarah tries to bring him into the dispute, and instead hands her, reinstated as 
a slave, back to Sarah. Once she has her power back, Sarah retaliates. Her harsh 
treatment of Hagar is described by the verb ‘nh, which along with the idea of afflicting 
signifies humbling or forcing submission on one’s opponent. Once again, the relative 
status positions between the two women are shifted: the mistress, who has been 
humiliated by her slave, now regains her standing by oppressing her rival. For a 
moment, the story seems to have returned to the initial situation. However, Hagar, who 
is now characterised by self-awareness as well as fertility, cannot fit into the old 
hierarchy. She runs away into the desert.
One might expect that Hagar’s flight should have implications for her 
relationship with Abraham. When she runs away from her mistress, she removes the 
child she is carrying from Abraham’s house, leaving him without the prospect of 
becoming a father. Yet the patriarch is apparently unconcerned about what happens to
his future child. Pregnancy m the patriarchal narratives is an exclusively female domain,
Ì
a state over which the husband has no responsibility (is that why Abraham will not 
hesitate before handing the pregnant Sarah over to Abimelech in Genesis 20?). In 
Genesis 16 Hagar is constructed vis-à-vis Sarah and not Abraham, and Yahweh 
endorses it when he sends her back to her mistress, and not to her husband (16:9).
The message that Hagar receives from Yahweh is double-edged. On the one 
hand, she is addressed as ‘Hagar, Sarai’s slave’, and in no equivocal terms is ordered to 
go back to her mistress and submit, or, literally, ‘be oppressed’, ‘under her hand’ (16:9). 
The root ‘nh, ‘to oppress, afflict’, echoes Sarah’s earlier mistreatment of her slave 
(16:6). Yahweh, like Abraham before him, reaffirms Sarah’s power and places Hagar 
back in the lower hierarchical position. Sarah’s superiority is thus upheld by the two 
providers of woman’s status, Abraham and Yahweh. One might read this ‘building up’ 
of status as an answer the narrative gives to Sarah’s initial wish to be ‘built up’: by 
being opposed to Hagar as the Other, Sarah too becomes part of the Subject, receiving a 
place in the structure of dominance that lies at the basis of the patriarchal narratives.
On the other hand, along with ordering her to submit, the angel promises Hagar 
exceeding fertility, and a son, whose name yiSmà'è’l, ‘God hears’, would forever
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remind her of the suffering she had from the hand of Sarah (‘for Yahweh has heard your 
affliction ["«/]’, 16:11). Trible notes the irony of the naming speech, in which ‘the 
comforting name attends affliction’.255 256 Sending Hagar back to the situation of 
oppression, Yahweh simultaneously suggests that he has paid heed to her being 
oppressed! The fact that both parts of Yahweh’s message are hinged on the root ‘nh 
makes it central to Yahweh’s perspective against the root s m ‘to hear’, used only in the 
naming speech (v. 11). Stressing Sarah’s dominance over her slave, the double use of 
‘nh problematises Yahweh’s compassion for Hagar.
The two parts of Yahweh’s message appear less contradictory in the context of 
the main narrative programme centred on the emergent identity of Israel. From this 
perspective, the divine revelation concerning Ishmael is not motivated by Yahweh’s 
compassion for Hagar or her future child but serves the construction of the ethnocentric 
Subject by establishing its national Other.257 The characters Abraham separates from 
need to be recognised as personifications of the nations that surround the historical 
Israel.258 Therefore, the narrator uses the human drama of Hagar, exploited as a woman 
and oppressed as a slave, as a blueprint for Israel’s domination. To make Hagar’s 
expulsion worthwhile, she should be expelled having first given birth to a nation that 
has its submission to Israel imprinted in its name and identity. And for that, she has to 
return and submit to her mistress.
That might be why Ishmael, an heir, needs to be sent away only once. Like other 
instances of the separation of rival brothers (Lot and Esau), Ishmael’s departure is 
definitive and allows no return. Hagar, on the contrary, has to be separated in two 
stages, both times ending up in a wilderness, both times given a message of reassurance 
by Yahweh. Exum, following Meir Sternberg, treats this double expulsion of Hagar as a 
sign of the difficulties the narrator has with justifying her removal from Abraham’s
255 Trible, ‘Ominous Beginnings’, p. 41.
256 Brett holds an opposite view. For him, the fact that a slave woman receives a promise of uncountable 
seed and of a son who will become a nation (16:10-11) undermines the dominant ideology o f 16:8-9 
(Genesis, p. 59).
257 One could recognise the same logic in 21:12-13, where Yahweh comforts Abraham, who is upset 
about Sarah’s order to expell Ishmael, by promising him that Ishmael will become a nation. Here Yahweh 
explicitly states that Ishmael owes his future status to Abraham. Exum notes that the promise in 21:12-13 
is not given ‘for the sake of the victims but because Ishmael is Abraham’s offspring’. The idea of 
Ishmael’s nationhood thus functions as a kind of compensation that ‘makes the reader feel better’ about 
the expulsion (‘Hagar en procès’, pp. 8-9).
258 1 propose that the same reasoning underlies Yahweh’s sparing of Lot that happens, admittedly, for the 
sake of Abraham (19:29). It is in the interests of the Subject to have Lot survive the fall o f Sodom, since, 
following his rescue, Lot becomes the father of the ancestors of Moab and Ammon. The identity of the 
hostile nations is thus controlled by the narrative, being simultaneously traced back to the Subject and 
definitively separated from him.
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household. Like other stories that exhibit patterns of repetition, the repeated theme of 
expulsion in the story of Hagar functions ‘as a textual working out of a particular 
problem or concern, repeated because the problem is not so easy to resolve’.259
It might be added that the two instances of separation in Genesis 16 and 21 
communicate two different levels of dissociation. In Genesis 16, the threatening Other 
(Hagar) is forced out, expelled with respect to the feminine part of Israel’s self (Sarah). 
It seems that Sarah as Israel cannot access her own fertility (birth of Isaac in 21:1-2) 
without first establishing her supremacy. In the Hagar episodes, Sarah mirrors 
patriarchal structures of dominance: she has a voice (or authority to give orders, 16:2; 
21:12) and a hand (as power over her rival, 16:6, 9), but little subjectivity. Elsewhere in 
the cycle, Sarah has little to show for being an independent character, being either used 
by Abraham as an object of trade in the wife-sister episodes, or paired with the patriarch 
in his encounters with Yahweh. Like Abraham, the father of a multitude of nations 
(17:5), Sarah is renamed as the one who will give rise to nations (17:15-16); like 
Abraham, she is too old to have children (18:11-12), and, like him, she laughs at the 
prospect of having a son in old age (17:17; 18:12-15).260 The only occasion when Sarah 
acts on her own, without ‘doubling’ Abraham, is found in her oppressive treatment of
Hagar and Ishmael. Yet even in this she implicitly represents the interests of the
I
patriarchal Subject.
Because Sarah is only a projection of Abraham’s needs, the process of 
separation needs to happen at the level of the male subject. Hagar has to return because 
Ishmael has to be bom in Abraham’s household and named by Abraham to be expelled 
‘properly’, enabling the narrative consciousness to affirm Isaac, the ‘right’ successor, 
over against the son of the Egyptian slave. Unlike the separation in Genesis 16 with its 
emphasis on the ‘female’ issue of conception, the expulsion in Genesis 21 is centred on 
the ‘male’ issue of inheritance. As soon as her own son Isaac is bom and weaned, Sarah 
sees the son of Hagar the Egyptian as me?aheq, ‘laughing’ (v. 9). As a pun on the name 
‘Isaac’, me?aheq implies that, by his laughter, Ishmael indicates his equality to Isaac, a 
hint that Sarah interprets as a threat to Isaac’s status and inheritance.261 It is this threat
259 Exum, ‘Hagar en proces', pp. 5-6 n 16.
260 Even Sarah’s internal momologue that accompanies her laughter places her next to Abraham: ‘After I 
have become old, shall I have pleasure, my lord being old too? (18:12).
261 Jo Ann Hackett, ‘Rehabilitating Hagar: Fragments o f an Epic Pattern’, in Peggy L. Day (ed.), Gender 
and Difference in Ancient Israel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), pp. 20-21; Exuni, ‘The Accusing 
Look: The Abjection of Hagar in Art’, in RelArts 11(2007), p. 149 nn. 17, 18; McKinlay, Reframing Her, 
p. 131.
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Of l jthat makes her require Abraham to expel ‘this slave with her son’ (v. 10). For 
Abraham, however, this demand appears exceedingly evil ‘because of his son’ (21:11). 
The gender positions of the husband and wife are thus transposed: Sarah is schematised 
as a bearer of the patriarchal concerns about status, power, and heritage, whereas 
Abraham is concerned about descent (‘his son’), a role usually attributed to the 
matriarchs. Abraham is also allowed to form attachments and show feelings. He grieves 
for his son, listens to Yahweh’s reassurance, and gives Hagar water and bread for the 
journey (v. 14).26 63 His involvement, however, does not diminish the brutality of his 
final gesture, communicated by the verb slh, ‘to throw’. 264 No matter how much the 
narrator tries to exculpate the patriarch, in the end, he is the one who performs the 
expulsion.
Significantly, in both episodes, neither Sarah nor Abraham regards Hagar as a 
subject. They never mention Hagar’s name, referring to her as either sijjhah (16:1, 2, 3, 
5, 6) or ’amah (21:10), both of which mean ‘servant’ or ‘slave’. In Abraham’s 
household, as Exum notes, Hagar is never spoken to, but ‘spoken about and acted 
upon’.265 26Yahweh is the only character who addresses her by name, and on the two 
occasions that he does it, Hagar is found outside Abraham’s house, in the wilderness 
(16:8; 21:17). Judith McKinlay sees the wilderness as the space ‘between’, for while it 
is ‘markedly not the space of Sarai and Abraham, it is also not Egypt’. In the first 
episode, the position ‘between’ is indicated geographically in the reference to Shur, the 
area south of Canaan, in the direction of Egypt (16:7). When Hagar first breaks away 
from Sarah’s household and from Abraham’s promised lineage, she places herself in the 
semantically empty space where a new identity can be formed. In this space she 
receives a promise of an identity of her own, and this space she goes back to when she 
is finally separated from the identity of Israel (21:14). The desert is for her a place 
where she becomes, however briefly, a subject.
262 Brett observes that the purely economic terms used to justify the driving away of Hagar in 21:10 
reflect the politics of dispossession that guides the divorces of foreign women in Ezra and Nehemiah 
(Genesis, pp. 60-61).
263According to Exum, Sarah and Abraham’s contrasting attitudes are part of ‘an ideology that uses the 
matriarchs to carry out disagreeable but necessary deeds for Israel to fulfill its destiny, thereby allowing 
the patriarchs to appear in a better light’ ( ‘The Accusing Look’, p. 149 n. 19).
264 Exum draws attention to the use of slh in the Hebrew Bible, stressing that whenever ‘people who are 
still alive are the object of nbtP, they are thrown out or thrown down to their deaths’ ( ‘Hagar en procès', 
pp. 12-13).
Exum, ‘Hagar en procès', p. 7.
266 Judith E. McKinlay, Reframing Her: Biblical Women in Postcolonial Focus (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Phoenix Press, 2004), p. 131.
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It is significant that, in the wilderness, the angel of Yahweh finds her by a water 
source, a symbolic reference to life in an arid and sterile environment. The Hebrew 
word for ‘spring’, ‘ayin, is a homonym that also means ‘eye’, and has been used 
repeatedly in the previous verses to indicate Hagar’s and Sarah’s points of view (w . 4, 
5, 6). Here ‘ayin functions as a pun that plays on the role of sight in the construction of 
Hagar’s character. By describing the site where Yahweh addresses Hagar, it also 
anticipates Hagar’s perception of Yahweh as ‘the God who sees me’ (16:13). Here 
Hagar holds a unique position. Not only is she the only woman in Genesis, apart 
Rebekah, to receive a theophany but she is also the only character in the Bible to ever 
name God. What does she mean by this name? Though the Hebrew of her speech is 
unclear (‘I have seen after ( 'affre) who sees me’), its structure anticipates another 
theophany, the one that Sarah furtively receives in 18:10: ‘and Sarah was listening at the 
tent door behind him ( ’aharaw)\ The manner in which the two women receive a 
promise reinforces the contrast between them. Sarah, who has been associated with 
voice and speaking (16:2; 21:12), can only over hear God promising her a son, since, 
being behind the door, she cannot see him; whereas Hagar, who is capable of seeing 
(16:4, 5), sees the God who has promised her countless descendants, and, moreover, 
names him as the one who sees her. The word ’alfre in 16:13, though difficult to 
translate, qualifies Hagar’s experience so as to remove the possibility of her seeing 
God’s face (Ex 33:20). But, even in this qualified way, Hagar’s naming speech sounds 
triumphant, for in it she posits herself as a subject of seeing in parallel to El Roi, the 
God who sees. .
The second time Hagar finds herself in the desert, she is there with Ishmael, 
having been driven out of Abraham’s household. Unable, this time, to find a water 
source, she leaves (lit. Slh, ‘throws’) Ishmael under a bush and sits down away from 
him, not wanting ‘to see the boy die’ (21:16). Exum interprets this desperate gesture as 
Hagar’s second attempt, after her fleeing from Sarah in 16:6, to separate herself from 
Israel. Using Julia Kristeva’s terminology, Exum describes Hagar’s distancing from 
Ishmael as abjection, a process whereby the Subject asserts its boundaries by expelling 
or abjecting a part of itself that is perceived as threatening. Just like Israel (Abraham) 
abjected or ‘threw out’ Hagar and Ishmael in 21:14, Hagar now abjects ‘what still 
connects her to Israel -  the child -  by casting the child away, throwing him under a 
bush’. To reinforce Hagar’s emotional distancing from Ishmael, the narrator of 21:14-20 267
267 Rulon-Miller, ‘Hagar’, p. 77.
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never describes him as Hagar’s son and consistently uses the impersonal terms ‘the 
child’ or ‘the boy’.268 In her abjection of Ishmael, Hagar claims boundaries of her own, 
and therefore, subjectivity.
Hagar’s rise to subjectivity is, however, short-lived. In another theophany, God 
orders Hagar to lift up the boy and hold him by the hand (21:18), which echoes his 
earlier order: ‘Go back to your mistress and submit under her hand’ (16:9). Once again, 
Hagar has to suppress her abjection of Israel and, instead, serve its interests, this time, 
by ensuring the survival of Israel’s Other, without whom the project of dominance is 
impossible. For, despite his exclusivity, Abraham cannot take all the space. The Subject 
needs his Other to remain there, in the shadow (and as a shadow) of Israel’s superior 
identity. Ishmael’s ambivalent presence therefore endures even after the expulsion. On 
the one hand, as a son of Abraham, Ishmael retains a degree of association with Israel: 
he becomes the father of twelve princes in parallel to the twelve tribes; Isaac and 
Ishmael together bury Abraham (25:9); later, Esau marries the daughter of Ishmael 
when he need to choose a wife from the parentage of Abraham (28:6-9). On the other 
hand, as the son of Hagar the Egyptian, he lives on ‘in the face of all his brothers’ as a 
conflicted presence, ‘his hand against everyone and everyone’s hand against him’ 
(16:12). His status as the national Other is reinforced when his mother takes him a wife
i
from Egypt. This is the last thing she does. Having served the function to assure both 
the similarity and the difference of Israel’s Other, Hagar now disappears from stage and 
from Israel’s narrative.
In the larger context of the Abraham cycle, the expulsion of Hagar serves to 
exclude Egypt from Israel’s self-identity in a movement that is parallel to the one 
effected by the separation of Lot. Above, I have argued that the ‘weight’ of Egypt, 
represented by the flocks, herds, and slaves that Abraham brings with him to Canaan 
(cf. 12:16; 13:2) becomes a key semiotic factor that springboards the construction of the 
Other at the level of both the female character and the land. At the level of the land, the 
wealth of Egypt leads to the separation of Lot, Abraham’s surrogate brother. At the 
level of the female subject, Egypt is represented by Sarah’s slave Hagar, who brings to 
the patriarch simultaneously a blessing of fertility arid a threat of assimilation. From the 
point of view of Israel’s identity, both Lot and Hagar are flawed through their 
association with Egypt.
268 Exum, ‘Hagar en proces', pp. 11-12.
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It is notable that, unlike the separation between the two male protagonists in the 
Lot story, the expulsion of Hagar involves both Abraham and Sarah and happens at 
Sarah’s initiative. From a psychoanalytic point of view, Sarah, like Lot, carries, 
projected upon her, the aspects of the narrative psyche that the Subject finds difficult to 
admit. While Lot is needed to channel the Subject’s repressed desire for the land of 
Egypt, Sarah serves as a projection of the Subject’s dominant, oppressive attitude 
towards Egypt as ‘nations’.
Fig. 11
Transactions between Self and Other in the Abraham cycle
Self
(Israel)
Other Levels of
(Egypt) representation
projection of desire
Abraham ---- -^---------------> Lot other land
I separation , *
I projection
I of dominance '
4
Sarah ' ---------------------► Hagar other mother
expulsion
I I
Isaac ______________^ Ishmael other heir
expulsion
The two cases of projection hold interesting implications for the understanding 
of gender in the narrative. Through the workings out of the Lot narrative, the Subject 
renounces the unwanted aspect of the Self, his underlying weakness of desiring the 
Other. As a result, in the narrative of Sodom the male protagonist loses power and 
masculinity, which leads to a reversal of the normative gender model. In the case of 
Sarah, by contrast, the ‘male’ function of dominance is projected onto female 
subsectivity, which increases Sarah’s power both over Hagar and over Abraham. The
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fact that, like desire, dominance too has to be projected, indicates that the Subject finds 
it problematic. Thus Sarah as a character pays the price, becoming an uncomfortable or 
even ‘exceedingly evil’ (21:11) presence for the Subject himself. In the end, desire for 
Egypt is disavowed through Lot’s demise, whereas dominance over Egypt is sanctioned 
and incorporated into Israel’s consciousness (‘whatever Sarah says to you, listen to her’, 
21:12). It is ironic that with this divine authorisation of her voice, Sarah is reduced to 
silence. As soon as the dominance over Ishmael has been established, she disappears as 
a character. Strikingly, having protected the interests of her son so fiercely in Genesis 
21, Sarah is absent when he is nearly killed by his father (Genesis 22). The last time she 
appears on stage is when she dies (23:1-2). Like in Lot’s case, repression here follows 
projection, and Sarah, in the end, is repressed as a narrative subject. Her role in the 
formation of the Subject receives, however, full institutional approval, which is 
indicated, in the account of her burial, by the reference to Abraham’s mourning and the 
large amount of narrative space given to the purchase of the land for her tomb (23:3-20).
Removing the threatening aspects of alterity (other land, other mother, other 
heir), the patriarch builds the concept of identity on what is not contaminated by the 
Other. Israel, like Sarah, is emphatically not ‘built up’ through Egypt. The only safe
ground for Israel’s emergent Self is found in the paradox and transcendence of
!
Yahweh’s promise, which is not dependent on human will or natural condition. 
Signified by Abraham’s and Sarah’s laughter (17:17; 18:12, 13, 15), this paradox 
becomes a constituent of Israel’s national identity through the name of their son, yishaq, 
‘he laughed’ (17:19). As a mark of discontinuity, Abraham’s laughter stresses that the 
birth of the right successor is not logically derived from any previously accumulated 
meanings, agencies, or identities. Having come out of nothing, Israel’s descent is totally 
‘uncontaminated’, and, therefore, totally separate or ‘holy’.269
The birth of Isaac, ‘the child of laughter’, and the expulsion of the other heir, 
establish the boundaries of the exclusivist national identity. And as soon as it is 
established, the ‘uncontaminated’ Self of Israel is brought to trial in the story of the near 
sacrifice of Isaac in 22:1-19. The unified identity, symbolised by the ‘only son’, is 
threatened to be absorbed back into its source, Yahweh or the ultimate Other, while all
269 As Brett points out, the expulsion of Hagar and her son can be read as a paradigm o f holiness, 
suggested by Ezra 9:1-2 with its insistence on endogamy and the need to send away foreign women. The 
ideology of holiness or exclusivism is, however, undercut by the text, which, despite the exclusion of 
Hagar and Ishmael from Israel, presents them as ‘effectively equal recipients of divine grace’ (Genesis, 
pp. 76-77).
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the other forms of alterity have been suppressed.270 Psychologically, Yahweh’s 
command to sacrifice Isaac reflects the perceived threat of annihilation associated with 
God as the Other, as well as posits the Other as the source of renewed identity. There is, 
however, another side to the drama of Genesis 22. According to Nancy Jay, this 
narrative restores Isaac, whose interests until now have been represented by his mother, 
to patrilineal descent. Through the symbolic transaction of sacrifice, Isaac ‘receives his 
life not by birth from his mother but from the hand of his father as directed by God’.271 
The totalising discourse is thus reaffirmed in the absence, literal and symbolic, of the 
mother, when God spares Isaac and renews the promise of countless descendants to 
Abraham (22:12, 16-18). The exclusivity of this discourse is, however, problematised, 
since Abraham’s trial bears striking similarities to the preceding story of Hagar: leaving 
early in the morning, 21:14; 22:3; exposure of the son, 21:15; 22:9; divine intervention 
and promise of nationhood, 21:17-18; 22:12,16-18; the motif of seeing in the naming of 
God and of the place, 16:13-14; 22:14; reference to Beersheba, 21:14; 22:19.272 The 
patriarch’s earlier treatment of the other mother is echoed in his own trial, which might 
be seen as another example of poetic justice or inner-biblical critique.273 274A similar 
process is apparent in the multiple parallels between the the story of Hagar and the 
experience of the Israelites'of Exodus, which reverses the respective positions of Israel
i 274and Egypt with respect to oppression, expulsion, and desert wandering.
270 Brett stresses the ambivalence of God’s command in 22:2, describing it as ‘a chilling display of 
exclusivist ideology, tortuously trying to cover up the reality of the one excluded’ (Genesis, p. 73). By 
saying, ‘Take now your son, your only one, whom you love, Isaac’, God entirely dismisses the existence 
of Abraham’s elder son Ishmael, whom God himself has called ‘Abraham’s seed’ (21:13), and for whom 
the patriarch has shown fatherly feelings (21:11). In Brett’s view, by making the near sacrifice o f Isaac 
follow the expulsion of Ishmael, the final editors subvert the exclusivism of the covenant in 17:18-22 (p. 
75).
271 Nancy Jay, ‘Sacrifice, Descent and the Patriarchs’, VT 38 (1988), p. 60. On constructing patrilineal 
descent through sacrifice see also Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 118-120.
272 The parallels between the expulsion o f Ishmael in Genesis 21 and the sacrifice of Isaac in Genesis 22
have been examined in S. Nikaido, ‘Hagar and Ishmael as Literary Figures: An Intertextual Study’, IT  51 
(2001), pp. 221-29; Jon D. Levenson, The Death and Resurrection o f  the Beloved Son: The 
Transformation o f  Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 
1993), pp. 104-10; Trible, Texts o f  Terror, pp. 34-35 n. 71; Alter, The Art o f  Biblical Narrative, p. 181. 
Curt Leviant presents a detailed analysis of the textual parallels in ‘Parallel Lives: The Trials and 
Traumas of Isaac and IshmaeF, BR 15 (1999), pp. 20-25,47. ,
273 Exum, ‘The Accusing Look’, p. 148 n. 15.
274Trible has observed multiple parallels between Hagar’s experience in the wilderness and the 
wanderings of the Israelites in Exodus. For her, it is ironic that, going through an experience similar to the 
oppression as Israel in Egypt, Hagar is not rescued by Yahweh, who in her case identifies with the 
oppressors (Trible, Texts o f  Terror, p. 22). For a detailed comparison o f the two stories, see Thomas B. 
Dozeman, ‘The Wilderness and Salvation History in the Hagar Story’, JBL 117 (1998), pp. 28-43.
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Chapter 3
The Mothers and the Mother’s Land in the Jacob Narrative
(25:19-37:1)
Binary Structures in the Jacob Narrative
As a continuation of the myth of national origin that started with the story of 
Abraham, the Jacob narrative too deals with issues of identity. Jacob’s story as the 
eponymous ancestor of the nation carries a particular symbolic value, for out of it is 
bom the identity of Israel as the one who strives with God and with people (32:28). It 
presents one of the finest biblical examples of a developed and well-balanced plot, 
where the protagonist moves through various conflicts and their resolutions to the final 
possession of the land of his fathers. In the narrative, Rebekah, the wife of Isaac, helps 
her younger son Jacob steal his elder brother Esau’s blessing. Fearing his brother’s 
vengeance, Jacob has to flee to Haran, his mother’s place. God appears to him on the 
way and promises him the land and Abrahamic succession. In Haran, Jacob serves his 
uncle Laban in return for marrying his daughters Rachel and Leah. During his twenty- 
year-long exile, twelve children are bom to his wives and Jacob gains considerable 
wealth. On the way back, he fights a divine adversary who blesses him with the new 
name of Israel, after which Jacob finally makes peace with his brother and returns to his 
father’s house in Canaan.
Even the most superficial examination of the Jacob narrative shows a clear 
presence here of binary structures. The story displays a fundamental tension between 
the patriarch and his opponents -  Esau, Laban, the ‘man’ at Penuel -  whom he has to 
overcome, by ruse or by force, in order to obtain a value object, be it blessing, land, 
wives, or property. The conflict between the two brothers, the rivalry between the two 
sisters, the fight with a deity, and the flight-return pattern of the overall plot are all 
binary mythic motifs familiar in comparative studies. A more detailed analysis of the
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text uncovers a network of carefully balanced elements that stand in opposition to each 
other. Arguably, the structural tensions that shape the myth on different levels all stem 
from the initial opposition between Father and Mother.
In the definition of Lévi-Strauss, myth provides a logical model capable of 
overcoming a contradiction.275 His method breaks down elements of myth into pairs of 
opposites, which are resolved through mediators only to be further broken down into 
new pairs of opposites. This generates a spiral progression, which only ends when the 
signified, or the complex idea behind the myth is exhausted. The Jacob story offers a 
striking example of such a progression.
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The father-mother dichotomy is reflected in the differentiation between the elder 
and younger sons, and as such is carried through all the divergences of the plot. It is 
finally resolved in the reconciliation scene, where the concept of the brother finally 
comes to replace the hierarchical notions of the younger or older sons. What unifies this 
prolonged sequence of related oppositions is its overall subversive character. From one 
level on to another, a tension is created between the existing system of reference and its 
opposite; that is, between the normal, accepted, or superior, on the one hand, and the 
irregular, impossible and subordinate, on the other. And the mediation between them 
consistently inverts the institutional order, for each time the narrative chooses to 
develop the element that represents a subordinate group or position. Therefore the
275 Claude Lévy-Strauss, Structural Anthropology 1 (trans. C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf; New York: 
Basic Books, 1963), p. 229.
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coalition of Rebekah and her younger son wins over the patriarchal authority and the 
right of primogeniture, and this initial impulse sets off a chain reaction of similar 
subversions: the blessed son goes into exile, the younger daughter is preferred to the 
elder, the unloved wife is fertile while the loved wife is sterile, the abnormally coloured 
herd animals produce most offspring, and, finally, Jacob holds his own against God. 
The minus sign at each stage of this progression stands for a negative or contrasting 
relationship between the opposites with the exception of the last stage -  the 
reconciliation that resolves the initial tension of the story.
The elements of most of these oppositions are grouped around two narrative 
strands, which correspond to the institutional and the individual perspectives in the 
story. The institutional group includes the elements of father, older sibling, blessing, 
fertility, promised land, whereas the individual trend operates with the concepts of 
mother, younger sibling, non-blessing, sterility, love, and exile. These two groups 
represent two value systems: one that represents the interests of patriarchy, in which the 
primary values are patrilineal descent, father’s authority over the household, and the 
first-born’s right, and the other that is revealed whenever the characters subvert 
institutional norms and display complex motivation, feelings and inner growth. Set 
within an institutional framework, the narrative, like the deity itself, favours those 
characters who defy the institution and display complex motivation, feelings and inner 
growth.
Jacob’s mother Rebekah and his wife Rachel represent the individual 
perspective in the narrative, and so, for the most of the cycle, does Jacob. As we saw 
above, authority here rests with the patriarch, while the woman/younger sibling has the 
power to influence the course of events.276 Mary Douglas describes a similar model in 
the myth of Asdiwal as a paradox between male dominance and male dependence on 
female help.277 Lévi-Strauss translates this dynamic into the language of kinship 
structures, defining it as a contradiction between patrilocal residence and matrilineal 
marriage.278 Both approaches are applicable in the case of the Jacob myth. Indeed, the 
fundamental binarity between Father and Mother manifests itself on different levels and 
to a certain extent accounts for the elegant concentric composition of the narrative.
276 Fewell and Gunn stress the difference between Isaac’s'authority and Rebekah’s power in Gender, 
Power, and Promise, p. 73.
277 Mary Douglas, Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1975), p. 163.
278 Claude Lévi-Strauss, ‘The story of Asdiwal’, trans. N. Mann, in E. Leach (ed.), The Structural Study o f  
Myth and Totemism (London : Tavistock, 1967), pp. 1-47.
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Fig. 13
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At the level of composition, the cycle consists of two extended narratives: the 
tale of Jacob’s conflict with Esau that takes place in Canaan, the land of their father 
(25:19-28:22; 32:1-35:22), and the story of the hero’s dealings with his uncle Laban in 
Haran, the land of Jacob’s mother (29:1-31:55). Comparing the two narrative strands, 
Michael Fishbane points out the elaborate technique of symmetry that links them 
together, making the central narrative of the births of Jacob’s children in 29:31-30:24 
counterpoint the surrounding tale of Esau.279 This happens through the symmetrical 
inversion of the episode of the stolen blessing in Genesis 27, where the elder brother is 
replaced with the younger, by Genesis 29, where the younger sister is replaced with the 
first-born.280
The configuration of the cycle supports the compositional polarity of the two 
narrative strands. Four major transformations of the Subject take place in the course of 
Jacob’s journey, and each of them changes the power balance in the world of the story. 
The overall plot unfolds as a series or chain of reversed situations, where the hero’s 
success alternates with defeat or relinquishing of power: .
279 Michael Fishbane, Text and Texture: Close Readings o f  Selected Biblical Texts (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1979), p. 55.
280 Yair Zakovitch describes this instance of symmetrical inversion as an ‘expression of an “eye for an 
eye” punishment’ (‘Through the Looking Glass: Reflections/Inversions of Genesis Stories in the Bible’, 
Biblnt 1 [1993], p. 140).
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Esau -  Jacob : Jacob -  Laban : Laban — Jacob : Jacob -  Esau
First, in Genesis 27 Rebekah replaces her first-born son Esau with his younger 
brother Jacob. As a result Jacob receives his father’s blessing, which was meant for the 
first-born {Subject gains). Next, in Genesis 29 Jacob is deceived by Laban, who 
replaces his younger daughter with the first-born; this action symbolically inverts the 
episode of the stolen blessing {Subject loses). Next, Laban’s deception by which he robs 
Jacob of his wages is reversed when Jacob takes all Laban’s flocks as his wage {Subject 
gains).2*1 Finally, these flocks that now belong to Jacob are shared with Esau in what 
the narrative presents as a symbolic returning of the blessing. In 32:13-16 Jacob selects 
from his herds a gift for Esau and later offers it to him saying, ‘Take now my blessing’ 
(33:11). The giving back of the stolen blessing marks the end of the series of symbolic 
inversions of the narrative and resolves the main complication of the plot {Subject 
renounces).
It is clear from the above sequence that the Jacob-Laban episode represents the 
central stage in the development of the plot. In the broadest terms it illustrates Levy- 
Strauss’s definition of myth as a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction. 
Through a mechanism of inversions this episode puts the hero in a position to resolve 
the main contradiction and thus serves to redress the disturbed balance within the 
narrative world. This role has, nevertheless, to be qualified, for although the story of 
Genesis 29-31 develops all the conditions necessary for a resolution, the resolution itself 
happens outside the episode, back in the Jacob-Esau story.
On the geographical plane, the compositional polarity between the narrative 
strands of Jacob-Esau and Jacob-Laban is reflected as a tension between Canaan, the 
promised land, and Mesopotamia, the land of exile. This tension is mediated by the 
hero’s journey from Beersheba to Haran and back that results in the treaty between 
Jacob and his uncle Laban (31:44-54). This treaty resolves the opposition between 
insider and outsider, between native and foreign, and validates the geographical 
boundary between Canaan and northwest Mesopotamia.
At the level of social structures, the Jacob narrative exhibits a tension between 
patrilocal residence and matrilineal marriage. Although the beginning and the end of the 281
281 The preceding story of the ‘red pottage’ and the birthright in Genesis 25:29-34 does not constitute a
separate transformation with respect to the power balance: it feeds into the episode of the stolen blessing, 
strengthening Jacob’s position in it (27:36). .
282 In his analysis of the compositional symmetries in the Jacob cycle, Fishbane emphasises the reversal 
of the main contradiction achieved in Genesis 33 (Text and Texture, pp. 42,52).
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cycle see the hero reside in the land of his father, for most of the story he stays with his 
mother’s family in Haran. This tension is reflected in the territorial taboo concerning the 
return of the heir to the ancestral land (cf. the earlier episode of the wooing of Rebekah, 
where Abraham prohibits his son Isaac from entering Haran, 24:6, 9). In the case of 
‘ Jacob this taboo is overruled by his mother’s authority. The mediation here takes place 
through the moving of the wives and children from their native land to the land of 
Jacob’s father that signifies a return to patrilocality.
The world of the narrative, constructed around the archetypes of Father and 
Mother, maintains a more or less clear division between their respective spheres. At the 
metaphorical level, all the structural tensions mentioned above contribute to a 
construction of one all-inclusive opposition between father’s and mother’s land.283
Father’s Land vs. Mother’s Land
The structural distinction between father’s and mother’s land seems to be 
emphasized in the narrative. Canaan, the father’s land, is a positive reality, the land of 
promise, the paramount symbol ^f God’s blessing. The connection with this land puts 
the hero in the wider context of Abrahamic succession, and thus denotes the unity and 
permanence of patriarchal history. The narrative repeatedly associates this land with 
Jacob, first as the realm of his immediate experience (‘the land you are lying on’, 
28:13), then as the land of his fathers (31:3), his native land (31:13), and later simply as 
‘his land’ (32:9). In Jacob’s vision at Bethel this land and the house of his father are 
indicated as his final destination, the ultimate goal of his journey ‘there and back’. From 
a structuralist point of view, this land is the object that the Subject has to come to 
possess if his narrative programme is to be successful. Therefore, although Jacob will 
remain in the narrative until 49:33, as a Subject he is acquitted in 37:1 with the 
achievement of his goal, ‘And Jacob lived in the land of his father’s journeys, the land 
of Canaan’. •
283 Exum discusses the tension between father-identified Canaan and mother-identified Haran in terms of 
opposition between patrilineal descent and uxorilocal residence (Fragmented Women, p. 113-18). While 
the proper wife must come from Haran, the husband may not live uxorilocally -  with the wife’s family -  
‘because it would take the rightful heir out o f the land promised to his lineage (loss of residence) but also 
because such an arrangement could result in Abraham’s lineage being swallowed up by the woman’s 
family (loss of descent)’ (p. 114). The narrative therefore resolves the issue o f descent and residence in 
favour of the husband.
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At the opposite pole from the father’s land stands Haran in Paddan-Aram, the 
land of Jacob’s mother. Here, the connection with Rebekah is not merely implicit; Jacob 
comes to be in Haran precisely on her account. It is Rebekah who initiates and organises 
the removal of her favourite son from the father’s house and his sojourn with her 
relatives. Jacob’s exile in Haran is both an indirect consequence of her trick with the 
blessing and a direct implementation of her wish for him to take a wife from among her 
family. Both through narrative causality and by association, Haran for Jacob is the 
mother's place.
This role of mother’s land is attributed to Haran elsewhere in the patriarchal 
narratives. In the stories of Abraham and Isaac this land has the function of providing 
future mothers: Rebekah, Leah, and Rachel all come from Haran, and even Sarah, the 
first matriarch, who like Abraham comes from Ur in Mesopotamia, is brought to Haran 
and stays there before the family moves to Canaan (11:31). The fact that Abraham 
comes from there too does not necessarily contradict the symbolic association with the 
Mother: for all that the reader knows, Mesopotamia is the birthplace, the origin, the 
cradle of the patriarchal lineage -  the motherland.
Compared to the clear and positive symbolism offather’s land, the metaphor of 
mother’s land is much more ambivalent and displays multiple characteristics. On the 
one hand, the narrative shows it as a negative reality, a land of bondage and exile, the 
taboo land that Jacob’s father was never allowed to enter (24:6-8). It brings Jacob a 
twenty-year-long servitude in the house of his uncle. Describing the hardship of his 
service to Laban, Jacob says, ‘the heat consumed me by day, and the frost by night, and 
sleep fled from my eyes’ (31:40). The land of Jacob’s mother is a symbolic punishment 
for his misdeeds, for here Jacob the deceiver is deceived ‘ten times’ by Laban (31:7). At 
the level of the overall plot this negative connotation of the mother’s land metaphor 
serves to express and balance out the tensions of Jacob’s story outside Haran. In this its 
function is expiatory.
On the other hand, during his exile Jacob is blessed in all other respects, as his 
family and his possessions grow in abundance. Fertility is a dominant feature of this 
land where women come from. One is reminded here of the patriarchal blessing the hero 
received back in Canaan; there the father’s promise of ‘earth’s richness and abundance 
of grain and wine’ (27:28) was only a potential that comes to realisation in Haran. Jacob 
himself describes his post-Haran situation as that of fulfilment: ‘God has been gracious 
to me and I have all I need’ (33:11). Moreover, Jacob’s wealth acquired in the mother’s
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land plays an important part in resolving the main conflict of the narrative, the hero’s 
conflict with his brother: in 33:11 Jacob symbolically returns the stolen blessing by 
sharing his possessions with Esau. The metaphor of mother’s land is therefore 
simultaneously experienced by the Subject as two contrasting realities, as punishment 
* and exile as well as fruitfulness and fulfilment.
This ambiguous symbolism of mother’s land is further amplified when Paddan- 
Aram, the destination of Jacob’s flight, is described as ‘the land of the sons of the east’ 
(29:1, cf. Num 23:7). This description is problematic from the point of view of the 
geography of the region, but as Robert Sacks comments, the specific geographical 
location of the land ‘may not be as important as its ambiguous character’, which arises 
from the symbolism of the term qerem, ‘east’.284 As we saw above in Chapter 1, the 
concept of the east carries two sets of connotations. On the one hand, from the onset of 
the Genesis narrative, east is named as the location of the garden of Eden: ‘Yahweh God 
had planted a garden in Eden, in the east’ (2:8). The obvious feminine symbolism of the 
garden, with the four rivers flowing from it and the tree of life in its midst, is consistent 
with the fertility aspect of the mother’s land. By placing Haran in the east, the narrator 
adds to it a connotation of life-giving. On the other hand, as Martin Hauge observes, in 
the wider context of Genesis the movement toward the east is repeatedly associated with 
the losing party, the outcasts, the exiles, so that the land of the east comes to symbolise 
defeat and separation from the promise. 285 Thus, the cherubim are placed ‘in the east of 
the garden of Eden’ after ha’adam is driven out of it in 3:24; later, the east becomes the 
‘land of wandering’ of Cain and his descendants (4:16), the location of the tower of 
Babel (11:2); the direction Lot goes on the way to Sodom (13:11), and the place to 
which Abraham sends away his sons bom after Isaac (25:6). Stephen Sherwood points 
out the irony of Jacob’s situation, where he, the victor in the conflict with his brother, 
must travel to the east, the land of exile and defeat.286
It seems that the tension between the negative and positive connotations of 
mother’s land in the Jacob narrative reflects the ambivalent role the narrator ascribes to 
the feminine. Borrowing the wordplay Exum uses in Fragmented Women, mother’s
284 Robert Sacks, ‘The Lion and the Ass: A Commentary on the Book of Genesis (Chapters 25-30)’, Int 
10 (1982), p. 304.
285 Martin R. Hauge, ‘The Struggles o f the Blessed in Estrangement’, StTh 29 (1975), p. 15.
286 Stephen K. Sherwood, ‘Had God Not Been on My Side’: An Examination o f  the Narrative Technique 
o f  the Story o f  Jacob and Laban Genesis 29,1-32,2 (European University Studies, series 23, vol. 400; 
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 34.
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place stands for other's place.287 28Her land is a realm of alterity, of symbolic inversions, 
of the intuitive, the unconscious, and the fertile. This is shown in a number of concepts 
or narrative elements that are found almost exclusively in the Haran episode. These 
elements include fertility, meeting at the well, sexual relations, use of herbs, night, 
dreaming, idols and divination.
The theme of fertility underlies the Haran episode. The long account of Jacob’s 
wives giving birth to his twelve children, unparalleled in the Bible, receives a particular 
emphasis, since it stands at the compositional centre of the episode and the entire cycle 
(29:31-30:24). Fertility (or the lack of it) is emphasised here as the main aspect of 
characterisation of Jacob’s wives; it is at stake in Rachel’s rivalry with Leah and in her 
conflict with Jacob (30:1-2); a conferral of fertility is implied in the purchase of 
mandrakes (30:14-16). Significantly, most instances of child-bearing in the cycle are 
found in the Haran episode, with the exception of the births of Jacob and Esau at the 
beginning of the cycle (25:21-26) and the birth of Benjamin that happens in the 
transition between the two lands (35:16-18).
The same theme of fertility is central in the story of Jacob’s sheep-breeding in 
30:25-43. What allows Jacob to get the upper hand over Laban is his control of animal 
fertility. It is hard \ to determine how exactly, in the narrator’s view, Jacob’s 
herdsmanship brings about the desired result, for his techniques could be regarded as 
the practice of magic as much.as traditional skills based on experience. There is 
disagreement among scholars as to the nature of Jacob’s procedures. Thomas 
Thompson, among others, defines them as ‘imitative magic’. In contrast, Bruce 
Vawter suggests that Jacob’s methods were quite scientific for their time, considering a 
‘notion of how prenatal influences can be transmitted to fetal life’.289 Claus Westermann 
expresses a moddle view, regarding Jacob’s artifice as a sign of an ‘earlier transition 
from magical to scientific thinking’.290 However, compared to his trickery back' in 
Canaan, where the reader was made fully aware of the rational mechanism of the 
deception, the procedure of Jacob’s appropriation of Laban’s flocks engages the natural 
forces of reproduction. .
Meeting at the well. This recurrent motif in thè biblical narrative that has 
become known as the ‘betrothal type-scene’, describes a situation, where the hero, or his
287 Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 94-147.
288 Thomas L. Thompson, ‘Conflict Themes in the Jacob Narratives’, Semeia 15 (1979), p. 19.
289 Vawter, On Genesis, p. 332.
290 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 483.
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envoy, meets his future bride at a well in a foreign land (24:10-61; 29:1-20; Ex. 2:15b- 
21). As Robert Alter points out, the well is a recognised symbol of fertility and 
generally a female symbol, while the foreign land could be serving as a ‘geographical 
correlative for the sheer female otherness of the prospective wife’.291 Significantly, the 
first thing that Jacob does in the land of his mother is draw water from the well; this 
action symbolises an opening of the land’s stored fertility, made possible by 
overcoming an obstacle (rolling off a stone in 29:10).
Sexual relations. With such a strong emphasis on fertility it is not surprising that 
six out of the seven references to sexual relations in the Jacob cycle belong to the Haran 
episode (29:23, 30; 30:4, 15, 16, 16). The only reference to sex outside Haran, found at 
the end of Jacob’s return journey to Canaan, concerns the illegitimate, incestuous 
relationship of Reuben and Bilhah (35:22). Legitimate sexual relations, that is, sexual 
expression in the service of procreation, are therefore limited to the mother’s land.
Mandrakes. In the middle of the child-bearing race between Jacob’s wives, 
Rachel acquires a plant from Leah that is possibly meant to cure her sterility (30:14-16). 
This mysterious plant derives its name from the root dwd, which has a connotation of 
physical love; the plant has been associated with the mandrake because of the latter’s 
well-known aphrodisiac properties. While the text throws little light on the exact use of 
the plant, there is little doubt that possession of the mandrakes is considered to confer 
fertility. .
Night. It is notable that the account of Jacob’s stay in Canaan contains no 
mention of night time.292 By comparison, in the story of Jacob’s exile in Haran the term 
laylah, ‘night’ appears seven times (30:15, 16; 31:24, 29, 39, 40, 42, 54), and is also 
implied in 29:23-25. At night Laban deceives Jacob, exchanging his daughters, at night 
Leah receives Jacob, having purchased him for mandrakes, at night God speaks to 
Laban in a dream. In addition, the theophanies of Bethel and Penuel that frame the 
Haran episode both take place by night (28:11; 32:23). Through these repeated allusions 
to the night, the realm of the Other acquires some of the Jungian symbolism of the 
‘night journey’ of the hero, which was mentioned above in connection with the Sodom 
narrative. It is interesting that the previous time that events took place in Haran, in the 
episode of the wooing of Rebekah in Genesis 24, the narrator makes it imperative for
291 Alter, The Art o f  Biblical Narrative, p. 52.
292 The only exception is found in Genesis 26:24, where God appears to Isaac the night he returns from 
Gerar. Although the episode belongs to the Jacob cycle, this instance is not directly related to Jacob, who 
is not mentioned in the entire chapter.
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Abraham’s servant to spend the night in the house, of Rebekah’s mother (the word 
‘night’ is mentioned here three times, 24:23,25,54).
Dreams. The Jacob narrative presents dreaming as a numinous experience, a 
communication from the deity that puts the immediate situation of the hero in the 
context of the promise. The first dream that Jacob has at Bethel, on the way to Haran, 
renews for him the Abrahamic promise and emphasises his future return to the father’s 
house. In the second dream, while he is still in Haran, God explicitly orders him to 
return (‘leave this land and return to the land of your fathers and to your kin’, 31:3; cf. 
31:13). The text limits Jacob’s kin (moledet) to the immediate family back in Canaan, 
and thus excludes the mother’s side of the family from Jacob’s kinship.293 It is 
interesting that in the language of Jacob’s visions Haran is qualified only in a negative 
way, as a state of separation from the father’s land, a finite and transitory stage of 
Jacob’s journey there and back (at Bethel, Haran is not mentioned at all, being 
concealed by the broad term hadderek hazzeh, ‘this journey’, 28:20). In terms of God’s 
promise, the opposition of Canaan and Haran becomes a dichotomy of sacred and 
profane.294
Apart from Jacob, Laban is the only other person whose dream is recounted in 
the narrative (‘God came to Laban the Aramean in a dream by night and said to him, 
“Take care not to speak to Jacob either good or bad’” , 31:24; cf. 31:29). Here the 
communication from God has an entirely different character: this dream conveys the 
idea of separation, setting a limit to further interaction between Laban, the bearer of the 
mother’s lineage, and Jacob. It is interesting that at this point Laban is called an 
Aramean ( ’arammt), which not only stresses his foreignness but also emphasises his 
connection with Rebekah (in 25:20 the word ’dram was used three times to introduce 
Rebekah, ‘daughter of Bethuel the Aramean of Paddan-aram, sister of Laban the 
Aramean’). At the end of Jacob’s stay in the mother’s land, the text highlights the 
increasing alienation of his mother’s brother as a foreigner. Jacob’s and Laban’s 
dreams, which present the only setting for God’s communications in the mother’s land, 
serve the same purpose: they facilitate the hero’s return to Canaan and sever his links 
with the mother’s lineage.
293 Herbert Haag regards the primary meaning o f moledet as ‘place of birth, native land’ and not 
‘kindred’ as such (‘moledet’, TDOTXIU, p. 165). In this case, God’s order in 31:3 should be understood 
as ‘return to the country o f your fathers and of your birth’. However, the use of the preposition f -  in 
fmoladteka suggests that the reading as ‘kindred’ is at least as legitimate.
294 Fishbane makes this observation in ‘Composition and Structure in the Jacob Cycle (Gen 25:19- 
35:22)’, JJS2(> (1975), p. 36.
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Idols. The foreign character of the mother’s land is further emphasised by the 
idea of its religious alterity. Laban’s idols or household gods (frajnm), which are called 
in 35:2, 4 ‘foreign gods’, receive a particularly subversive meaning in the narrative, 
because they become an instrument of a feminine quest for power. Rachel, the favourite 
‘ wife of Jacob, steals her father’s idols, and later in an attempt to hide them, sits on the 
frajjim, further undermining her father’s authority by doing so (31:33-35).295 The 
frajnm belong to the inferior reality of the mother’s land, and the narrator clearly shows 
the superiority of the God of Jacob’s fathers over the gods of Laban in the final dispute 
between Jacob and Laban. The difference in the presentation of the two sides of the 
dispute is striking: the short designations of Laban’s idols (‘my gods’, 31:30,.‘your 
gods’, 31:32) stand out against the elaborate formulas describing the God of Jacob (‘the 
God of your father’, 31:29; ‘the God of my father, the God of Abraham, and the fear of 
Isaac’, 31:42; ‘the God of Abraham, and the God of Nahor, the God of their father’, 
31:53). In this dispute the God of Jacob’s fathers wins, and so Jacob may leave his 
mother’s land, but an element of alterity lingers with him and his family: the f  rajnm, 
which Rachel stole from Laban, stay in her possession until the end of their journey, 
when all the ‘foreign gods’ are destroyed at Bethel (35:2-4). Only then Jacob can 
reaffirm his fidelity to the God of Jhis fathers.
Divination. It is likely that household gods or frajnm were used for the purpose 
of divination (cf. the references to frajnm as. an object of divination in Ezekiel 21:26; 
Zechariah 10:2). In 30:27 Laban leams through divination that God has blessed him 
because of Jacob. This detail seems to imply that the idols that are supposedly used for 
divination are subordinate to the higher deity who alone can issue blessings.
When we consider the above features of the Haran episode, it would appear that 
the narrator, presenting a male, institutional, rational perspective, grouped them together 
as signifiers of alterity, constructing thereby a complex, if biased, metaphor of the 
feminine. The mother’s land is much more than a spatial element of the narrative; it is 
the locus and in a broad sense the symbol of its main transformation. This is a 
shadowland where Jacob, the male hero, a bearer of the patriarchal promise, or the 
conscious Self, has to be enslaved, subdued, allowing the other side of reality to 
manifest itself. Jacob’s exile resembles a mythic journey to the ‘other side’, which 
effects a transformation, endowing the hero with a new identity. In this way the 
contradiction between Father and Mother, the main contradiction of the cycle is
295 See the discussion of this incident in ‘The Father’s Gods and the “Way of Women’” below.
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mediated: Jacob is separated from his father and the promise, and can only come back 
when he has matured enough to become Israel in the exile of his mother’s land. The 
narrator signals the gradual relinquishing of the mother’s influence at the end of Jacob’s 
journey. To begin with, the Subject distances himself from religious alterity when the 
foreign gods are disposed of in Shechem (35:2-4). Next, Rebekah’s nurse Deborah dies 
and is buried in Bethel (35:8). This seemingly superfluous detail serves to mark the final 
departure of Jacob’s mother, for Rebekah will never be mentioned again after 35:8. 
Finally, Rachel, the younger wife of Jacob who continues Rebekah’s strand in the 
narrative, dies in childbirth before the family reaches the home of Jacob’s father (35:16- 
20).
The Jacob narrative establishes boundaries, moving from what is potential and 
undefined to what is defined and structured. It is a myth of national origin, and the 
boundaries it establishes are those of national identity. The mother’s land plays a crucial 
role in this process. The three successive patriarchs who live in Canaan are the only 
ones whom the narrative memory associates with God (cf. ‘God of Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob’), and this association lays the foundations of the myth. But in order to initiate the 
dynamics of national identity, the myth seems to require the feminine, the Other, and 
therefore it introduce^ Haran, the realm of the mother. Along similar lines, Exum has 
observed that the father in the narrative is a source of unity, whereas the mother is the 
source of difference, whose function is ‘to differentiate Israel from (some of) the 
surrounding peoples’. It is significant that none of the forefathers of Israel becomes 
an eponymous representation of a nation while staying in the promised land of Canaan; 
the collective representation appears only in the name of Israel given to Jacob on the 
way from Haran. The new name reflects the struggles of the Subject on both sides of the 
‘looking glass’: Jacob is called yisra’el as the one who ‘has striven (sarah) with God 
and with men ( " nasim), and has prevailed’ (Gn 32:29) This phrase summarises a 
narrative transformation, which incorporates the metaphors of both the father’s and the 
mother’s land and of which the otherness of the Mother is an unacknowledged 
prerequisite.296 97 The narrative status of Jacob on his return is loaded with the connotation 
of national identity, and so is the status of his children; one could argue that their special
296 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 145.
297 The male identity o f both “lohim and "nc&tm as Jacob’s opponents in the naming speech appears 
significant. Women never rise to the status of opponent in the patriarchal narratives, functioning as 
mediators in the transformation o f the male Subject, and are, therefore, never acknowledged. The 
mediation of the Mother (or the Other) is, in Jacob’s case, accepted only implicitly, in the fact that his 
struggles against men, initiated by his mother and resolved in the mother’s land, are ratified in his new 
identity as Israel.
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role as the forefathers of the twelve tribes of Israel is related to their being bom in 
Haran, the realm of the Mother.
Rebekah’s Mission
Large space in the Jacob cycle is occupied by stories centred on women’s role in 
the construction of the house of Israel. As elsewhere in the patriarchal narratives, their 
primary function is to be mothers to the male heirs of the promise. And yet the stories of 
the three matriarchs, Rebekah, Rachel, and Leah, show more complexity and 
ambivalence than what the stereotyped role of mother requires.
Complications arise at the very beginning of the cycle, first threatening the birth 
of Jacob (the initial infertility of Rebekah, 25:21), and then compromising his position 
as a possible successor to Isaac (the status of younger son, 25:26). Jacob is bom second, 
grabbing the heel of his brother, and this gesture to which Jacob owes his name ya '“qob,
epitomises his future stance towards his adversaries. But at the beginning this stance is
\
innate, without much sign of deliberation on Jacob’s part. Next, in 25:29-34 Jacob 
deliberately reverses the birth order, buying his brother’s birthright for a bowl of red 
pottage. Here, once again, the younger brother is motivated by the basic desire to take 
the place of the other; in this sence his exchange is not much different from the initial 
clutching of the heel.
Something radically different happens in Genesis 27, where a new agent comes 
on stage, Rebekah, the mother of the two sons, whose actions from the beginning stand 
out as purposeful and intelligent. In the world of the story, Rebekah is the only character 
who knows what the readers know about God’s plan for Jacob, and this is not without a 
reason. From the outset, Rebekah is characterised by self-awareness. When Isaac prays 
to God for Rebekah, who is sterile, his prayer is answered, and Rebekah conceives 
(25:21). Her pregnancy is difficult, as the children struggle together in her womb, and 
so Rebekah, too, turns to Yahweh. But unlike Isaac with his straightforward demand 
( ‘atar), Rebekah moves beyond the objective to the interpretative level, searching 
(darns) for the meaning of her experience. She asks God, ‘If this is so, why is this me 
(lammah zeh ’anoki)T (25:22). The explanation comes at once, putting Rebekah’s 
pregnancy in the context of the promise: she is a matriarch who will give birth to two
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nations; what is more, she is told which one of her two sons will be the direct bearer of 
the promise.
The words of Rebekah in v. 22 deserve closer attention. The Hebrew text is 
uncertain, and most translations conceal its juxtaposition of the words zeh, ‘this’, 
and ’anoki, ‘I’.298 In Rebekah’s question, the use of the personal pronoun ’anoki in its 
full form, instead of the suffixed form li, ‘to me’ (cf. 27:46), seems to put an additional 
stress on Rebekah herself. Could it be that her question ‘why?’ concerns primarily that 
‘I’, that is, herself and her role as a subject, and not the things happening to her (zeh, the 
babies jostling)? Could it mean ‘why is it I  and what am I  to be in relation to this? ’
If this were the case, the answer that she gets from God would have far more 
serious consequences. The translation ‘why is this happening to me?’ implies that 
Rebekah seeks a divine oracle to know why her babies are fighting inside her; so she 
leams about their different destinies, which do not seem to have much to do with her. 
But if we accept the emphasis on ’andki and translate the phrase as ‘why is this F, 
Rebekah appears to be asking about her role in the situation and the answer she receives 
tells her what she is to do. Since the oracle twice refers to Rebekah as the origin of the 
two nations (bebi(nek, ‘in your womb’ and mimme ‘ayit, ‘from within you’), could it 
imply her participation in their formation? If so, Rebekah is expected not only to give 
birth to her twins but also to ensure that ‘the older will serve the younger’. It seems that 
the text of 25:22-23 allows both readings, giving Rebekah an unparalleled role in the 
narrative. Being endowed with the knowledge of forthcoming events, she now also has 
the responsibility for bringing them about.
The situation is even more unusual since, in the patriarchal narratives, it is 
normally the father who receives the revelation: God’s promise is reiterated on different 
occasions to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Hagar, Sarah’s Egyptian maid, is the only other 
woman in Genesis who, like Rebekah, receives a revelation from God concerning her 
child (16:8-12; cf. 21:17-18).299 The narrative function of that particular revelation is to 
bring Hagar back to Abraham in order to ensure the future rivalry between his two sons 
and to emphasise through it the final election of Isaac. Hagar’s knowledge of her son’s
298 Cf. ‘If it is to be this way, why do I live?’ (NRSV); ‘Why is this happening to me?’ (NIV); ‘If this is 
the way of it, why go on living?’ (JB).
299 A woman also receives the revelation in the birth account of Samson, Judges 13, and here, too, one 
might ask ‘why?’. On the positive role of Samson’s mother, see Exum, ‘Promise and Fulfilment: 
Narrative Art in Judges 13’, JBL 99 (1980), pp. 43-59; and on the patriarchal interests served by this 
portrayal, see Exum, Fragmented Women, pp. 63-68.
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destiny neither strengthens her position nor influences the following events; on the 
contrary, her stance afterwards is that of submission, as the theophany requires (16:9).
Rebekah holds a unique position in relation to the other matriarchs, first, 
because in addition to the normative task of bearing the child of the promise, she also 
becomes a participant in the revelation, and second, because as the only wife of Isaac, 
she has no female rivals to her authority (cf. Sarah and Hagar; Rachel and Leah), and, in 
an interesting twist of the plot, it is her husband who becomes her real opponent. Both 
these features contribute to the transformation of her task in the narrative from static 
motherhood, the role she is expected to play, into a dynamic role of the originator of 
action.
It is only to be expected that in the world of the patriarchal narratives, so heavily 
dominated by the issue of succession, the rivalry between Rebekah and Isaac arises over 
their children. The first hint of discord in the family is given in 25:28: Isaac loves Esau 
for his tasty game, and Rebekah loves Jacob. The text has been reticent about Isaac 
since his pleading for a child in 25:21, and there are no indications that he knows 
anything about the oracle. A reader of the Bible is accustomed to the situation where a
male character receives a revelation and acts on it, having neither consulted nor
\
informed his female partner (cf. lihe stories of the call of Abraham in Genesis 12 and of 
his near sacrifice of Isaac in Genesis 22). In Genesis 24 the familiar pattern is reversed: 
here Rebekah, the mother, loves Jacob, knowing all along that he is the child of the 
promise, while the father, Isaac, remains in the dark.300
‘Remaining in the dark’ is a precise metaphor to portray the position of ageing 
Isaac.301 He is old and frail, and his eyes are now ‘too weak to see’ (27:1). And his 
physical blindness is paralleled by his moral and intellectual benightedness. Is it his 
blindness that keeps him from realising that his favourite son Esau is no longer worthy 
of his status (cf. 25:29-34; 26:34-35)? What is there left of a patriarch in a man whose 
love can be traded for ?ayid bepyw (lit. ‘game in his mouth’)?302 Only the authority of 
paterfamilias, but that authority is quite enough for him to designate his favourite son as
300 Jeansonne holds a similar opinion, looking at Rebekah’s feelings for Jacob in the context of the oracle 
in which his destiny has been revealed {The Women o f  Genesis, p. 63).
301 Exum notes the two aspects of Isaac’s blindness, physical and metaphorical, in Fragmented Women, p. 
140.
302 Jay suggests reading Isaac’s taste for game in sacrificial terms. Since the Bible presents game, as 
opposed to domestic animals, as non-sacrificial meat (Dt 12:13), Isaac’s preference for game might be 
read as his refusal to sacrifice, ‘central to his loss of control of his line o f descent’ (‘Sacrifice, Descent 
and the Patriarchs’, pp. 62-63).
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his successor. And it is precisely this indiscriminate institutional authority that Rebekah 
sets out to challenge.
As is often the case with rivals, Rebekah has everything that Isaac lacks and vice
versa. Clever and strong-willed, she is the one who sees and who knows; her position is
that of clarity and insight. On the other hand, her social status is inferior, and she cannot
openly contradict the will of her husband. But are there not some advantages to that
inferiority? Does not being a woman, which means being unnoticed in the house, make
it easier for Rebekah to overhear the men talk (27:5) and thus strengthen her position of
knowledge even further? The binary opposition between the two sides in the conflict
unfolds, contrasting the individual with the institutional, a visionary with a visionless, a
woman with a man. .
Christine Allen observes, along similar lines, that Rebekah is brought into relief
by her contrast with wary and apathetic Isaac. Since the narrative presents Isaac as
falling far short of an ideal patriarchal figure, Rebekah takes over what should be his
functions, becoming ‘the necessary link between Abraham and Jacob’.3»4 Putting this
suggestion in the context of patriarchal conventions, Nelly Furman comments that
Rebekah’s action ‘ultimately disturbs the exclusively male genealogical lineage’.30 405 
\
Rebekah’s compelling presence overshadows the entire story of Isaac, beginning from 
her wooing in Genesis 24, and leaves him only a limited role to play in establishing the 
succession.
The contrast between Rebekah and Isaac extends at another level to the 
structural division between the inside and the outside, presented through the different 
occupations of Rebekah’s sons. The two brothers belong to opposite realms: Esau, a 
hunter, is out in the fields, whereas Jacob, who stays in the tents, is in a position to cook 
meals (25:29) and look after the cattle.306 On the whole, Jacob’s character does not seem 
to fit a dominant ‘male’ model. Is it because his affinities lie with his mother? In any 
case, Rebekah and Jacob together represent the irregular other side, the inferior, the
303 It is ironic that the development o f the conflict completely bypasses Isaac, who will eventually become 
aware of its outcome (Jacob getting the blessing) but not o f its driving forces. The reader is invited to see 
the story from Rebekah’s perspective, whereas Isaac’s perspective is virtually absent.
304 Christine Garside Allen, ‘“On Me Be the Curse, My Son!”’ in Martin J. Buss (ed.) Encounter with the 
Text. Form and History in the Hebrew Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), p. 168-69.
305 Nelly Furman, ‘His Story versus Her Story: Male Genealogy and Female Strategy in the Jacob Cycle’, 
in Adela Yarbro Collins (ed.), Feminist Perspectives on Biblical Scholarship (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 
1985), p.114.
306 Here the text constructs an opposition between wild game, associated with the world ‘outside’, to 
which Esau belongs to, and cattle or domesticated animals, which belong to the cultivated world ‘inside’, 
the shared domain of Jacob and Rebekah.
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internal, and the non-institutional. And the dominant patriarchal pair of Isaac and Esau 
displays a need of that which this other side provides (cf. Isaac’s love of food and 
Esau’s hunger in 25:30,32).
The strength of Rebekah’s position in the plot of knowledge gives her a 
transforming power in the plot of action. In the story of the stolen blessing, she is not 
only the author, the mastermind behind the events but also the principal authority who 
gives orders and folly controls the situation. When she gives instructions to Jacob, her 
words sound overpowering: ‘Obey me (fm a ‘beqdli) and do as I command you’ (27:8), 
and again, ‘Obey me { fm a ‘ beqolf)\ 27:13. Rebekah’s mediation of Yahweh’s will, 
concerning the child of promise is comparable with that of Sarah. In 21:12 God says to 
Abraham, ‘Listen to whatever Sarah tells you ( fm a ‘ beqolah), because it is through 
Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned’. In both cases the mother plays the leading 
role in assuring the succession of the ‘right’ son.
The distribution of roles between the mother and the son reflects Rebekah’s 
central position: in the preparations for the identity trick, Jacob is only his mother’s 
instrument. Their interests coincide in that they both want to win the blessing for Jacob, 
but they show different degrees of engagement in the action. Jacob is afraid to be found 
out and needs considerable encouragement. Rebekah, on the other hand, is absolutely 
determined and assumes full responsibility for deceiving her blind husband (‘My son, 
let the curse fall on me’, 27:13). What is the source of such a strong resolve? From 
Rebekah’s point of view, Isaac has to be deceived and give his blessing to Jacob so that 
the oracle starts to fall info place. Later in the narrative, Jacob too will gain insight into 
his own destiny, but at this stage.Dnly Rebekah is aware of God’s plan for her son and 
so is solely responsible for carrying it out.
To effect the transformation, Rebekah manipulates the objects of her realm, the 
household. She prepares the ‘tasty food’, maf'ammim, that Isaac loves so much, not 
from wild game, but from young goats from the flock. She dresses Jacob in the clothes 
of Esau, which she had ‘in the house’ and covers his hands and his neck with goatskins 
to make Jacob resemble his hairy brother.307 In all these preparations Rebekah aims to
307 Furman draws attention to the symbolism o f women’s actions when they use men’s garments for their 
own personal ends. She groups together Rebekah, Potiphar’s wife, and Tamar as the women who ‘use 
pieces of attire -  which are the symbolic markers o f the father-son relationship -  to reinscribe themselves 
in the patriarchal system’. Furman points out that men in Genesis treat garments as a means of 
communication between men, while for women, ‘garments function as communicative devices between
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deceive Isaac’s senses, and in all of them she succeeds. The dish that Jacob brings to 
Isaac tastes like the food, normally brought by Esau, and, as Isaac himself admits, Jacob 
smells and feels like his elder brother. In fact, the only part of the disguise that does not 
fool Isaac is the voice of Jacob, which Rebekah could not change but over which, in 
Isaac’s case, the taste take priority. For it is the taste for Isaac is the decisive factor in 
allocating his love and blessing. Through this emphasis on the senses, the two 
opponents, Rebekah and Isaac, are contrasted even further: the mother’s knowledge 
comes from a superiour source, a theophany, and results from her own search for 
meaning, whereas the father is limited to sensory perception.308
It is striking how well calculated and rational are all Rebekah’s actions. In this 
whole dramatic episode, she never displays any emotions.. When the truth is discovered, 
both the deceived father and Esau will tremble and cry, but Rebekah will simply not be 
there. In fact, had she been more ‘human’, had she had any remorse, any feeling for her 
frail husband, any compassion for her cheated son, her whole mission would have 
failed. And because her narrative identity must coincide with her mission, it is not 
possible for her to display such feelings.
The closure of the episode in 27:41-46 is the last we see of Rebekah. Having 
won Isaac’s blessing for the son of promise, she now removes him from the father’s 
land, ordering him to flee from Esau’s revenge to her brother’s family in Haran (w . 42- 
45). Her seemingly straightforward motives become less clear when, in the next verse, 
speaking to Isaac, she suggests that Jacob should get himself a wife from her parentage 
in Haran. '
Rebekah’s statement in 27:46 should be assessed against the report about the 
exogamous marriages of Esau and the ensuing displeasure of his parents in Gn 26:34- 
35, where the narrator emphasised the origin of Esau’s wives, ‘Judith daughter of Beeri 
the Hittite, and Basemath daughter of Elon the Hittite’. This emphasis is developed in 
Gn 27:46, where Rebekah expresses in powerful terms her aversion to Hittite women: 
‘If Jacob marries one of the Hittite women such as these, one of the women of the land, 
what good will my life be to me?’ Like the narrator in 26:34, Rebekah uses the word 
het, Heth, twice in her speech, adding to it an obviously derogatory designation benot_
the sexes’ (‘His Story versus Her Story’, p. 114). Seen in this light, Rebekah’s ruse not only serves 
Yahweh’s purpose but also reinscribes her as a subject into the exclusive father-son relationship.
308 Dennis Sylva speaks about Isaac’s being ‘led astray by the sensory focus of his life not only in how he 
treats his sons but also in his ability to discriminate them’ (‘The Blessing o f a Wounded Patriarch: 
Genesis 27:1-40’, JSOT 32 [2008], p. 271).
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ha’arez, ‘women [daughters] of the land’. As previously in 25:22, Rebekah’s statement 
can be read as a value judgment. The expression ‘what good is life for me if... ’ implies 
an either-or situation, in which the two sides of the balance — Rebekah’s life and the 
right wife (or wives) for Jacob -  are symbolically equalised. Does this mean that she 
sees the purpose of her life in establishing the right succession based on endogamous 
marriage? The fact that, until now, she has been concerned with securing descent 
through the ‘right’ son, supports her role as the one in charge of succession. However, 
since in the patriarchal household she has no authority to perform her role openly, she 
resorts to double communication.
Rebekah shows remarkable mastery of communication. She did not say a word 
to Jacob about the daughters of Laban: as far as Jacob knows, his mother is providing 
him with a refuge from Esau. To Isaac, on the other hand, Rebekah says nothing about 
protecting Jacob from Esau’s revenge. It is understandable, since Isaac himself has 
enough reason to feel vengeful towards his younger son. Her speech, however, allows 
her to get a sanction from the patriarch for what she has already ordered to happen, and 
she does it creating the illusion that he has all the agency. Brett calls Rebekah’s speech 
in 27:46 ‘an extraordinary successful case of indirect communication’.309 But what is 
her own point of view? Is she, 'as Brett suggests, exploiting Isaac’s dislike of Esau’s 
Hittite wives in order to get his permission for Jacob’s flight?310 Or is her primary 
motive obtaining the wife for Jacob from her own parentage? The whole of chapter 27, 
where Rebekah manipulates everyone including Jacob, does not offer any insight into 
what she really thinks or wants. She is the trickster, the puppeteer of the story, the one 
who plays on communication, upsetting and redressing the balance of power to suit her 
hidden motives. In a trickster story, any particular action, which in itself can be elusive 
and ambiguous, serves the story as a whole. Rebekah’s communication is deeply 
ambiguous because it serves the multiple causality of the narrative. Offering different 
versions of events to different people, Rebekah does not lie, but apportion information, 
deciding who needs to know what in order for the plot to go the way that it should. In 
this sense, she is a perfect instrument of the narrator whose double agenda includes 
reversing the right of primogeniture (25:23) and assuring continued descent through the 
‘right’ mother.
309 See Brett, Genesis, p. 89. Turner describes Rebekah as a master of deception, able to ‘orchestrate 
events and yet remain undetected’ (Genesis, p. 122).
3,0 For Jeansonne, Rebekah in 27:46 not only avoids potential conflict but also ‘prompts Isaac to give 
Jacob an additional blessing’ (The Women o f  Genesis, p. 68).
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Rebekah’s speech in 27:46 allows the reader .to reconsider the logic of Genesis 
27, taking for a possible starting point not only Rebekah’s love of Jacob but also the 
implicit taboo on exogamous marriage that she appears to observe. According to that 
taboo, even before his blessing was stolen, Esau had already excluded himself from the 
succession by marrying outside the parentage of Abraham. By orchestrating the events 
that lead to Jacob’s being blessed, Rebekah thus shapes the chosen line of succession 
according to the pattern established by Abraham. Her ambiguous actions are therefore 
implicitly sanctioned in the narrative, because they serve the best interests of 
patriarchy.311 Following Rebekah’s instigation, Isaac forbids Jacob to marry outside the 
family and sends him off to look for a bride among his mother’s kin: ‘You shall not take 
a wife from the daughters of Canaan. Go now to Paddan-Aram, to the house of Bethuel, 
your mother’s father; and take a wife for yourself from there, from among the daughters 
of Laban, your mother’s brother’ (Gn 28:1-2). This statement echoes Abraham’s orider 
issued earlier in Genesis: ‘you shall not take a wife for my son from the daughters of the 
Canaanites, among whom I live, but you will go to my country and to my kindred and 
get a wife for my son Isaac’ (Gn 24:2-4). The story seems to be repeating itself, but the
change from ‘my country’ and ‘my kindred’ to ‘your mother's father’ and ‘your
\
mother's brother’ (emphasis mine) signals an important shift of perspective between 
Abraham and Isaac. Although it is true that Haran is not Isaac’s land in the sense in 
which it is the land of Abraham and therefore he cannot call it ‘my country’, by 
referring twice to Jacob’s mother Isaac seems to admit Rebekah’s superior role in 
establishing succession, while removing himself from all agency.
Thus Rebekah completes her task, ensuring the purity of the lineage continued 
through her younger son and simultaneously saving him from his brother’s vengeance. 
There is nothing more she can do for Jacob, and he will have to face his destiny and 
mature to become Israel. Her narrative function fulfilled, Rebekah disappears from the 
narrative, and her name from now on will be mentioned mainly in connection with her 
brother, Laban.
311 The importance of endogamy in the construction o f patriarchal identity in Genesis has been 
acknowledged in scholarly literature. Jay has described endogamous marriage as a solution to the problem 
that descent from women poses to the patriarchal mindset. For her, ‘marriage between members of the 
same patrilineage ensures the offspring’s patrilineage membership even if  it is figured through the 
mother’ ( ‘Sacrifice, Descent and the Patriarchs’, p. 56). See also Naomi Steinberg, ‘Alliance or 
Descent?’, pp. 45-55; Kinship and Marriage in Genesis, pp. 10-14. Exum discusses the idealogical 
function of endogamy in the patriarchal narratives in Fragmented Women, pp. 107-20.
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It seems unusual that the death of such an important character is not mentioned 
in the text, especially since the death and the burial place of her nurse Deborah is 
reported in 35:8 (cf. also the extended account of the death and burial of Sarah in 23:1- 
20, and the story of the death of Rachel in 35:16-20). Could it be an implicit reprisal of 
the man-dominated world of the text on the woman who dared to challenge its 
structures? Having demonstrated the hidden power that a woman’s position holds in the 
world of patriarchal narrative, Rebekah, like Eve before her, gets her narrative 
punishment by being denied closure.312
Rachel as the ‘Right’ Bride
As was shown in the above analysis of matriarchal succession, the narrative 
introduces Rachel as a proper matriarch, in a set piece ‘meeting by the well’. Next, the 
reader leams that Rachel is a beautiful woman, like Sarah and Rebekah before her, but 
her beauty receives a double emphasis, for she is described as ‘beautiful in form and 
beautiful in appearance’ (29:17). In fact, even the information that she is the younger
daughter of Laban seems to be in her favour, since the narrative so far has been
S
privileging the younger siblings over the first-bom (Isaac, Jacob). Therefore, for the 
reader it is only fitting that Jacob should love Rachel.
In 29:20 the narrative indicates indirectly its further support of Jacob’s choice. 
Jacob serves seven years for Rachel, but because of his love for her they seem to him 
keyamim "hadim, ‘like a few days’. Strikingly, Rebecca used the same expression when 
she commissioned Jacob to go to stay with her brother: ‘stay with him for a few days’ 
(27:44). Thus, the seven years of service that was the original bride-price of Rachel 
seem to be sanctioned by Jacob’s mother. From that perspective, Jacob would have to 
be released from service after that period, marry Rachel, and return home with his wife. 
But the Jacob stories are never woven with one thread. While the individual theme in 
the narrative seems to sanction the choice of Rachel, the institutional opposes it with its 
usual argument of power, in this case, paternal. From the outset, the narrator makes 
Rachel subordinated to her father (29:6, 10). She comes on stage as a shepherd, tending
312 See Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 107.
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the flocks of her father (29:9),313 and the first thing she does after her meeting with 
Jacob is to run and tell her father about the newcomer (cf. Rebekah, who in a similar 
situation ‘ran and told the house of her mother’, 24:28). Whereas Laban exercises equal 
power over both of his daughters, Rachel, the younger daughter, demonstrates particular 
submission to her father.
When Laban interferes with her fortunes and substitutes her sister for her in 
marriage, Rachel remains silent. We do not know whether or not she loves Jacob, 
whether or not she feels resentful toward her father; in fact, her feelings do not play any 
role at the moment. At the beginning of her married life, Rachel is still found 
enwrapped in her father’s power: she stays in the realm of Laban together with Jacob, 
who is bound by Laban’s deception to serve another seven years, and the inferior status 
of Laban’s younger daughter is projected onto her marriage when she becomes Jacob’s 
second wife.
But Jacob’s love for Rachel keeps singling her out as a narrative resistance to 
the patriarchal norm. The narrator reminds us that Jacob loves Rachel more than Leah 
(29:30), and that fact inverts once again the sisters’ hierarchy: whenever in the text his
wives act together, Rachel’s name comes first (31:4, 14; cf. 33:2, 6-7). The reference to
Vlove points to the presence of an alterity in the story, of something that repudiates rules 
and customs and leads to the unexpected. From 29:30-31 it follows that Jacob’s love is 
the indirect cause of Rachel’s sterility; conversely, Leah’s fertility compensates for her 
being‘unloved’ (29:31).
Rachel’s ‘otherness’ in many ways reflects the characterisation of Jacob himself. 
As a younger sister, qetannah, her position with regard to institutions is inferior; like 
Jacob, she strives to achieve institutional recognition, which in both cases involves 
‘wrestling’ with the brother or sister.
3,3 Later in the cycle the transferral of the flocks from Laban to Jacob parallels the father’s loss of power 
over his daughters. Jacob starts preparations for the transfer of his wives from the house o f their father as 
soon as he has acquired the wealth (lit. ‘the weight’) of Laban (30:43; 31:1). In 31:4 Jacob calls Rachel 
and Leah to his flock in the field to discuss their separation from Laban. The fact that Rachel first appears 
with her father’s sheep might be interpreted as a sign of her father’s power.
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Leah and the Institutional
In contrast to Rachel, Leah does not receive any introduction and first appears in 
the narrative quite unexpectedly, as haggeddlah, the older daughter of Laban. It appears 
significant that she is presented as Laban’s daughter rather than Rachel’s sister (29:16). 
Further in the story, Leah will come to represent the power of her father and the 
establishment in her relationships with her husband and her sister. Her appearance is 
much less emphasised than that of Rachel (‘weak eyes’ as opposed to Rachel’s beauty 
of form and appearance, 29:17);314 indeed, for the purposes of the narrator, she does not 
need to be a beauty, for in the only two narrative instances when her husband 
encounters her, she is covered by darkness (29:23; 30:16).
In the wedding-night scene, Leah is used as Laban’s instrument (‘and he took 
his daughter Leah and gave her to Jacob’, 29:23). Silently and passively, she becomes a 
substitute for Rachel. The tension arises here between her presence for Jacob, that is 
only too real (‘and see, she was Leah’), and her continuing absence as a character, a 
subject, an intention. If Rachel is objectified, Leah is a hundred times more so. She is 
used not only by Laban, she is ‘used’ by the narrator as an epitomised birthright that 
serves to recall ironically the story of Jacob’s conflict with his brother. In the wedding 
of Jacob, the plot of Genesis 27 is inverted: the first-born, tfkirah, substituted here for 
the younger sister, becomes an instrument of poetic justice, a kind of narrative 
punishment that Jacob receives for substituting his own bekor, Esau.315 To be an 
instrument of punishment for her husband - what a pitiable role for the wife to assume 
from the very first day of marriage!
Therefore, it is not surprising that Leah is hated by her husband (29:31, 33): for 
him she will forever be a reminder of his own misdeeds. Similarly, her sister will 
become her enemy, jealous of the institutional precedence Leah takes over her. But 
what about Leah herself? A pawn of her father and an instrument of the narrative 
strategy, how does she see herself and the others? Looking for an answer, we might be 
helped by the fact that the only characterisation the text gives of Leah is that her eyes
314 Because another possible meaning o f rak, ‘weak’, is ‘tender’, this detail of Leah’s appearance might 
also be mentioned to her advantage. Fewell and Gunn offer an attractive interpretation o f v. 17a, deducing 
from it Leah’s ability to look rather that to be looked at, and therefore her capability o f affection and love 
(see Gender, Power, and Promise, p. 78). However, there is no semantic evidence to support this view, 
since the Hebrew word seems to have a connotation of delicate and undeveloped rather than affective.
315 See Brett, Genesis, pp. 89,92.
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are weak (29:17). The only other occurrence of the word ‘eyes’ in the Jacob cycle is in 
27:1, where the eyes of Isaac are reported to be too weak to see.316 In my reading of 
Genesis 27 above, I attempted to demonstrate how the physical faculty of seeing was 
symbolic of the character’s mental and spiritual abilities. Like his dimmed eyes, Isaac’s 
point of view in the episode is defective too and is, therefore, inferior to that of 
Rebekah. Similarly, could the reference to Leah’s eyes as weak not only refer to her 
appearance but also connote some deficiency in her point of view?317 If so, the 
descriptions of Leah and Rachel in 29:17 cease being parallel, presenting one sister in 
terms of her perception, and the other in terms of her appearance. This, however, would 
not be the first instance of the narrator’s juxtaposing qualitatively different 
characteristics: in the account of the birth of Jacob and Esau, the description of Esau’s 
appearance (red and hairy) was followed by the description of Jacob’s action at birth 
(clutching his brother’s heel), which gave an insight into Jacob’s character and had 
lasting repercussions for the development of the plot (25:25-26).
Whether or not the above argument is valid and Leah’s ‘weak’ eyes reflect her 
lack of discernment, she does seem to misjudge her situation when she is finally put into
focus. God grants Leah abundant fertility, which the narrator interprets as compensation
v
for being unloved (29:31), as does Leah herself (29:32, 33). But Leah goes further: not 
accepting God’s gift of fertility for what it is, she expects that the sons she gives to her 
husband will change his attitude to her, and will finally bring about his love. This point 
of view is shown in her naming speeches, which reveal, in the words of liana Pardes, 
‘more about the character of the name-giver than the recipient’.318 The irony here is 
powerful: naming her sons, Leah makes happy announcements that contradict her real 
situation (‘for my husband will love me now’, 29:32; ‘what good fortune!’, 30:11; 
‘happy am I!’, 30:13). But in the succession of her son’s names, the reader can see the 
gradual decline of Leah’s expectations: with her second son she sees that she is still 
hated (29:33), with the third she expects only her husband’s attachment rather than love 
(29:33), with the fourth son the reference to her husband disappears (29:35). Naming 
her sixth son near the end of her long marathon, she will simply hope for her husband to
316 The Hebrew text uses a different word for ‘weak’ in each case. In 27:1, the root khh communicates the 
idea of growing dim, faint, dull (BDB, p. 462), whereas the root rkk in 29:17 means ‘to be soft, delicate, 
weak’ with the implication of being undeveloped (BDB, pp. 939-40).
317 Turner considers a possible parallel between Leah and Isaac in Genesis, p. 128.
318 liana Pardes, ‘Beyond Genesis 3: The Politics of Maternal Naming’, in Brenner (ed.), A Feminist 
Companion to Genesis, p. 176.
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honour her (30:20).319 And after bearing next a daughter who, does not serve as an 
occasion to express any feelings, Leah disappears as a subject.
The failure of Leah’s narrative programme seems to be caused by its inner 
contradiction. On the one hand, it is impossible for Jacob to love her: he ‘hates’ her for 
what she represents for him as much as for the fact that she is there at all, having taken 
Rachel’s place in Laban’s identity trick. But once she has taken Rachel’s place, Leah is 
striving for what she expects should come with it, that is, Jacob’s love.
There can be no resolution to this deadlock, for seeking her husband’s favour is 
the only intention that the narrator allows Leah to have. She is a flat character, whose 
identity coincides with the role given to her by others. Even the intervention of God 
strengthens the position of Leah not as lover, but as mother, and thus reinscribes her 
into the institutional role that patriarchy wants her to play. And when her son’s 
mandrakes put her in a position of advantage, it allows her not to win her husband’s 
love, but to hire him from Rachel, reintroducing her father’s perspective of bondage 
($kr), that originally made her Jacob’s wife (30:16).
The Twists of God i
Rachel and Leah seem to be true rivals; each possesses what the other lacks. 
Rachel has her husband’s love but is sterile, and Leah is unloved but exceedingly fertile. 
Fewell and Gunn stress the essential un-wholeness of the sisters, presented ‘only as 
parts, as though neither were complete in herself.320 Each one desperately wants for 
herself what the other has. Yet their respective attitudes in that rivalry are not 
symmetrical. While Leah is preoccupied with Jacob, Rachel seems to be very conscious 
of Leah: she is envious of her sister (30:1), and she interprets her quest for sons as 
naptülé *Idhim, ‘struggles of God’ with Leah (30:8). Since the hapax legomenon 
naptülim means literally ‘twists’,321 it could imply a forceful exchange of places or 
identities. Rachel’s primary motive in striving for fertility might be a desire of the 
institutional status associated with Leah as fertile wife (‘so that I, me too, can build up 
[a family]’, 30:3). ‘Building’ a family (banáh) entails a symbolic ‘building up’ of the
Exum observes this in Fragmented Women, p. 142.
u Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power and Promise, p. 78.
' BDB, p.836.
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female subject, and it is this status-related advantage that Rachel appears to seek (cf. 
Sarah’s similar desire to be ‘built up’ in 16:2). Structurally, the struggle between Rachel 
and Leah inverts the rivalry between Sarah and Hagar, which, though shaped by the 
same hierarchy ‘husband -  first wife -  second wife’, associates the first, ‘institutional’ 
wife with sterility, while making the second wife fertile.
Jan Fokkelman offers a plausible explanation of the expression na0ule *15him 
as an example of an objective genitive, in which case na0ule *lohim should be 
translated not with a superlative, as in most versions (‘mighty wrestlings’) but as 
‘wrestlings for  God’.322 In this case Rachel would be seen as fighting with her sister for 
God’s favour, demonstrated in the ‘opening of the womb’ and the restoration of status.
The fact that it is Rachel who actively fights with her sister and not vice versa 
could be seen as a reaction to Leah’s usurpation of her place in 29:23-26. Although at 
the time Laban’s substitution of Leah for Rachel on the wedding night is described 
solely in terms of its impact on Jacob, the replacement of the bride by her elder sister 
necessarily has consequences for their respective status as wives. Leah takes her status 
of bekirah, the first-born, into the marriage when she becomes the first wife. Although 
unwanted by Jacob, she still has her rights protected by the power of the establishment 
that Laban represents^ since Jacob has to complete a bridal week with her before taking 
Rachel as his second wife (29:27-28). Not only is she the first wife and a first-born 
daughter, Leah also bears Jacob his first son, Reuben, and then five more sons and a 
daughter. Thus she more than fulfils her institutional duty. From the point of view of 
patriarchy, Leah is an exemplary and honourable matriarch. It is therefore not surprising 
that the institutional perspective of the narrative should favour Leah over Rachel. In the 
accounts of Jacob’s descendants, the names of Leah and her sons will always be 
mentioned before the names of Rachel, Joseph and Benjamin (35:23-26; 46:8-25; cf. 
also 49:2-27).323 Near the end of Genesis, in 49:31, the narrative will signal its 
approbation of Leah by mentioning that she, unlike Rachel, is buried together with 
Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, and Rebekah in the ancestral tomb of Abraham near Mamre, 
which will eventually become the resting place of Jacob himself (50:13).
322 Jan P. Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis: Specimens o f  Stylistic and Structural Analysis (Assen: 
van Gorcum, 1975), p. 135.
323 The order in which the sons o f Jacob are bom is relevant here only to an extent, as each account 
displays a different sequence.
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By contrast, Rachel’s married life is shaped by her loss of status. Having been 
introduced as the ‘right’ bride in Genesis 29, Rachel is pushed out to an inferior position 
when Leah takes her place on the night of the wedding. And God’s intervention 
reinforces that status quo: the God who opens and closes wombs (see 29:31; 30:17, 22; 
' cf. 21:1-2; 25:21) makes Rachel sterile. It is striking to see how, time after time, Rachel 
is objectified: loved by Jacob for her beauty, traded by her father for material gain, 
Rachel is kept by God from having children as if in punishment for being favoured by 
her husband. The narrative is reticent about Rachel’s own feelings for Jacob. While 
Leah strives for Jacob’s love, Rachel appears indifferent and easily gives him up in 
exchange for the mandrakes of Leah’s son (30:15). In ‘the struggles of Elohim’, which 
unfold between her and her sister, at stake for Rachel is never her husband but rather 
having sons as a means to restore her status as the ‘right’ wife and matriarch, the status 
that her sister has usurped.
The text of 30:1 offers the only instance when the reader accesses Rachel’s point 
of view: ‘when Rachel saw that she did not bear Jacob any children, she became 
envious of her sister’. The contrasting description of Hagar in Gn 16:4 (‘when she saw 
that she had conceived, her mistress became slight in her eyes’) is structured by the 
same concern over status in a hierarchical relationship. In both cases, the status position 
is directly related to fertility, and in both cases, it is the sterile matriarch who complains 
to her husband. Rachel thus blames Jacob for her sterility: ‘Give me children/sons, or I 
die!’ This angry and seemingly displaced outburst parallels Sarah’s speech in 16:5, 
where she blames Abraham for Hagar’s contempt. In Sarah’s case, her husband 
responds to her need by restoring her power over Hagar (‘Your maid is in your hand,’ 
16:6). Rachel, on the other hand, does not receive satisfaction from her husband. On the 
contrary, Jacob, whose ‘anger burned against Rachel’, 30:2, admits that he is powerless 
to help her and redirects her to God. Ignored by Jacob, Rachel’s death threat becomes 
suspended, casting a shadow over her entire narrative programme, since, ironically, she 
will die as soon as her wish to have sons is fulfilled (35:16-20).
Rachel’s wish to be ‘built up’ as matriarch leads to her using a substitute mother, 
her servant Bilhah, in a move analogous to Sarah’s use of Hagar in 16:1-4. But, unlike 
Sarah who comes to resent Hagar’s fertility, Rachel interprets Bilhah’s childbearing as 
her own victory in the wrestlings with her sister (30:8). Leah follows suit and gives her 
servant Zilpah to Jacob to bear children on her behalf (30:9). Between them, Bilhah and 
Zilpah give birth to four of Jacob’s sons. Functioning as surrogate mothers for their
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mistresses, they are used as instruments of their rivalry and are totally controlled by 
them. Significantly, they do not have their own voices, not even for naming their 
children. Even though between them they provide four of the fathers of the tribes of 
Israel, this does not have an impact on their status, for it is their mistresses who are 
‘built up’ through them. Unlike Hagar, they remain in the family along with their sons, 
but will be referred to as servants, not wives (33:1,2,6).
The duda’im of Reuben (30:14-16)
In the middle of Rachel’s wrestlings with Leah, an enigmatic exchange takes 
place between the two sisters. Reuben brings some plants, duda’im, from the harvested 
field. The text sheds no light on this rare term that is not used anywhere else in Genesis. 
The Hebrew word duda’im comes from the root dwd, ‘to love, caress’, and since the 
Septuagint translation in the third century BCE it has been understood as ‘mandrakes’, 
the plant that was believed to arouse sexual desire and cure infertility.324 Westermann 
also calls them ‘love-apples’.325 326Commentators agree that the plant duda’im is an 
aphrodisiac as well as a remedy for sterility, which means that both sisters would be 
interested in having it: Leah to attract Jacob; Rachel, to conceive. But is it that easy? 
The text appears to pose more questions than it answers.
The first problem is the use of duda ’im. This mysterious value object causes a 
verbal dispute between Jacob’s wives, in which Rachel asks Leah to share them with 
her, and Leah wants to keep them for herself. The plant has to combine two properties 
for the mandrake hypothesis to work; namely, it has to both excite passion and bring 
about fertility, but this would only explain why both sisters need the plant, and not the 
outcome of the exchange, for Rachel will stay sterile, whereas Leah will have three 
more successive pregnancies (seemingly, without the help of the plant).
324 See BDB, p.188; D CH ll, p. 424.
325 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 475. '
326 Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 475; Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 16-50 (Word Biblical Commentary; 
Dallas: Word Books, 1994), pp. 246-47. This traditional interpretation was supported by the studies of 
Mircea Eliade (see ‘La mandragore et les myths de la “naissance miraculeuse’” , Zalmoxis 3 [1942], pp. 1- 
48; Patterns in Comparative Religion [trans. R. Sheed; London: Sheed and Ward, 1979], pp. 314-18; see 
also Theodor H. Gaster, Myth, Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament: A Comparative Study with 
Chapters from Sir James G. Frazer’s Folklore in the Old Testament [New York: Harper and Row, 1969], 
p. 200). For a bibliography of earlier literature on mandrakes, see Westermann, Genesis, p. 469.
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Second, what is the role of Reuben in this scene? Since the text refers to him 
repeatedly throughout this episode, is there some special significance attached to this 
character? Could the mention of Reuben, the first-bom of Jacob, reintroduce the 
institutional perspective into the dispute and thus reinforce Leah’s position of 
’ advantage? Or does he symbolize for Rachel those banlm that she wishes for so badly?
The attribution of medicinal properties to duda ’im presupposes that the plant and 
its qualities should be well known to the intended audience, who would easily see the 
attraction of it for the characters. This reading is based on information that is not 
communicated by the text but has to be inferred by the reader. The value object that 
changes hands in 30:14-16 is almost ephemeral and the only insight into its nature is 
obtained from its etymology and its context, both of which point to its erotic 
connotation.
The other most common forms of the verb dwd in the Hebrew Bible are dod, 
‘beloved’ and dodim, ‘love, caresses’. Fokkelman points out that the alliteration of 
duda’im with dodim enhances the parallelism of the sisters’ exchange as the plant is 
exchanged for ‘a right to Jacob’s ‘caresses’.327 The form duda’im, however, is 
extremely rare in the Hebrew Bible: apart from its five occurrences in 30:14-16, it is 
attested once more in the Song of; Songs (7:14). This only other occurrence of the rare 
term deserves a closer look.
In Sg 7:14 the term is characterised by fragrance with no mention of its other 
properties: ‘the mandrakes give forth fragrance’. It is presumed to denote a fragrant 
flowering plant, identical to the mandrakes in Gn 30:14-16. However, like other images 
of the garden in the Song of Songs, the meaning of duda’im is open to double 
interpretation. Exum speaks of the double significance of the plant imagery in relation 
to the pleasure garden of Sg 4:13, ‘which is both the woman’s body and the place for 
lovemaking’.328 In Sg 7:1-10 the woman is admired by her lover, who uses the images 
of vineyard, palm tree and its fruit to describe metaphorically the beauty of her body. 
Here the images of the garden are the medium through which the text communicates the 
sensuousness and the intensity of the lover’s desire. In this respect, the response of the 
woman in Sg 7:11-14 is different, for the metaphors she uses are less transparent, 
alluding rather than describing, and pointing to the fulfilment of her lover’s desire. In
Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis, p. 136.
8 Cheryl J. Exum, Song o f  Songs: A Commentary (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 
p. 241.
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Sg 7:12-13 she invites her lover to go out in the fields to see whether the vine and 
pomegranates are in blossom (cf. Sg 6:11). Here, the blossoming garden presents a 
perfect setting, and a precondition for the lovers’ imaginary encounter, for, at the peak 
of its splendour, it prefigures the consummation of their love. Semantically there is a 
correspondence between the buds opening on the vines (pittah, 7:13), the woman 
opening her door to her lover in 5:2, 5, 6 (pth) and the doors (petahenu, “our openings”, 
7:14) where she has stored ‘all the delicacies’ for him.329 This interplay of projected 
meanings that creates an association between the garden and the woman is also present 
in 7:13-14: the woman’s call reaches its climax when she promises to give her love 
(Sam ’etten 'et-ddday lak), and her words are immediately reflected in the image of the 
mandrakes giving off their fragrance (duda’im nafnu-reah). As Exum notes, ‘the 
mandrakes, in giving their fragrance for the lovers’ pleasure, mirror and participate in 
the woman’s gift of love’.330
Along with the other sensory images of the garden, the mandrakes thus participate 
in the unfolding and fulfilment of the drama of desire. They receive an even stronger 
connotation of physical love due to the extensive use of the root dwd in the woman’s 
speech (dodi, “my lover,” 7:10, 11, 12, 14; doday, “my love”, 7:13). With such density 
of related vocabulary,', the use of the term duda’im could hardly be accidental. The 
apparent chiasmus “I will give mv love” : “love-flowers give" (w. 13b-14a), further 
supports the parallelism between the images of the garden and of physical love. The 
term duda’im, while denoting a fragrant plant, is loaded with erotic connotations, 
arising from its context.
Some scholars have argued on linguistic grounds that the word duda ’im could 
simply be synonymous with dodim, ‘caresses’.331 The ‘delicacies’ stored at the door, 
mentioned later in v. 14, are most likely referring to a similar concept; in fact, the entire 
verse seems to unfold the meaning of v. 13b as it portrays the pleasures that are waiting 
to be released in the love-giving of the woman. With the lack of further characterisation, 
it is possible to say that the text allows a double reading of the term duda’im, as a 
flowering plant as well as an aspect of physical love.
329 Exum mentions a possibility of a sexual allusion in 7:13 and 5:2-6 (Song o f  Songs, p. 242).
330 Exum, Song o f  Songs, p. 242.
331 According to the linguistic analysis of A. Fitzgerald, the Hebrew word yd, ‘hand’, that is often used as 
a euphemism for genitals, could be possibly related to duda ’im through the verb ydd/wdd, ‘to love’ 
(‘Hebrew yd  = “Love” and “Beloved”’, CBQ 29 [ 1967], pp. 368-74).
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Given the highly metaphorical use of the term düdá’im in Song 7, could it also 
be used as a metaphor in Gn 30:14-16? The term düdá’im is structurally associated with 
Reuben, the first-born of Leah. It is used either in conjunction with the name of Reuben 
or with a reference to him {duda’é benék, w . 14, 15; düdá’é beni, w . 15, 16). This 
reiteration suggests some kind of special link between Reuben and the mysterious plant. 
If Reuben has given it to his mother, why is it still considered to be his? Also, when 
Leah responds to Rachel in v. 15, she mentions her husband ( ’¡si) in parallel with her 
son’s mandrakes (duda ’é beni), making the two realities comparable and an exchange 
possible. Thus Rachel allows Leah to have Jacob, even if it is just for one night, and for 
Leah the consequences are significant: three more pregnancies one after the other. 
Rachel, however, disappears from the stage, presumably in possession of the object of 
her desire. Her actual receiving of the düdá’im is not reported, neither is the effect of 
using them. The narrative strategy in the episode seems to emphasise the Leah line 
whereas the Rachel line is suppressed. But is it enough to say that Reuben’s mandrakes, 
with their five occurrences within three verses, are introduced only as a bait for Rachel, 
to make Leah benefit from the trade? The object that holds such obvious significance in 
the world of the narrative is partly veiled from the reader’s view.
One possible explanation for the vague description of the exchange has been put 
forward by Seth Kunin, who considers the episode to be an incest story, sharing the 
same motif with the other Reuben episode in 35:22. Seeing incest as an ultimate 
structural expression of endogamy, favoured by Hebrew mythology, Kunin suggests 
that the son’s offering mandrakes to his mother may represent an incestuous 
relationship between the two.332 Though it is mythologically acceptable, incest is 
culturally problematic, which could explain the vagueness that characterises the entire 
episode.
The word düdá’im in this case, just as in Sg 7:14, would refer to physical love. 
Stephen Sherwood mentions among possible readings of düdá’im ‘love making’, which 
in this case would be attributed to Reuben.333 But is Reuben old enough for this 
suggestion to work? If one follows the account of the pregnancies of Jacob’s wives and 
concubines and allows one year for each birth, it seems that at the time of the mandrake
32 Seth Daniel Kunin, The Logic o f  Incest: A Structuralist Analysis o f  Hebrew Mythology (JSOT SS, 185; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), pp. 123-25. Kunin’s argument stops short of including 
Rachel as part of the incest model.
333 See Sherwood, 'Had God Not Been on My S i d e p. 165.
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episode Reuben can be only a child. Westermann, for instance, assumes that Reuben in 
30:14-16 is about six years old,334 *as does Fokkelman, referring to the boy as ‘a little 
chap’. It is necessary to note here the narrator’s underlying concern to locate all the 
twelve pregnancies and births within the seven years that Jacob is serving his uncle for 
Rachel (cf. 29:30; 30:25; 31:41). This concern leads one to postulate that the process of 
childbearing that involved all four women was incessant. Hard to envisage as it is, even 
this conveyer-belt idea of how the ancestors of the Israelite tribes came into being does 
not make it possible to squeeze the twelve births into seven years. Leah, for her part, 
needs at least nine years in order to produce seven children of her own, have a period of 
infertility, and allow her servant Zilpah to have two sons on her behalf. Wenham 
suggests an even longer period, spacing out the pregnancies at two-year intervals.336 
Thus the time span of seven years for the births of Jacob’s children can only be 
considered emblematic, with no strict chronological accuracy. If one were to relax the 
tempo of childbearing in the story, the age of Reuben would become less of a problem.
The incest theory seems to fit the context of the episode, tying up some loose 
ends in its interpretation. Importantly, the bringing of the mandrakes to Leah does not 
necessarily point to the mother-son type of incest, as Kunin sees it; it could just 
symbolise Leah’s authority over her son’s sexual faculties. If this were the case, the 
exchange between the sisters should be reassessed. It is possible that Rachel, who failed 
to obtain children by Jacob, is now trying to use Reuben as a surrogate father, for she is 
striving to have a child by any means (cf. Rachel’s initiative in 30:3, where she sets up 
her servant Bilhah as a surrogate mother). Leah’s angry response also makes sense, for 
she sees in Rachel’s demand a greed for men; indeed, the whole trade now becomes 
more understandable, seen as a swapping of the two men’s sexual services. The episode 
highlights the powerful position of the matriarchs in the matters of family building: 
Jacob, who has already renounced his responsibility for Rachel’s bearing children in 
30:2, is now used as a mere pawn, letting his women decide with whom he and his first­
born should sleep.
Seen from this angle, the episode brings to completion the underlying theme of 
the ‘wrestlings’ between the two sisters. In the dispute, Rachel’s position is one of need. 
On the other side of the dispute stands Leah with her first-born son, tfkirah and bekor,
334 Westermann., Genesis 12-36, p.475.
333 Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis, p. 136.
336 Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 246.
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in possession of all that Rachel lacks and strives for: a fertile mother whose power has 
increased even more, now that she can dispense her son’s newly acquired fertility. From 
that position of power comes a response that treats Rachel as a thief: ‘Was it not enough 
that you took away my husband?’ (v.15). Leah’s point of view is clear: Jacob is her 
husband by right, not Rachel’s, and the present situation is a result of Rachel’s ‘theft’, 
or her taking away what is not hers. Significantly, Rachel does not object to this 
accusation. Saying, ‘he may lie with you’, Rachel does not mention Jacob’s name, 
neither does she call him ‘my husband’ as Leah does; thus, literally, she agrees to 
relinquish the husband of Leah, accepting the blame for having taken what was not hers.
The incest model provides the characters with the motives that are consistent 
with their actions and characterisation throughout the story. Here, as elsewhere in the 
account of the confrontation between the sisters, Leah gets the upper hand no matter 
what Rachel tries. Thus, when Rachel uses a surrogate mother, Leah copies her with 
niuch the same effect (two sons bom from each woman’s servant, 30:3-13), but still 
outdoes Rachel, having had four sons of her own to begin with. In the same way, now 
that Rachel ‘buys’ Reuben in the hope of getting pregnant, Leah effectively ‘hires’ her 
husband and ends up having two more sons and a daughter. The birth of Joseph to 
Rachel that occurs at the end of this procreation marathon, may take away her disgrace, 
as she sees it (30:22-24), but does not diminish Leah’s outright victory.
Who is Who in Jacob’s Family?
If one reads the episode of 30:14-16 as an incest story, one needs to take account 
of the problem that such a reading creates with regard to the legitimacy of Rachel’s 
children. That is to say, according to the interpretation of the duda’im, discussed above, 
Joseph or both Joseph and Benjamin could have been the sons of Reuben as substitute 
father. Is it plausible though to assume that Jacob would first allow his son to have sex 
with his beloved wife, the self-same action that he will later in Bilhah’s case see as an 
abomination (35:22), and then consider the children bom as a result as his own and even 
favour them above the others (Gn 37:3; 44:20)? Far-fetched as this suggestion may 
appear, the narrative seems to allow for such a possibility.
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The most important key to it is found in 30:1-2, where Jacob replies to Rachel’s 
plea for children, ‘Am I in the place of God, who has withheld from you the fruit of the 
womb?’ It is common in the biblical narratives to portray God as the sole source of 
fertility. Sarah, Rebekah, Manoah’s wife (Judges 13) and Hannah (1 Samuel 1) are all 
initially sterile and owe their miraculous pregnancies to God. Likewise, in the Jacob 
story Leah’s superabundant fertility results from God’s ‘opening her womb’ (29:31) and 
listening to her (30:17). Later in the narrative, Rachel herself is able to have a child 
thanks only to God’s triple action of remembering her, listening to her and ‘opening her 
womb’ (30:22), a role that she admits when, after the birth of Joseph, she says, ‘God has 
taken away my disgrace’ (30:23). It is notable that in the scenes where God intervenes 
in order to make a sterile wife conceive, the husband is present too and is typically 
portrayed as helpless (Isaac is an exception in that he prays for Rebekah in 25:21, and 
Yahweh makes her conceive in answer to his prayer). From this point of view, Rachel’s 
demand is misplaced, which makes Jacob’s retort entirely logical.
Another reason why Rachel’s view might appear unreasonable is that, at the 
time when Rachel addresses her husband in 30:1, Jacob has already fathered four sons, 
which is an objective proof of his virility. Jacob is a potent father, which means that 
Rachel cannot blame him for lier sterility. Clearly, it is Rachel who is at fault, the one 
from whom ‘the fruit of the womb’ is withdrawn. Jacob therefore appears justified in 
declining his responsibility with respect to making Rachel pregnant. Elsewhere in the 
Bible, sterility is blamed on the woman, whose husband has already got children by 
other wives (cf. Gn 17:17-18; 1 Sam 1:1-2). According to Fuchs, this pattern reflects the 
way in which patriarchy redefines procreation, giving the father the ‘prerogative of 
owning his sons, without however bearing responsibility for their absence’.337
On the other hand, could Jacob’s strong reaction, described as burning anger, 
arise if Jacob himself were entirely blameless? The pronoun ’andki, though used 
ironically to deny his involvement, nevertheless draws attention to the character Jacob. 
Behind his shifting of the responsibility to God, and of the blame to Rachel, the narrator 
cannot conceal Jacob’s frustration and self-diminishment (‘Am I in the place of 
God...?’) in the face of his failure to impregnate his beloved wife. Jacob’s aloof 
response to Rachel’s plea reflects both his physical inability and his unwillingness to
337 Fuchs, Sexual Politics, p. 54.
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share her point of view.338 Why would Jacob not pray to God for the sterile wife he 
loves, as his father did for Rebekah in 25:21? Hidden beneath his anger is Jacob’s 
personal deficiency as Rachel’s husband.
This masked deficiency is not fortuitous. The preceding narrative tells us that 
Jacob’s love for Rachel is the real reason why she is sterile. It is his feelings that create 
the initial differentiation between his wives, and bring about God’s counterbalancing 
allocation of fertility. The whole network of relationships in Jacob’s polygamous 
marriage is thus determined by the husband’s preference for one of the wives at the 
expense of the other. In its turn, the institutional framework of the story refutes this 
exposure of feelings by opening the womb of the unloved wife and leaving the loved 
one sterile (29:31). In this way, the narrative presents two value systems: one that 
validates individual choices, feelings and intentions, and the other, which serves the 
interests of patriarchal power, and where the primary values are purity of patrilineal 
descent and fertility. In the case of Jacob’s wives, the latter system is superimposed 
onto the former. God’s institutional response is triggered by Jacob’s individual choice in 
such a way as to demonstrate that God’s gift of fertility is incompatible with the 
experience or expression of love. Jacob thus cannot father Rachel’s children so long as 
he loves her, for it is his love that makes heV sterile in the first place. Similarly, Leah by 
definition cannot win her husband’s love by bearing him more children, for she is only 
fertile on account of being unloved. It is obvious therefore that Jacob, as the cause of 
Rachel’s misfortune, is not able to answer her plea because by loving her he renders 
himself symbolically sterile, dissociated from the institutional power associated with 
fertility.
The issue of biblical men’s being implicated in the sterility of their wives has 
been recognised by scholars. Comparing the examples of 18:12, 30:2 and 1 Sam 1:8, 
Bal notes that in situations where a deity ‘“closes the womb” of the woman... the 
husband is powerless and acknowledges this’. Bal interprets the opposition between ‘the 
powerful deity and the powerless men’ in terms of sexual potency and suggests that 
relegating to the deity the power to open and close wombs is a narrative strategy aimed
338 Fuchs makes a similar observation concerning Jacob’s attitude, although she draws from it different 
conclusions. She notes that Jacob’s response in 30:2 ‘implies both that he has no control over and no 
responsibility for Rachel’s barrenness’ (see Fuchs, Sexual Politics, p. 154). Fuchs puts this attitude down 
not to the character’s own motives but to the narrator’s intention to undermine the husband’s role in order 
to free him from responsibility for his wives’ tragic experiences. Accordingly, the narrator presents 
Rachel’s demand as an ‘irrational and morally invalid complaint of the barren wife’, which contrasts 
Jacob’s reasonable and pious response (pp. 154-55).
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at concealing the impotence of the husbands.339 Rulon-Miller develops Bal’s insight, 
interpreting the sterility of Sarah as a result of Abraham’s inability or unwillingness to 
respond to her sexually. For Rulon-Miller, Sarah’s laughter in 18:12 arises not from her 
disbelief in her ability to procreate in old age, but from being surprised that now that she 
is old, she could have the pleasure ( ‘ednah) she has been denied before.340
Rachel’s quest to become a mother and matriarch is marked from the outset by 
Jacob’s renunciation. After their angry exchange in 30:1-2, Rachel’s motherhood 
becomes a matter to be settled between God and her. However, given that God is 
usually accessible to a married woman through her husband,341 Rachel can rely only on 
her own ingenuity. But does being left to her own devices mean that Rachel is 
authorised to do as she sees fit? It certainly seems so when she uses her servant Bilhah 
as a surrogate mother (30:3-8). When Bilhah bears two sons on her behalf, Rachel rather 
hastily interprets it as a sign of God’s favour and victory over her sister (30:6, 8). Yet 
her triumph over Leah is short-lived, for although Bilhah bears two sons, Dan and 
Naphtali, who are included in the list of Israel’s ancestors, they add to their father’s 
credit, while Rachel herself remains sterile and without status. In this context it seems 
possible that Rachel would start looking for a surrogate not for herself, but for her 
husband, in which case Reubeh, Jacob’s first-born son, would be the best candidate. 
Given Rachel’s limited options, intercourse with Reuben is the only expedient that 
would allow her to have children within her husband’s direct lineage.
This motivation may answer the question of the legitimacy of Rachel’s children. 
If the duda 'im really do symbolise Reuben’s procreative abilities, then the incestuous 
relationship between Reuben and Rachel would serve the institutional purpose of 
acquiring offspring of pure descent. The Hebrew Bible has other instances of culturally 
problematic sexual encounters that serve the ends of patriarchy. Lot’s two daughters 
preserve their ‘father’s seed’ through incest in 19:30-38; likewise, Tamar in Genesis 38 
seduces Judah, her father-in law, in order for the patrilineal descent to continue. In this 
context, observing cultural prohibitions could become a lesser priority, and the sexual
339 Mieke Bal, Death and Dissymmetry: The Politics o f  Coherence in the Book o f  Judges (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 73. Later in the book, Bal argues that the very insistence on the 
woman’s sterility in the biblical narrative ‘addresses, as in an attempt to repress, the opposite possibility -  
that the men are impotent’ (p. 266 n. 10).
340 Rulon-Miller, ‘Hagar’, pp. 69-72. See also Jeansonne, The Women o f  Genesis, pp. 23-24; Bal, Death 
and Dissymmetry, p. 73.
341 The case of Rebekah in 25:22-23 is an exception only to a point, for she inquires of God about the 
meaning of her experience rather than imploring him to grant her wish, which is the prerogative of Isaac 
in 25:21.
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relationship between Rachel and her husband’s first-born son could become an 
acceptable, if veiled, way for Rachel to be included in the ranks of the matriarchs.
If Jacob’s angry reply in 30:2 has potential repercussions for the interpretation 
of the duda’im episode, so does Rachel’s demand in 30:1. She commands Jacob, ‘Give 
me children, or I shall die!’ and the subsequent story shows that it is not an empty 
threat. The fact that Rachel will die prematurely creates a paradox in the light of 30:1, 
for she will die, a mother of two sons. In a certain way this paradox can be resolved if 
one were to assume that Jacob did not in the end give Rachel what she had asked for. In 
this case, the failure of Jacob to give her children would cast a shadow over Rachel’s 
married life, making forever futile her attempts to overcome her sister and leading,
. mdirectly, to her death. It would be this pain of her destiny being unfulfilled that she 
will inscribe so hauntingly in the name of her last son: ben- ’dni, ‘the son of my sorrow’ 
(35:18).
In this elaborate interplay of power and desire, what is the part of Reuben, the 
original owner of the duda’im? On the one hand, Jacob’s first-born is a flat character, 
whose only significance in the narrative comes from his association with the duda ’im. 
On the other hand, this very association singles him out among his brothers, making his 
presence linger on stage. After the episode^of 30:14-16, Reuben will reappear in 35:22 
where he is reported to have had sexual relations with Bilhah, his father’s wife of 
secondary rank and Rachel’s chosen substitute. The narrative here is remarkably brief, 
and seemingly disrupts the context. As Frederick Greenspahn points out, there is neither 
motivation for Reuben’s action here nor any immediate consequences or condemnation 
°f his behaviour, nothing like the parallel episode in 2 Sam 16:21-22, where Absalom’s 
mcest with David’s wives of secondary rank is performed in an explicit attempt to 
displace his father.342 Reuben’s motives appear to be self-evident, without any power- 
related connotations. Nevertheless, at a closer look, the text of 35:22 sheds more light 
0n Reuben’s narrative role. The event almost immediately follows the death of Rachel 
m 35:19-20. It seems rather that the narrator reports the incest with Bilhah at this 
Precise moment to hint at Reuben’s association with Rachel. In other words, after the 
death of her mistress, Bilhah once again replaces Rachel as a ‘substitute’, only this time 
d is Jacob’s son who initiates the substitution.
Frederick E. Greenspahn, When Brothers Dwell Together: The Preeminence o f  Younger Siblings in the 
Hebrew Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 122.
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On this occasion, however, the narrative does not suppress the negative 
judgement on incest. The deed that was at least implicitly justified for Rachel is not at 
all acceptable in the case of her servant, for she was able to have and indeed had had 
children by Jacob. A sexual encounter that is not intended for lawful procreation cannot 
be sanctioned within the institutional framework, which is represented here by Jacob- 
Israel: ‘and Israel heard of it’ (Gn 35:22). There is a striking contrast between the 
narrative attitudes towards the two instances of incest. In the first case, Rachel is the 
conscious instigator of the incest, which is subsequently hushed up; in the second case, 
Bilhah is a voiceless and passive substitute for her mistress, and the initiative belongs 
entirely to Reuben, whose transgression is brought to light and brings upon him severe 
consequences. Thus, when old Jacob confers his last blessing on his sons, he will accuse 
Reuben of defiling his father’s bed (Gn 49:3-4) and thus give him an anti-blessing: ‘you 
shall excel no more’.
The institutional reaction to Reuben’s transgression is further developed by the 
Chronicler who states that Reuben lost his birthright ‘because he polluted his father’s 
couch’ (1 Chr 5:1). Here, the narrator refers to the tradition expressed in Gn 49:4, 
repeating almost word for word Jacob’s formulation of Reuben’s guilt. Given that the 
incident with Bilhah is the oily explicit account of incest in the Jacob cycle, one
l
presumes that this is what both Gn 49:4 and 1 Chr 5:1 refer to. Thus, it looks as though 
the non-sanctioned incest with Bilhah is what loses the first-born his father’s favour 
(Genesis), and what costs him the primacy over his brothers (Chronicles), his tfkdrah 
passed on to the two sons of Joseph, Ephraim and Manasseh.343
On the other hand, both Genesis and Chronicles allow the possibility that incest 
with Rachel, though not acknowledged by the narrator, is also implicitly counted 
against Reuben. The clause about defiling his father’s bed in Gn 49:4 uses the word 
miskab, ‘bed’, in the plural; similarly, in 1 Chr 5:1-2 the word yatsu'a, ‘bed, couch’, is 
used in the plural. One could argue that this usage implies multiple occasions on which 
Reuben transgressed the incest law of Lev 18:6-10. But it is not unthinkable that the 
narrator literally means different beds, the bed of Rachel as well as the bed of Bilhah. If 
this were the case, and the Chronicler’s reading of the Reuben story in Genesis took
343This removal of Reuben’s birthright is not as clear-cut in Genesis as it is in the book of Chronicles. 
Greenspahn stresses that the text of Genesis is not aware of Reuben’s right of primogeniture being 
transferred to Joseph’s sons, rather it presents their elevated status as a result of their having been adopted 
by Jacob: ‘Ephraim and Manasseh shall be mine, as Reuben and Simon are’, Gn 48:5 ( When Brothers 
Dwell Together, p.121).
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account of the double incest, then Reuben could be seen here as the physical father of 
Joseph, which would make the transferral of the birthright from Reuben to Joseph’s 
sons perfectly justified.
Scholars have expressed different views about the role of the duda’im in the 
birth of Joseph. God’s intervention and Rachel’s ensuing childbirth in Gn 30:22 are 
usually treated as unrelated to her efforts to conceive. Exum states that Rachel’s attempt 
to use aphrodisiacs has no impact on her conception because of the time gap between 
30:14-16 and 30:22, and concludes generally that the narrator ‘regards female fecundity 
us due solely to divine intervention’.344 Westermann, on the contrary, holds that 
Rachel’s storyline is interrupted in 30:17 so that Leah could have a son, and is resumed 
, later in v. 22; despite this time lapse, ‘the narrative traces Joseph’s birth back to them 
[love-apples]’.345 In my view, the narrative allows both possibilities, and Yahweh’s 
involvement might be seen as a ratification of Rachel’s exchange in an instance of what 
Yairah Amit has described as ‘dual causality’.346
Two Perspectives on Gn 29:31-30:24
\
Much as the above reading may resemble an exercise in deduction appropriate to 
a detective story, one cannot deny that many elements of 29:31-30:24 present a 
challenge to interpretation. The text bears witness to a structural tension between the 
bvo conflicting narrative attitudes that are found elsewhere in the Jacob narrative, the 
institutional and the individual. These two attitudes overlap in the story of the contest 
between Rachel and Leah, presenting different levels of narrative causality or 
configuration. It is worth considering each configurative strand more closely.
From the institutional perspective, the main point of the contest between 
Jacob’s wives is to produce the twelve fathers of the Israelite tribes, and the rivalry 
between Rachel and Leah is a perfect means of escalating the process of child­
bearing.347 Within this process women present themselves as acting subjects, entitled to
344 Efcxum, Fragmented Women, pp.123-4; for a similar view see also Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 248.
34« ^ estermann> Genesis 12-36, p. 476.
Yairah Amit, ‘The Dual Causality Principle and Its Effects on Biblical Literature’, VT 37 (1987), pp.
385-400.
For a presentation of patriarchal strategies in conjugal narratives see Fuchs, Sexual Politics, pp. 1 lb- 
76.
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manipulate all available means to ensure the patrilineal continuity that leads, in the case 
of Leah and Rachel, to a profusion of offspring, the outcome privileged by patriarchy. 
This is congruous with the social conventions operating in the world of the narrative, for 
despite the central importance of patrilineal descent, all the responsibility for producing 
and bringing up offspring lies with mothers. Exum holds a similar view when she 
considers the domestic sphere as one place where women can exercise authority of their 
own, seeing the ‘hiring’ of Jacob by Leah in 30:14-16 as an instance where such 
authority is demonstrated.348 In fact, the entire account of the contest between Rachel 
and Leah gives one an impression of women’s indisputable rule in Jacob’s household, 
where only the names of Leah’s children betray the husband’s superior position.. Fuchs 
sees in it a patriarchal strategy, which minimises to the point of passivity the role of the 
husband in matters of procreation, although, in the end, it is he and not his wives who is 
perpetuated through the ensuing lineage. By setting the women up against each other, 
the narrator ‘incriminates the victims of the contest rather than the husband, who is in 
the final analysis the cause of their mutual rivalry’. 349 In this way the institution 
exploits the women, making them engage in a fight that has no winners, and in which 
their conformity to the patriarchal stereotype is to be their only reward.
Jacob, however, does not, entirely fit into this institutional scheme. Though the 
overall ideology of the narrator makes him the ultimate beneficiary in the domestic 
conflict, his individual goals as a character seem to be directed elsewhere. The time 
during which his wives wrestle, building up his house, is, from his point of view, the 
extra time he serves Laban for Rachel. From what the narrative lets us know, the desire 
to have the ‘right’ wife -  the wife whose betrothal is modelled on that of his mother -  
and to obtain a son by her remains at the top of Jacob’s personal agenda. This is also 
implied in the fact that the birth of Joseph is followed by Jacob’s ‘giving notice’ to 
Laban in 30:25, as if all Jacob waited for in Haran was for Rachel to have a child. That 
the rest of Jacob’s children are bom on the way to achieving this goal results not from 
Jacob’s immediate choices, but from the dysfunctional, bigamous character of his 
marriage. For it is through the presence of Leah in the family that the institution stages 
its continuous reprisal on Jacob, and through it Jacob becomes invested with a role he 
has not sought. This is why neither Leah nor Bilhah and Zilpah, no matter how 
productive they might be, could fulfil Jacob’s need of progeny.
348 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 137.
349 Fuchs, Sexual Politics, p. 154.
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The individual motivation in the narrative conflicts with its institutional goals in 
such a way that Jacob is not able to father the desired descendant until the formation of 
the house of Israel is complete. Even then, as has been argued above, it is possible that 
Jacob fathers Joseph only through the mediation of his first-born son Reuben. As for 
Rachel, she is the one who is responsible for ensuring that the favoured descent can take 
place. Like Rebekah and Sarah before her, Rachel is an agent of matrilineal succession, 
through which the chosen lineage is reckoned. And though, from the point of view of 
patriarchy, all the sons of Jacob are equally incorporated into the house of Israel, 
Jacob’s individual preference for Rachel’s first-born son will still be acknowledged, 
forming a complication in another extended narrative (‘Israel loved Joseph more than 
any other of his sons, because he had been bom to him in his old age’, 37:3). In the 
subsequent story of Genesis 37-50, a considerable narrative space is devoted to Joseph, 
where he will plays the special role of preserving the entire clan. In this way, the 
narrative validates the individual perspective centred on Jacob’s love. A trace of 
institutional disapproval remains in the fact that in Israel’s collective memory Joseph 
will be replaced by his sons, Ephraim and Manasseh, who instead of their father will be 
assigned places in the tribal structure of the nation (1 Chr 7:14-29).
The Father’s Gods and th e ‘Way of Women’
In keeping with the rules of patriarchy, the daughters of Laban never confront 
their father while they are still in his house. The position of Jacob, their husband, is 
compromised because of his enslavement and Laban remains the real head of the 
household. When Jacob receives God’s command to return to the land of his fathers, he 
takes Rachel and Leah ‘into the field where his flock was’ (31:4). That is, he takes them 
out of their father’s house into the open plain, which is temporarily ‘his’, since his 
flocks are grazing there. One might see here a parallel between Jacob’s flock, which he 
has already ‘removed’ from Laban’s possession, and his wives, whom he is yet to 
remove from their father’s household. It is significant that Jacob seeks his wives’ 
consent in making a transition. While they remain in Haran, Rachel and Leah represent 
the mother’s lineage that is yet to be absorbed into the patrilineal identity of the Subject. 
But in 3:15 Jacob’s wives see themselves as already separated from their father, which
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suits the interests of the Subject (‘Does he [Laban] not regard us as foreigners?’, 31:15). 
For Exum, their speech signifies the passing over of the women and their children from 
their father’s control to that of the husband, and through it, a denial of the importance of 
matrilineal descent.350 To achieve this transition would also complete Jacob’s task set 
* by Isaac in Gn 28:2, namely, acquiring a wife from the family of Jacob’s mother and the 
parentage of Abraham, whose descendants would be his rightful successors in his 
father’s land.
After the joint decision to leave Haran, Jacob and his family set off for Canaan, 
the land of his father (Gn 31:17-18). But the situation is not yet resolved, for they are 
not free to go without a formal settlement. Thus the text straightaway indicates the 
dubious character of their departure by linking it to a double act of theft in 31:19-20.
Rachel reinforces her breaking free from her father’s house by stealing his 
household idols, frajnm  (Gn 31:19). The text also reports that Laban is not in the house 
at the time. Here, as Fuchs rightly remarks, the two clauses that make up v. 19 disrupt 
the flow of the narrative, focused otherwise on Jacob’s flight: ‘Laban had gone to shear 
his sheep, and Rachel stole her father’s household gods’. In this syntactic combination 
of Laban and Rachel, Fuchs sees a parallel between them as deceivers, the daughter 
having inherited her father’s fundamental characteristic.351 Apart from this metaphoric 
association, the link between the two clauses, according to Fuchs, is simply 
circumstantial, the report about Laban’s absence in v. 19 explaining how it was possible 
for Rachel to steal the idols.352 351 would object to Fuchs’s reading of Laban in 31:19 as a 
deceiver, parallel to Rachel. In this instance, the text focuses on Laban as paterfamilias, 
a head of the household whose authority is challenged by the two parallel acts of theft 
described in w . 19 and 20. Rachel’s theft anticipates the analogous action of Jacob, and 
it is to him, not Laban, that she is paralleled as a deceiver; while Rachel stole (tignob) 
her father’s gods, Jacob ‘stole (yignob) the heart of Laban the Aramean by not telling 
him he was running away’ (v. 20). In fact, the clause about Laban’s absence in v. 19 
seems to relate to both acts of stealing. The stylistic presentation of Laban in both cases
350 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 117.
351 Fuchs, ‘“For I Have the Way of Women”: Deception, Gender, and Ideology in Biblical Narrative \  in 
J. Cheryl Exum and Johanna W. H. Bos (eds.) Reasoning with the Foxes: Female Wit in a World o f  Male 
Power (Semeia, 42; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), p. 71.
352 Fuchs, “‘For I Have the Way of Women”’, p. 71.
353 Fishbane points out the parallelism between the two acts of stealing and suggests that ‘in this theft o f 
the objects of family blessing Jacob, the trickster... has married his match’ (‘Composition and Structure’, 
P- 31).
173
seems to indicate the scope of each conflict. The fact that Rachel’s opponent is ‘her 
father’ suggests that the object of her quest belongs within the limits of the household, 
whereas in Jacob’s case, his adversary is described formally as ‘Laban the Aramean’, 
which stresses Jacob’s impending separation from his uncle and introduces a ‘national’ 
dimension into their dispute. The wife and her husband each seem to have their own 
individual contest with Laban, and, following the order of their presentation, the wife’s 
quest takes precedence.
So what is the nature of Rachel’s quest and what are her motives in stealing 
Laban’s idols? It appears that Rachel’s characterisation throughout the narrative 
provides some important clues as to her station vis-à-vis her father. From the moment 
when Rachel first appears on stage (29:9-10), the narrative puts a particular emphasis on 
the link between her and her father. First, the shepherds introduce her to Jacob as 
Laban’s daughter (29:6). In fact, the announcement of Rachel’s approach is linked to 
the report about Laban’s well-being, as if it were its proof or demonstration: ‘He is well 
(sàlóm), and see, here is Rachel his daughter coming with the sheep’. This syntactic link 
puts Rachel in the position of an agent or representative of her father, the one 
epitomising his welfare and in charge of his flocks. It is in her capacity as representing 
Laban, his mother’s brother, that Jacob kisses Rachel in v. 11, and it is this role that she 
plays when she runs to inform her father of Jacob’s arrival. The association of Rachel 
with the flock, reflected in her name (rahèl, ‘ewe’) and in her characterisation as rd ‘ah, 
‘shepherd’ (29:9) also points to her special function in her father’s household. At this 
stage, nothing indicates Rachel’s inferior status as the younger daughter; her 
representational function is not limited or qualified, for the narrator here withholds all 
information about Leah or indeed about the sons of Laban, mentioned in passing in 
31:1.
This initial clue to Rachel’s identity is fully exploited in the next scene, where 
Laban tricks Jacob into servitude, using Rachel as bait (29:14-30). Here Rachel is a 
means to further her father’s goals, that is, increasing his flocks or, in the words of 29:6, 
his well-being. Her function of shepherd is relinquished, for it is now taken over by 
Jacob. From being her father’s daughter she becomes her husband’s wife; on the other 
hand, she still lives under her father’s roof, and her husband is enslaved to her father. 
Laban remains the main patriarchal authority over Jacob’s household for as long as the
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family lives in Haran. The double theft symbolises the separating from that authority of 
those who have been bound by it the most.
As in the case of the dudci ’im, the exact function of the frdjnm  is not clear. The 
Hebrew word frapim  is usually translated as ‘household gods’, understood to be figures 
of the deities protecting a family and worshipped by it. 354 Karel van der Toom also 
suggests a possibility that these sacred figurines were associated with ancestral cults.355 
As images of the ancestors, they would represent the family’s origins; they would be 
honoured and consulted in divination. This last function of the frdjnm  is attested in the 
Hebrew Bible: in the Deuteronomist’s condemnation of idolatry in 1 Sam 15:23, the use 
of household gods is put together with the practice of divination; likewise, the religious 
reform of Josiah eradicates mediums together with frdgim  and idols as their sacred 
objects (2 Kg 23:24). However, the narrative of Rachel’s theft and deception (Gn 31:19, 
33-35) does not mention her intending to consult the figurines about the future; in fact, 
the text is silent as regards Rachel’s motivation.356
The reader has already encountered a similar case of Rachel’s motives being 
suppressed in the duda’im narrative (30:14-16). Fuchs argues that this reticence in 
relation to Rachel’s motives results from the narrator’s underlying strategy of 
representing negatively women whose actions do not accord with the purposes of 
patriarchy. One part of this negative approach is the narrator’s discriminating treatment 
of male and female deception, which creates the impression that deceptiveness is a 
feature common to women. Comparing the literary presentations of Jacob, Laban and 
Rachel, all of whom deceive their opponents in the course of one narrative, Fuchs 
recognises three major strategies unique to the story of Rachel’s theft: suppressed 
motivation of the character, suspended authorial judgment, and the absence of 
closure.357
354 For a discussion of different views on the significance of the frajrim see Wenham, Genesis 16-50, pp. 
273-74.
355 See Karel van der Toom, ‘The Nature o f the Biblical Teraphim in the Light o f the Cuneiform 
Evidence’, CBQ 52 (1990), pp. 203-22.
356 Zakovitch (‘Through the Looking Glass’, p. 141) maintains that the fragim  are used for divination on 
the basis of textual evidence from outside Genesis (Ezek 21:26; Zech 10:2) as well as following the 
parallelism between Rachel’s theft and the staged theft o f Joseph’s goblet in Genesis 44. In the Joseph 
narrative, the goblet is explicitly used for divination (44:5, 15). Exum mentions divination as a possible 
explanation of Rachel’s motives, though admits that if, in taking the idols, Rachel intended to prevent 
Laban from divining the family’s route of escape, her plan fails, for Laban still manages to find them 
(Fragmented Women, pp. 134-35).
357 Fuchs, “ ‘For I Have the Way of Women’” , p.70.
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There appears to be room for discussion regarding whether or not all clues to 
Rachel’s motivation have been suppressed. The larger context of the episode suggests 
two possible interpretations. First, in removing the sacred and symbolic objects from 
her father’s house, she might be driven by the wish to retaliate against her father who 
deprived her of her rightful status as Jacob’s only wife. Second, more practically, the 
“ f  ragim could represent patriarchal blessing and inheritance.358 The fact that Leah does 
not participate in the theft makes it more specific to Rachel’s situation, against 
Steinberg’s suggestion that, by stealing the fragim, Rachel is ‘settling Laban’s debt for 
her and Leah’.359 Rachel’s action in Gn 31:19 must be set in the context of what the 
reader already knows about her motivation, which has been to achieve precedence over 
Leah through her son(s). In this light, Nancy Jay’s view that Rachel here seeks to 
establish the proper matrilineal descent through Joseph appears most plausible.360 The 
image of Rachel who wants to possess ‘her father’s gods’ to ensure the precedence of 
her first-bom son Joseph over his elder half-brothers fits well into the theme of rivalry 
over succession that underlies all the narratives of the patriarchs and parallels, in 
particular, Jacob’s stealing of the blessing from his brother Esau in Genesis 27. In the 
absence of the male head of the household, Rachel, the younger daughter and the second 
wife, one with the least entitlement to any institutional succession, simultaneously 
challenges patriarchal authority and claims power and status for herself and her son.
When Laban apprehends Jacob and his family in their flight and starts searching 
for the idols, Rachel sits on them, and refuses to rise in front of her father, saying that 
‘the way of women’ is upon her (31:35). The expression derek nasim is usually 
understood as a euphemism for menstruation, which Rachel supposedly lies about in 
order to hide her theft. Whether or not Rachel is really menstruating is not, however, 
crucial. In either case, the ritual impurity she refers to is not the real reason for her not 
to be able to rise in front of Laban. What is important here, as Exum observes, is that 
Rachel ‘uses male fear or respect for a uniquely female condition to gain power over a
358
Fishbane, Text and Texture, p. 56. The evidence from the archives o f Nuzi supports the idea that 
fragim  symbolised family status and normally belonged to the paterfamilias (see Sama, Understanding 
Genesis.- The Heritage o f  Biblical Israel (New York: Schocken Books, 1966), p. 201).
3fio Steinberg, Kinship and Marrige in Genesis, p. 107.
Nancy Jay, Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and Paternity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 106-7.
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man’.361 362From this perspective, Rachel’s words communicate a powerful statement of 
womanhood and a disregard for patriarchal authority.
Reading ‘the way of the women’ as menstruation is not, however, the only 
possible interpretation. Rachel’s statement has many levels of meaning. For Fewell and 
Gunn, ‘the way of women’ refers to motherhood, which patriarchy constructs as an 
ultimate mark of Otherness. By saying that she ‘can no longer show deference to her 
father’, Rachel might be suggesting that she now has other, more important loyalties, 
that is her new loyalties as mother, the loyalties she demonstrates by stealing the idols
' i f . ' y
as a status symbol for her son.
Along similar lines, Jacqueline Lapsley distinguishes many voices in Rachel’s 
speech. She reveals the hidden polemic of the statement, which on the surface refers to 
the codes of ritual purity, but at a deeper level communicates Rachel’s resistance against 
the patriarchal structures, derek nasim, which is an unusual way to denote a woman’s 
period in the Hebrew Bible, receives an additional meaning in the patriarchal context of 
Rachel’s utterance. In that context, as Lapsley points out, ‘the way of women’ is 
invariably perceived as ‘not the way of men’, or as the way of the Other, and by 
associating herself with it, Rachel challenges the structures of (male) power that deny 
her fulfilment of her ambitions.363 By saying that the way of women is upon her, Rachel 
indicates her ‘unofficial, unsanctioned means of getting justice’: having been excluded 
from inheritance, she steals it.364 Rachel’s deception, which Fuchs interprets as part of 
the androcentric strategy condemning women, is seen by Lapsley as a sign of female 
resistance and critique.
There is yet another level of meaning that potentially undermines the subversive 
character of Rachel’s speech. Saying that she cannot rise (qum) in front of her father, 
she might also be pointing to the fact that, in the male-dominated world of the 
patriarchal narrative, ‘the way of women’ cannot achieve the same status as, or rise up 
to, ‘the way of men’. The dichotomy of Rachel’s narrative position as one who strives 
for subjectivity and self-expression but is destined to failure, one who can steal the 
inheritance but cannot use it for herself, makes the irony underlying her speech even 
more poignant.
361 Exum, Fragmented Women, p. 138.
362 Fewell and Gunn, Gender, Power, and Promise, p. 79.
363 Jacqueline E. Lapsley, ‘The Voice of Rachel: Resistance and Polyphony in Genesis 31.14-35’, in 
Brenner (ed.), Genesis, pp. 238-42.
364 Lapsley,‘The Voice of Rachel’, p. 243.
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Equally ironic is the death penalty that Jacob issues in 31:32, saying to Laban, 
‘the one with whom you find your gods shall not live’. It is not clear whether Rachel 
heard Jacob speak, but the reader’s understanding of the story is affected by the hinted 
equation between the frajnm  and death. The fact that they are not found with Rachel 
does not take away the allusion to death any more than Rachel’s giving birth to sons 
'  does with respect to her statement in 30:1. Whether she herself weighs her life against 
fertility (‘give me children or I’ll die!’, 30:1), or has her life balanced against her 
father’s idols (31:32), each time the narrative announces an implicit failure in her quest. 
That failure will become apparent with Rachel’s premature death in 35:16-20. This 
brings to the fore the tragic determinism of her situation. Rachel is condemned whatever 
she tries, despite her beauty, resourcefulness, and strength, and despite her being one of 
the most real and distinct characters among all the cast of the Jacob story. Or, perhaps, it 
is because of her striking individuality that the favourite wife of Jacob does not survive 
to the end: this story can have only one hero. Rachel’s destiny is inscribed within her 
narrative function, which is to be an agent of the narrative judgement on Jacob, and, 
although she can raise her voice in front of her husband (30:1), she cannot emancipate 
herself from her secondary position. Too strong a character to keep a quiet existence 
behind the scenes like Leah, Rachel has to die so that Jacob may complete his own 
journey. |
Accordingly, with her last breath, she names the child ben-’oni, ‘son of my 
sorrow’ (35:18). Through that name she recapitulates, together with the pain of 
childbirth that is killing her, her tragic story. A striking parallel arises between this last 
utterance and her first words in 30:1, addressed to Jacob. There, Rachel wanted children 
to the point of death; here, she has her wish granted, but she dies nevertheless. Rachel’s 
narrative programme, like that of Leah before her, ends in a failure, and Rachel protests 
it through the name of her son.
But Rachel is not allowed to inscribe her sorrow in the patriarchal history. Jacob 
renames the son with a more suitable name, binyamin, ‘son of the right hand’, thus 
overriding the expression of Rachel’s immediate and personal experience with a 
general, schematic name that alludes to power and masculinity. Here, as in 30:1-2, 
Jacob denies Rachel the right to communicate her own perspective.
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Forms of Binary Relationships in the Jacob Narrative
The structural tension between Father and Mother that permeates the Jacob 
narrative translates itself at the level of specific male and female characters. Here the 
patriarchs control all the initial and final situations, and the function of the feminine is 
to mediate, to effect transformations without ever participating in the final balance of 
power. This principle is clearly demonstrated by looking at the patterns of relationships 
in the story, and in particular, at the character of Rachel and her relationship with Jacob.
It is not surprising that this narrative based on opposition and conflict abounds in 
binary relationships. In such relationships, the choices and motives of the Subject are 
shaped by the presence of the Other and through the interaction with the Other. When 
one considers the patterns of relationships between paired or contrasted characters in the 
Jacob cycle, it is possible to distinguish among them two different forms of binarity.
The Subject vis-à-vis the Twin: Antagonistic Relationship
In this relationship the initial equality is stressed, exemplified in the pair of the 
twin brothers, Jacob and Esau. The Hebrew term ’ah, ‘brother’, communicates the idea 
of sameness and affinity as well as difference. A brother is someone like me, but not 
myself. The equality of coming from the same womb, or even more, of sharing the same 
womb in the case of twins, purports their essential parity. This parity makes the 
opposition between them even more striking. Starting with their struggle in the mother’s 
womb in the opening scene of 25:22, Jacob and Esau undergo a gradual process of 
differentiation, which leads them through the experiences of deception, theft, anger, 
fear, exile, to reconciliation and the final establishment of boundaries. Constituting the 
main story line of the Jacob cycle, this process gives the narrative its structure and 
thrust.
The other pair of characters that exhibits the structural characteristics of the 
Subject-Twin type of relationship is Rachel and Leah, the two sisters who become 
Jacob’s co-wives. Being daughters of the same father and wives of the same husband, 
they are nevertheless made unequal by the social structures (elder/younger daughter), 
characterisation (fertility/sterility) and attitudes of other characters (love/hate of Jacob). 
As in the case of the twin-brothers, Rachel and Leah’s equality on one level (siblings,
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co-wives) reinforces the opposition on another, to the extent that their dispute 
achieves, at least in the eyes of Rachel, the scale and intensity of the ‘twists of God’.
The Subject in his/her relationship to the Twin typically lays claim to the 
Other’s identity. The Subject (Jacob, Rachel) cannot accept the dichotomy of being with 
the Other, which involves seeing the Other as a subject possessing the equivalent 
“ existential freedom. Instead, both Jacob and Rachel attempt to assume the identity of 
their opponents and to take up all the existential space in the story. This relational 
model is typified in the Hebrew Bible by Cain’s attitude towards Abel (Gn 4:1-16), the 
attitude that leads the eldest brother to the total elimination of his Twin.
v The Subject craves everything that belongs to the Twin: Jacob strives for the 
status and the blessing of the first-bom, and Rachel yearns for her sister’s fertility. It is a 
peculiarity of the Jacob story that the character of the Twin is endowed with a superior 
institutional standing (bekor, bekirah), whereas the narrative favours the Subject whose 
status is inferior and whose importance derives from his/her individual quest.
Despite the strong structural parallels between the two antagonistic pairs, the 
conflict in each case ends in a different way. The opposition between Jacob and Esau is 
resolved, and the two brothers achieve reconciliation in Genesis 33, where Jacob’s 
lengthy preparations to meet his brother and his ritual-like welcome lead to the 
symbolic return of the stolen b'lessing in 33:11. In this way, the main storyline is 
■ rounded off, with no less narrative space given to the account of the brothers’ 
reconciliation than was alotted to the story of their conflict.
Nothing like this is found in the case of female Subject/Twin opposition. 
Lapsley observes that in the patriarchal narratives as well as generally in ancient 
Israelite culture ‘women do not participate in the form of negotiation that brings about 
reconciliation’.366 For the women involved, there are no boundaries established, no 
apologies issued, no relationship formed beyond that of rivalry. The story of the sisters’ 
‘twists of God’ has no resolution. As characters, both of them disappear from the stage 
without comment: first, Leah, when she quietly merges with her role of mother, having 
failed to attract her husband; next, Rachel, when she dies prematurely, despite her final
5 Fuchs makes a similar observation. Comparing the confrontation between the two sisters to that 
between Sarah and Hagar, she finds that ‘the power relations between Rachel and Leah are more 
balanced, which exacerbates the rivalry between them. ...What Leah wins through reproductive 
performance, Rachel nearly outweighs through sexual appeal’ (Fuchs, Sexual Politics, p. 162).
66 Lapsley,‘The Voice of Rachel’, p. 236.
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success in becoming a mother. The binary opposition between female characters is not 
developed fully because it is subordinate to the androcentric plot.
The Subject vis-à-vis the Double: Parallel Relationship
The character of Rachel, among all the protagonists of the Jacob story, is 
structurally unique. Her narrative identity unfolds on two distinct planes, both of which 
present different degrees of opposition between the characters. The first opposition 
develops along the lines of Subject versus the Twin; the second, Subject versus the 
Double. In the first form of binary relationship Rachel is the Subject who defines herself 
through the conflict with the Twin, her sister Leah. In the second form of opposition 
Rachel is the Double, in other words the character who shadows the main Subject, her 
husband Jacob.
The many similarities between Jacob and his favourite wife have been 
acknowledged in the scholarly literature. Fokkelman calls Rachel a ‘true Jacoba, related 
by nature to Jacob’.367 Pardes describes Rachel’s narrative programme as a counterplot 
that ‘mirrors’ the primary plot of Jacob. 368 Like Jacob, Rachel is the younger sibling, 
deprived of status, arid, like him, she strives to acquire it. Both of them are resourceful 
and determined, both are engaged in a confrontation with their rival (Twin). Both of 
them, as Fishbane observes, ‘deceive their fathers and flee from home’, having 
appropriated the patriarchal blessing and inheritance.369 At the end of their stay in 
Haran, they are put alongside each other, committing parallel thefts (Gn 31:19-20).
In the episode with the frapjm  in 31:33-35, Rachel’s behaviour imitates that of 
her husband. Rachel steals and hides her father’s idols (31:33-35), matching Jacob’s 
stealing of his father’s blessing in Genesis 27.370 On the lexical level, Fishbane observes 
the use of the verb màsas, ‘to feel’, in both episodes: Laban ‘feels’ for the idols in 
Rachel’s tent (Gn 31:34, 37), similar to Isaac feeling Jacob’s hands in 27:22. In both 
cases, the action characterises the father as a man who cannot see clearly. The lack of 
sight and perception undermines the authority of the father and allows his son/daughter 
to remove the symbols of patriarchal succession. By stealing the idols, Rachel claims
367 Fokkelman, Narrative Art in Genesis, p. 163; see also Fishbane, Text and Texture, p. 56.
368 Pardes, Countertraditions in the Hebrew Bible, pp. 73-75.
369 Fishbane, Text and Texture, p. 56.
370 Fishbane, Text and Texture, p. 56; see also Wenham, Genesis 16-50, p. 268.
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something of the same nature as the blessing of Isaac. Only, in her case, the bid for 
status is more daring than that of Jacob, for she has been doubly deprived of it, first, as 
the younger daughter, and second, as a woman. The misappropriation of status holds in 
itself the danger of death, and both successful deceivers have to experience this threat. 
Thus, Jacob, despite his new position of power, has to flee from his brother who seeks
" to kill him, and Rachel’s death will come as a delayed outcome of her theft.
What is the function of this marked parallelism? Indeed, what is the narrator’s 
purpose in introducing another Subject, subordinate to the first and bearing such a close 
resemblance to it? In this story the Subject’s journey, like a play of mirrors, seems to 
generate multiple reflections revealing different aspects of narrative identity. Zakovitch 
calls this type of narrative a ‘reflection story’. In such a story, the narrator shapes a 
‘character, or his or her actions, as the antithesis of a character in another narrative and 
that character’s actions’.371 According to Zakovitch, this technique is used to guide the 
reader in evaluating characters. However, it appears to me that narrative parallelism 
functions at a deeper level than that of ethical evaluation. Rather, reflection stories seem 
to redress the structural balance in the story; they manifest its inner thematic 
connections and causal links, and, on the whole, together with other forms of 
intertextuality, reveal a narrative world where everything is a sign of everything else.
While the Subject and hissDouble display many parallel features, they still stand 
in opposition to each other. Their binarity is based on the same complementary 
opposition between Male and Female that governs the metaphors of father’s and 
mother’s land. Rachel continues the mother's strand in the story, epitomizing all the 
features of the feminine known to the biblical narrator: her meeting with Jacob at the 
Well, her beauty, the love of her husband for her, her initial sterility, and her 
shrewdness, all these features associate her with Jacob’s mother Rebekah and single her 
out as the one who continues the matriarchal succession. Like Rebekah who once took 
the place of Isaac’s mother in Sarah’s tent (24:67), Rachel takes the place of Jacob’s 
mother in his mother’s land.
It seems significant that Rachel’s role as a character is restricted to the area 
outside the promised land (she dies almost as soon as the family has reached Canaan in 
Genesis 35). She is Jacob’s Shadow, confined to Haran, the realm of the mother, the 
shadow-land of the story. Her function in the story is determined by her belonging to 
what is for Jacob the other side of the looking glass, and is to reflect and invert the
, , 371 Zakovitch, ‘Through the Looking Glass’, p. 139.
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narrative identity of the Subject. This is seen clearly in 29:22-26, where Rachel, the 
younger daughter, symbolically representing Jacob, is passed over in favour of the elder 
daughter, Leah, who represents Esau.
Rachel’s personal tragedy seems to be a direct reversal of Jacob’s success. 
While Jacob is the chosen heir to the promise, blessed and prosperous, his beloved wife 
stays unblessed (sterile) for a long time, and when she finally gives birth to sons, the 
very childbirth she has longed for brings her death (Gn 35:16-20). For Pardes, Rachel’s 
narrative programme has to fail because, as a subordinate female counterplot, its 
function is to serve the primary plot centred on the male subject. As a female character, 
Rachel serves Jacob’s symbolic transformation and therefore cannot shape her own 
programme, fulfil her own ambitions. On the occasions when she ‘goes too far in 
striving to become a subject, like her counterpart,... her voice must be repressed’.372 73
This ambiguous role of Rachel determines the pattern of her relationship with 
Jacob. Whereas Jacob’s changing attitude to Esau brings him to see God in the face of 
his brother (33:10), Rachel’s face for Jacob remains a reflection of his own. Therefore, 
~ if the Subject-Twin relationship moves from confrontation towards association, the 
relationship Subject-Double follows the opposite pattern, changing from unity to 
dissociation. At the beginning the narrator stresses Jacob’s love for Rachel, using the 
word ’ahab three times in the space of twelve verses (29:18,20, 30). And yet, this love 
is allocated a specific, limited place, that is, the sphere of affection is restricted by the 
primary institutional values of status and fertility. The association between the Subject 
and his Double soon begins to crumble, as Jacob’s love turns into anger after Rachel’s 
desperate demand for children (‘and Jacob’s anger flamed at Rachel’ 30:2). Later, 
having left Haran, Jacob unwittingly but effectively sentences her to death, saying to 
Laban, ‘whoever you find your gods with shall not live’ (31:32). The beloved wife of 
Jacob is not allowed to be brought to the land ‘where Abraham and Isaac dwelt’ 
(35:27): she dies in childbirth and the pillar that Jacob erects over her tomb conveys the 
final character of his dissociation from his Double.374 But this dissociation also signals 
the end of Jacob’s story. With the feminine presence in the myth gone, the Subject’s
372 Pardes, Countertraditions in the Hebrew Bible, p. 75-77.
373 Pardes, Countertraditions in the Hebrew Bible, p. 74.
374 In a recent article, Benjamin D. Cox and Susan Ackerman examine the reasons why Rachel is buried 
in a road-side grave and not in the ancestral tomb at Machpehah like all the other tnatriarchs. They 
conclude, on the basis of anthropological evidence from other cultures, that the reason for it lies in the 
particular manner of her death -  in childbirth -  which is deemed polluting (‘Rachel’s Tomb’, JBL 128 
(2009), pp. 135-148).
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journey is over. The story of Jacob and Rachel demonstrates the general pattern of 
dissociation that characterizes the Male-Female opposition in the Hebrew narrative, 
where love stories do not have happy endings.
From a psychoanalytic point of view, Rachel’s symbolic role is to represent a 
repressed part of the Subject associated with his misdeeds. In this light, Jacob’s gradual 
“ dissociation from his Double could be seen as a process of semiotic ‘cure’ that the 
patriarchal psyche undergoes in the mother’s land. By burying his Double, the patriarch 
symbolically buries the part of his identity that is problematic to the narrative 
consciousness (his character as thief and deceiver) and thus ‘clears’ himself of all 
charges. Rachel’s death is a necessary part in the process whereby the Subject casts off 
his identity of ya "qob and becomes Israel. In this new capacity, he becomes capable of 
returning to the land of his fathers, where the narrative resumes its institutional 
framework. Yet the seed of the narrative resistance to the institution that was associated 
with Rachel will be distinguishable in the patriarch’s subversive preference for his 
younger sons Joseph and Benjamin, both sons of Rachel (37:3; 42:4). The individual 
strand in the narrative will persist, and Jacob’s love for Joseph will trigger the conflict 
in the next generation of the patriarchs, which will lead to the family’s move to Egypt 
and the setting of stage for the exodus and the birth of Israel as a nation.
It could be said by wayv of conclusion that the Jacob narrative validates the 
feminine as the area of Otherness at the level of a general metaphor as well as that of a 
specific character. The story owes its depth and complexity to the structural tension 
between the crucial role of the feminine as a fundamental constituent of identity and its 
narrative representation as a subordinate reality that never quite rises to the status of the 
Subject. In his study of Genesis 2-3 Jobling observed that structural methods of 
exegesis have a potential, almost fully unexploited, for furthering the programme of 
feminist biblical exegesis.375 The analysis of binary structures in the narrative of Gn 
25:19-37:1 shows just how rich that potential can be.
37$
Jobling, The Sense o f  Biblical Narrative, p. 19.
184
Conclusion .
The present study concurs with recent biblical scholarship in recognising the 
fundamental tension between the dominant patriarchal discourse and the subversive 
voices underlying biblical narrative. In this, my enquiry shares ground with feminist 
criticism, which steps outside the dominant ideology of the text, bringing its suppressed 
elements to the surface.376 378The perspective of this study is, however, slightly different, 
inasmuch as it explores the ambiguities created by the andro- and ethnocentric argument 
from the vantage point inside the narrative. To clarify my view, I would refer to 
Jobling’s suggestion to ‘accept the Bible as everywhere patriarchal, but as everywhere 
expressive, for that very reason, of the bad conscience that goes along with trying to 
make sense of patriarchalism’. I would add that this bad conscience comes, for the 
most part, with some degree of resistance and an attempt at compensation that the 
narrative makes in response to the created imbalance. At a deeper level, this tension 
could be examined in terms of the opposition between the Subject and the Other.
In Julia Kristeva’s theory of subjectivity, the subject is viewed as a dynamic 
signifying process, an unstable identity that is ‘constantly called into question, brought 
to trial, over-ruled’. The ever-changing boundaries of this identity are shaped by the 
subject’s continuous abjection of what is different and threatening to the existing 
order.379 Applying Kristeva’s model of the ‘subject in process’ to the narratives of 
Genesis,380 one distinguishes here two processes of signification that run alongside each 
other, namely, the construction of the androcentric Subject that starts in the garden 
narrative, and the formation, in the stories of the patriarchs, of the ethnocentric Subject 
of Israel. In both cases, unified subjectivity is perceived in relation to an over against 
the Other, represented respectively as female and foreign identity.
376 Exum describes her approach as a feminist reader as ‘stepping outside the ideology o f the text and 
reading against the grain’ {Plotted, Shot, and Painted, p. 89; see also Fragmented Women, p. 9).
377 Jobling, The Sense o f  Biblical Narrative II, p. 43. Jobling’s view reflects a widespread position of 
feminist critics.
378 Julia Kristeva, ‘A Question of Subjectivity: Interview with S. Sellers’, in Women’s Review 12 (1986), 
p. 19.
79 Julia Kristeva, The Powers o f  Horror: An Essay on Abjection (trans. L.S. Roudiez; New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 4.
380 As it was mentioned above, Exum has used the concept of abjection to illuminate the formation of the 
subject in the story of Hagar (see ‘Hagar en procès', pp. 1-16).
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In Genesis 2-3 the unified discourse is epitomised by the central character of 
ha’adam, who simultaneously occupies two structural planes: one, as a general 
representation of humankind, and the other, gendered as male. In the double logic of the 
plot, ha ’adam can only emerge as a complex Subject in possession of knowledge and in 
a relationship with the earth with the help of woman, the transforming and therefore 
»threatening Other to whom the narrator attributes both the agency and the blame.
In Genesis 12-36 the unified identity inherent in hd’adam is represented in a 
sequence of patrilineal genealogies that convey the idea of totality and continuity of the 
male Subject. Narrative identity, however, cannot be built through genealogical 
accounts. To become a Subject, Israel needs a story, an instance of symbolic 
communication, through which it can draw its significance in relation to the world. At 
the level of female subjectivity, this story starts with the image of the sterile mother 
(Sarah), which interrupts genealogical continuity and demonstrates' the need of the 
gendered Other. At the level of national representation, the narrative Self of Israel 
begins by establishing itself over against the other nations, which it has to ‘abject’ in 
order to become a separate, or holy, that is, ‘set apart’ people (Ex 19:6). To become a 
chosen nation, Israel needs the Other, the non-chosen.
The Other, therefore, has to be bom, and, because the Subject is total, it can be 
bom only out of the Subject. Iq the garden narrative, the Other is taken out of the 
Subject’s body, separated from it, and at once becomes subordinated to its needs 
(woman as ‘helper’). In a similar way, the narrative of the ethnogenesis of Israel time 
after time derives foreign identity from the members of the patriarch’s family.381 To be 
able to define itself over against the Other, the Subject first needs to construct the Other 
as a split-off, separated part of the Self, as ‘flesh of its flesh’, and only then move on to 
its exclusion. Accordingly, Lot is paralleled to Abraham as a brother and ‘double’, and 
the patriarch shows particular attachment to his nephew (Genesis 14) before the 
definitive separation is effected. Ishmael has to be named and circumcised by Abraham, 
carrying the patriarch’s mark on his flesh and identity, to foreground the significance of 
his expulsion (16:15; 17:23-26). In the Jacob narrative, out of the patriarch’s two
381 The eponymous ancestors of the Moabites, the Ammonites, the Ishmaelites, and the Midianites are all 
close relatives o f Abraham, Edom is associated with Jacob’s brother Esau, and Aram is a descendant of 
Abraham’s brother Nahor. Although Egypt, Canaan and the Philistines are not immediately related to 
Abraham’s parentage, their lineage is traced, incorporated into the account of Israel as a Hamite branch of 
Noah’s posterity and is, therefore, not entirely unconnected (10:6,13-14).
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opponents, from whom he will be formally separated, Esau is his twin-brother, and Lot 
is his uncle, who also calls Jacob his brother and his own flesh (29:14-15).
While the dominant patriarchal discourse aims at the construction of the unified 
Subject -  hâ’âdâm in Genesis 2-3 and Israel in Genesis 12-37 -  the Other in all its 
guises is also constructed, serving the Subject’s need of self-definition and yet always 
threatening, by the very fact of its existence, to slip across the boundaries of identity and 
subvert them. The subversive discourse arises from the structural impossibility to 
construct identity without difference. The Other epitomises difference and subversion, 
has it as its raison d'être. Without it, the story would revert to genealogy.
Incorporated into the overall patriarchal and ethnocentric discourse of Genesis, 
the voices of subversion and difference serve a function within the project of unified 
identity, are subordinated to it. In Genesis 2-3 woman, the gendered Other, 
communicates the knowledge of distinctions to hâ ’âdàm, destabilising his totality-based 
identity. The effects of her agency are incorporated into the Subject’s new identity. She 
is, however, subsumed by the Subject once she has served her task, and her place is 
taken over by the earth, ha “damah, the metaphorical counterpart of hâ 'âdàm.
The Abraham cycle introduces new, national parameters to the Subject. Here, 
the patriarch’s emergent identity as personification of Israel is constructed over against 
Egypt, the powerful pther that cannot be subsumed and therefore has to be rejected. 
Lipton’s idea that the book of Exodus is guided by Israel’s resistance to assimilation 
could be successfully applied to Genesis 12-24.382 As a ‘people who came out of Egypt’ 
(Num 22:5, 11), Israel has to relinquish its memory of the land and the desire to ‘turn 
back’ to it on the one hand, and to deal with the threat of assimilation through 
intermarriages with the Egyptians on the other. The narratives of Lot and Hagar provide 
a semiotic solution to these problems. In these texts, it has been argued above, the 
identity of Egypt is purged from Israel’s self-image through the mechanism of 
projection. The patriarchal Subject symbolically disposes of the desire for the lush and 
fertile land of Egypt by attributing this desire to the character Lot. Since, in the 
collective consciousness of Israel, longing for Egypt is seen as a threat to identity, the 
Subject’s projection leads to the ‘abjection’ of Lot and the obliteration of the land of 
Sodom as the other land and an image of Egypt. At a different level, the threat to the 
patriarch’s descent posed by Egypt is removed through the expulsion of the other 
mother, Hagar the Egyptian, and of the other heir, her son Ishmael. Sarah here occupies
382 Lipton, Longing for Egypt, pp. 13-49.
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a central role as a mediator of dominance, through whom the primacy of Israel is 
asserted.
By projecting its desire and its dominance onto Lot and Sarah, the patriarchal 
consciousness achieves the desired effect (destruction of the other land, expulsion of the 
rival heir) without assuming responsibility for it. However, the very need to project 
•reveals the uneasiness that marks the unifying discourse, shown also in Abraham’s 
apparent displeasure about the destruction of Sodom and the expulsion of Ishmael 
(18:23-32; 21:11). Moreover, the validity of exclusion is thrown into question when the 
Subject, having ‘removed’ the Other, is forced symbolically to expel, eliminate the 
‘only son’, the symbol of the unified Self. The final trial of the Subject in 22:1-19 
makes Abraham re-enact in relation to himself what he has done to the others, and thus 
subverts the idea of identity based on dominance and exclusion. Although, in the end, 
the Self is restored, the trauma of the ‘binding of Isaac’ remains imbedded in the 
narrative consciousness as a price Israel has to pay for its being ‘set apart’.
The Jacob narrative presents a different stage in the construction of the Subject 
that culminates in the patriarch acquiring the name and identity of Israel. Here concerns 
over assimilation are translated into the focus on endogamy, and the Subject establishes 
himself not with respect to other nations, but within the extended patriarchal family. In 
the analysis of the Jacob cycle, I used Levy-Strauss’s structural approach to demonstrate 
how the initial contradiction between Father and Mother unfolds through a series of 
oppositions into a general conflict between the institutional and the individual structural 
perspectives. The difference between the two perspectives does not run along the gender 
divide, as Leah comes to represent institutional values, while Jacob, the future patriarch, 
first appears as a deceiver who destabilises the institution. In his individual quest, Jacob 
is associated with the mother and with the mother’s land, the transformative space 
where he becomes Israel; it is, however, also a place of bondage and exile. In this space, 
Jacob is paralleled to Rachel, upon whom his subversive qualities are projected and 
through whom he is punished for his misdeeds. Through Rachel, the narrative disposes 
of Jacob the deceiver, and then invests him with the new, heroic identity of Israel, the 
one who ‘strived with God and with men and prevailed’.' The name, however, comes 
with a wound (32:25,31), and though the unified, institutional Subject is re-established, 
his new identity as Israel is marked by conflict and alterity.
In the dynamic opposition between the Subject and the Other, the dominant 
Programme is subverted every time the Other emancipates to subjectivity. Woman in
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Genesis 3:6 becomes the garden narrative’s only independent subject who seeks 
experience and understanding. Hagar becomes self-aware and rejects the oppressive 
structures, running away to the desert. Lot’s wife, in the minimal narrative space she 
has, subverts Yahweh’s judgment of Sodom simply by ‘looking back’. Rebekah 
searches for the meaning of her painful pregnancy and uses her knowledge to reverse 
the patriarchal status quo. More than others, Rachel is subversive in both what she says 
and what she conceals. Her reticence in the mandrake episode allows for the possibility 
that she uses Reuben as a surrogate father (30:14-16). In the episode with the stolen 
idols, she communicates her point of view as ‘the way of women’, thus indicating her 
power to confront patriarchy on her own terms. In this she manages, if only briefly, to 
turn the tables, and treats patriarchy as her Other. It is noteworthy that Hagar, Rebekah, 
and Rachel all use emphatically the personal pronoun ’ânôkî, ‘I’, in their speeches, 
drawing attention to their subjectivity (16:8; 25:22; 30:1, 3). Typically, their resistance 
to the patriarchal structures stems from uniquely female conditions. Hagar’s conception 
triggers her flight from her mistress; Rebekah’s pregnancy, interpreted in Yahweh’s 
oracle, leads to her deception of Isaac; and Rachel’s alleged menstruation allows her to 
subvert the authority of her father. The female Other finds her strength in that which 
cannot be taken away from her and which patriarchy both needs and fears, her alterity.
The present study has highlighted the essential similarity between the narrative 
structures mapping out the construction of the Subject in Genesis 2-3 and in Genesis 12- 
36. On the one hand, the basic opposition between the Subject and the Other that 
underlies the narrative imposes a hierarchy of value and significance, where the 
transformation is teleologically subordinated to the patriarchal ethnocentric discourse. 
In the end, the apparent concern guiding the overall composition is that each narrative 
cycle establishes a male genealogical entry in the tôlëdôt of Israel. Yet, on the other 
hand, the Subject in these narratives is both challenged and changed by what the 
hierarchies cannot contain -  the transforming power, the symbolic fecundity of the 
Other. This posits a different kind of teleology that is never explicit, yet, like Yahweh’s 
shadow agenda in Genesis 2-3, is what pushes the narrative forward. For both hâ ’âdâm 
and the patriarchs become who they are through their ambiguous relationship with the 
gendered and political representations of the Other. Whether it is woman as the mother 
of all living, or the fruitful paradise of Egypt, the Other, being repressed, expelled, 
destroyed or punished, remains foundational to Israel’s consciousness.
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